
BRICS and the Evolution of a New Agenda Within Global Governance

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Abstract

The rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the advance of the 2008 global financial crisis have fuelled a fresh round of debate concerning the sustainability of transatlantic norms, ideas and institutions that have dominated global governance since its foundation. Many of the bodies and organisations that help create global governance were developed between 1945 and 1980 and have been dominated by Western actors and a Western agenda. Using role theory, this chapter looks at the rise of the BRICS within the international system and the evolution of a new agenda within global governance, such as the G20, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United Nations.

1 Introduction

It has been longer than a decade since Jim O'Neill (2001) of Goldman Sachs coined the acronym BRIC to refer to Brazil, Russia, India, and the People's Republic of China. With a large and growing share of world GDP, the BRICs have been seen as the vanguard of emerging economies of the global south. Since the lowercase *s* has been replaced by an uppercase *S*, indicating South Africa's membership of BRICS, the group has been seen as both a political and economic challenge to Western domination of the architecture of global governance. The rise of the BRICS and the 2008 global financial crisis have fuelled a new round of debates concerning the sustainability of transatlantic norms, ideas, and institutions, which have dominated global governance. The BRICS are seen to represent a new force in defining the "rules of the games"

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(North 1990) of global governance and have changed the agenda and approach of global institutions.

This chapter looks at the effect of the BRICS on the evolution of a new agenda within global governance. As Lawrence Finkelstein highlighted, “Since the international system notoriously lacks hierarchy and government, the fuzzier word ‘governance’ is used instead” (Finkelstein 1995: 367). Of the term “governance” itself, Finkelstein highlights its lack of definition. He states that, “We say governance because we don’t really know what to call what is going on” (Finkelstein 1995: 368). Thomas Weiss outlines a clearer picture of the term. He states that the word “governance” is employed “to connote a complex set of structures and processes, both public and private” (Weiss 2000: 795). The term “global governance” can refer to a wide number of organisations that help to coordinate international action. It can also refer to a number of international norms that determine how nation states and nongovernmental actors interact with one another. Therefore global governance can be understood at an abstract level as the creation of rules and norms on a global scale by international organizations, which establish “the conditions for ordered rule and collective action” (Stoker 1997: 17). This chapter will look at the effect of the rise of the BRICS on both the rules and norms of global governance, as well as on the international organizations. It will trace the origins of the BRICS and attempt to outline a collective identity among the members. It will then outline if and how the BRICS have affected the development of the agenda within global governance institutions such as the G20, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United Nations.

2 Theoretical Framework

A number of different theories address the rise of powers in international affairs. One of the oldest such theories is the balance of power theory from the realist school of international relations (IR). The underlining principle of this theory is that states will attempt to find equilibrium among one another. Structural realists regard the system as having a tendency toward a natural equilibrium. It is a doctrine and an arrangement whereby the power of one state (or group of states) is checked by the countervailing power of other states. Authors who apply the balance of power theory to the rise of the BRICS, such as Leal-Arcas (2008: 236) and Skak (2011: 4), often posit that emerging powers such as Brazil, Russia, China, and India do not share Western values and therefore ought to be isolated from core global governance until they subscribe to these values. As Stefan A. Schirm (2010) highlights, this argument has several flaws. First, it ignores the substantial differences in interests and ideas within the West—that is, between the United States and continental European countries. In addition, the rivalry argument also ignores that emerging powers like Brazil and India are stable democracies with a strong multilateralist record and, therefore, can hardly be characterised as dominated by differing ideas than those that are prevalent in the West. The same flaws can be applied to other structural theories—such as power transition theory (Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980), long-cycle leadership theory (Modelski 1988), power-cycle theory (Doran 1991), hegemonic stability theory

(Kindleberger 1981) and, from the liberal school, institutionalist regime theory (Krasner 1983)—when they are applied to the BRICS. Thus, applying a purely structural approach to the study of the BRICS cannot help us to understand the role of emerging economies in global governance. To comprehend the rise of the BRICS, there must be a greater focus on the role of the agent in the action of states. Thus, most look to a group of international relations scholars such as Wallerstein (1974) and Gill and Law (1988), who, according to Lake (1993), use an interpretative approach. Collective identification from the constructivist school (Thies 2010a; Wendt 1999; Klotz 1995; Wiener and Puetter 2009) is one of the more cohesive groups within the interpretative approach. Within the constructivist approach, states are differentiated not just based on power, as would be the case in realism, but also according to a state's social role within a given system, which may change over time. Constructivists argue that each state is differentiated by a specific role, and that differentiation constitutes national identity. Over time, the interaction of states (population flows, trade, etc.) might develop some form of collective identity that extends beyond state borders and includes other states or the population of other states. Thus, in situations where there are layers of collective identity, this may include multiple different states and exclude others. Therefore, by developing a “we” group, and, by extension, excluding other states, an alter or other is formed. The best example of this is the development of the European collective identity. In this case, identity does not mean “Who am I?” and “What do I do?” but rather “With whom do I collective identify?” Identity formation is a process of social boundary drawing. It is the creation of the rules and norms of that identity. A state's identity therefore affects how it perceives the world and, thus, its actions in the world. Within this context, social roles are not equal identity. Social roles have a function under a particular context, and they are expected to fulfil that function. Social roles contain normative assumptions about what is appropriate to do, what are the appropriate goals and what are the appropriate actions to achieve those goals. Role theory is a theoretical framework that is committed to the study of behaviour using the notion of “role.” International roles are understood to be social positions (as well as socially recognized categories of actors) constituted by ego and alter expectations regarding the purpose of an actor in an organized group (Thies 2010b: 6336). Roles are created by the combination of an actor's subjective understandings of what its behaviour should be—that is, its role conceptions—and international and domestic society's demands—its role expectations—combined with the particular context in which the role is being acted out. Roles are neither deterministic nor infinitely elastic (Chafetz et al. 1996: 733). They are the categories of behaviour that states, like individuals, rely on to simplify and to help guide themselves through a complex world. Roles provide individual states with a stable sense of identity (Bloom 1991).

This study sits within the constructivist IR framework of role theory (Harnisch 2001; Maull 1990; Stryker and Statham 1985). Taking a single-role assumption,¹

¹ A shared, historically constituted role: The single-role assumption allows us to trace and explain long-term patterns in the foreign policy of the state and identify ideas (discourse) shared even among national politicians with different political preferences in everyday foreign policy making.

this chapter will understand a role expectation to be a balance of the domestic expectations (ego expectations) and the implicit or explicit demands of others (alter expectations). The current self stabilizes both relevant to a current significant other and to its historical self (McCourt 2012). Both the historical self and the current self are conceptual through “ontological security” (Zarakol 2010), which can be defined as the situation in which “an actor has a consistent sense of self by performing actions in order to underwrite his or her notion of ‘who they are’” (ibid: 3). States seek ontological security because they want to maintain consistent self-identity. That self is constituted and maintained through a historical narrative that gives life to routinised foreign policy actions (Steele 2008: 2–3). Maintaining those foreign policy action routines stabilizes a state’s historical narrative, allowing it to protect its historical self. Mitzen argues that a state values these routines because they underwrite a state’s sense of self. Therefore, a state might prioritize routine over other values, even when physical cost is involved, in order to protect its historical self (Mitzen 2006).

In terms of alter expectations, it is important to note that not all others carry the same weight (Shih 2012). This is clearly outlined by Wendt, who stated that “not all others are equally significant, however, so power and dependency relations play important roles in the story” (Wendt 1999: 327). There are tangible and intangible reasons for the selection of significant others: The tangible reasons are an actor’s material extension and resources, while the intangible reasons are notions of the state’s identity and the needs that derive from that identity (Wendt 1999: 328). Therefore, the selection or appearance of significant others in international relations does not happen randomly. The choice or constitution of a significant other is based on past experiences by the role beholder (Harnisch 2001: 12). Domestic expectations are created from foreign policy makers’ perceptions of the outlook of internal actors such as economic elites or other key state supporters among the general population. The influence of public opinion on foreign policy issues (Kaarbo and Cantir 2012), as well as a state’s historical self, is integral to determining domestic expectations.

National role conceptions in this chapter, therefore, refer to an actor’s perception of its position vis-à-vis others (the ego part of the role) and the perception of the role expectations of the others (the alter part of the role) (Elgström and Smith 2006: 5). While role conception is an ego’s own conception of its position and function, the term “role perception” has been introduced to capture the alters’ perceptions. Holsti defines role perceptions as norms, expectations, cultures, societies, institutions, or groups attached to particular positions (Holsti 1970: 239). Therefore, role perceptions emanate from the external environment (Walker and Simon 1987). In the constructivist school of IR theory, role perceptions are intersubjectively shared norms and expectations that form the social structure of the international system.

As an approach to the study of international relations, role theory offers a thick description and does not codify abstract regularities (Walker 1987: 255). The inclusion of role perception in this chapter is the acceptance that roles are institutionalized in social structures (Wendt 1999: 227) and therefore adopt particular epistemological and ontological positions. Carlsnæs (2002: 241) outlines the

epistemological position of the role theory as an interpretative perspective—that is, that role theory produces interpretative knowledge rather than causal explanations offering a thick description (Doty 1993; Walker 1987). For Carlsnæs (2002: 241), the ontological positions of role theory focus on “the reasoning of individual national foreign policy makers”. In foreign policy analysis (FPA), role theory exemplifies the bottom-up individualist interpretative approach, which is concerned with understanding “decisions from the standpoint of the decision makers by reconstructing their reasons” (Hollis and Smith 1990: 74). However, this position does not deal with the intersubjective ideas that come into consideration with the involvement of role perceptions. Therefore, by including role perception, this chapter takes a holistic approach.

3 From BRIC to BRICS

Coined in a 2001 by Jim O’Neill, the author of a Goldman Sachs report entitled “Building Better Global Economic BRICs”, the BRICs refers to the economies and states of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The BRICs economies reflected only a small portion of global GNP in 2001. However, they represented a large portion of the world’s populations and territory. In demographic terms, the BRIC nations include two of the world’s most populated countries. China alone is home to one-fifth of the world’s population and is followed closely by India (17.5 %). Other members of the group—Brazil (2.9 %) and Russia (2.2 %)—also house large populations. The BRIC nations also boast large territories: Russia’s territory is 17 million km²; India’s is 3.2 million km²; China’s, 9.3 million km²; and Brazil’s, 8.5 million km² (UNDP).

Taking these factors into account, the 2001 Goldman Sachs report projected that within 40–50 years, these nations would match and overtake the OECD countries in their economic prowess. The article reported that the BRIC nations had little in common other than the fact that they were all developing nations with significant growth potential. Each member of the grouping had undergone major structural changes in the decades before the creation of the acronym. China had undertaken dramatic economic reforms in the 1980s and again in the early 1990s allowing it to emerge unscathed from the 1998 Asian economic crisis. India had introduced sweeping economic reforms in the early 1990s. In the late 1980s, Brazil had put in place a drastic economic stabilisation plan to reverse hyperinflation and boost privatisation. In the late 1990s, Russia had also started putting structural reforms in place to rebuild its economic status. Despite the fact that each BRIC nation had undertaken structural reforms, the reforms themselves differ dramatically from states to state, both in terms of underlying principles and policy implementation. The BRIC nations, which often had foundationally differently economic and political systems, as well as different cultural contexts and belief systems, shared little in terms of a common identity. It seemed unlikely that Goldman Sachs could create a simple acronym that would generate a new formal or institutional arrangement and affect the evolution of a new agenda within global governance. However,

once the acronym had been created, the idea of an institutionalised BRIC grouping was floated. At that time, there was little movement to formalise the group. From 2001, the BRIC economies continued to gain strength and influence in the global economy.

However, as highlighted by Kristen Hopewell (2015) in the case of the WTO and by Schirm (2010) in the case of the G20, little or no coherent action was taken by the BRIC nations to create and drive a BRIC agenda in global governance. Hopewell (2015) argues that in the case of the WTO, new powers, such as China, India, and Brazil, are challenging the traditional dominance of the United States in the governance of the global economy. However, as Hopewell highlights, the BRICs took different paths to power: While China's rise has been more closely tied to its growing economic might, the rise of Brazil and India has been driven primarily by their mobilization and leadership of developing country coalitions, which enabled them to exercise influence above their economic weight. This has driven the BRIC nations to undertake very different role behaviours within the WTO. Hopewell (2015) identifies that not only have Brazil and India assumed a more aggressive and activist position in WTO negotiations than China, they have also played a greater role in shaping the agenda of the Doha Round. In fact, there are a number of clear political tensions among the BRICs. Brazil has engaged in trade disputes over market access with both Russia and China in its strategy of seeking full liberalisation of agricultural trade. In the WTO Doha trade talks, Brazil clashed with India over India's insistence on protection for its rice farmers. Even at the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009, Russia distanced itself from the other BRICs. Unlike Brazil, China, and India, Russia sides with the Europeans in its support of the Kyoto Protocol. Both in the case of the WTO and the G20, no clear case of a BRIC collective identity has emerged to affect the role behaviour of the BRIC nations. The same is true in the case of global climate change governance. It seems that the BRIC concept does not drive the role of its members but in fact, as Hopewell states, "masks considerable variation in their sources of power and behaviour in global economic governance".

After a long campaign, South Africa was invited to join the BRIC grouping in December 2010, changing the acronym to BRICS. South Africa's economy is much smaller than that of the other four countries. South Africa's GDP is only a third of Brazil's and Russia's GDPs, and a tiny fraction of China's and India's GDPs. South Africa's claims for membership were driven and justified by political rather than economic factors. South Africa, as Africa's only member of the G20, is an important political actor among developing nations. South Africa itself was attempting to gain greater influence in global affairs. Increased influence in global governance is one of the most important aspects of BRICS membership (Keukeleire et al. 2011: 16). As Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing states, its largest economy, South Africa, was seen by the BRIC states as a representative of the entire continent. Other factors that worked in the country's favour include vast natural resources, excellent infrastructure, an established corporate sector, a stable macro and micro financial climate, an advanced banking system, and functioning regulatory frameworks. Creating a collective BRICS

identity becomes even more complex with South Africa's inclusion. South Africa is a democracy with close links to Western economics, and it is seen as a representative of all 54 diverse (politically and economically) nations of Africa. It seems unlikely that South Africa could find a common cause with Brazil, India, Russia, and China to form a common identity.

4 Institutionalising the BRICS

The BRICS differ from one another in a number of ways: culturally, politically, and demographically. What these countries do share, however, is an aspiration to be “rule makers” instead of “rule takers” within global governance. From 2006, the BRIC nations began to take steps to formalise the group. In September 2006, the first meeting of the BRIC foreign ministers took place, as a side event to the 61st UN General Assembly in New York. This was followed by a number of other meetings among representatives of the BRIC states. In the September 2007 and 2008 meetings, foreign ministers met once again in a side event to the 62nd UN General Assembly in New York, with next meetings of foreign ministers taking place in Russia. The first meetings of the BRIC heads of state/heads of government was in July 2008, and the first finance ministers' meeting in November 2008. In June 2009, the BRIC countries had their first summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia. The focus of the summit included the 2008 financial crisis, issues of global development, and the further strengthening the BRIC collaboration. The summit's joint declaration outlined foundations of common thought between BRIC countries, including the primacy of the rule of law and multilateral diplomacy with a leading role for the UN (Brazil 2008: 2). The assumption of these principles as the foundation of the BRICS meant that they became the driving force behind the BRICS actions within global governance. During this summit, Russia and China voiced their support for a greater role for Brazil and India in the UN (Brazil 2008: 3). Broader issues such as hunger, disease, the sustainability of the global economy, and an overall fairer global economic system (Brazil 2008: 4) were also discussed at the summit. This resulted in a strong understanding among the BRICS that energy security, socioeconomic development, and environmental protection would all be interconnected and that “South–South co-operation is a key element behind international efforts in the field of development” (Brazil 2008: 10). However, at this stage, the BRIC nations clarified that they would work within the traditional structure of global governance by cooperating with the G8 and other traditional dialogue partners (Brazil 2008: 11). Yet within these traditional institutions of global governance, the BRICS attempted to push the issues facing developing states—for example, food security—onto the agenda. In 2009, the BRIC states issued a joint declaration on global food security. The document outlines a number of issues of common understanding on food security. These include promoting the responsible use of biofuel and ensuring sustainable production in accordance with the three pillars of sustainable development: (1) society, (2) economy, and (3) the environment. In addition, the BRIC countries expressed support for the provision of

technological and financial resources to help developing countries build the necessary infrastructure to minimise the impact of climate change on food security (Brazil 2009: 2). This focus on development issues like food security has affected the role behaviour of the BRICS states in global governance. For example China has pushed the issue of food security onto the G20's agenda (Duggan and Naarajärvi 2012). However, the role behaviour of Brazil and India in the WTO clearly highlights that while the need to focus on food security is placed on the agenda of global governance bodies, there is no coherent policy among the BRICS to achieve the goal (Thorstensen and Oliveira 2014). A focus on food security continued during the early formation of the BRICs. In 2010, the ministers of agriculture of the BRIC nations meet in Moscow. They produced a joint declaration that focuses on establishing modes of action to pursue global food security. These focused on the production of grain and on the increase in the standard of living and the development of rural areas. These modes of action included:

1. Creation of an agricultural information-based system of the BRIC countries
2. Development of a general strategy for ensuring access to food for the most vulnerable members of the population
3. Reduction of negative impact of climate change on food security and adaptation of agriculture to climatic changes
4. Enhancement of agricultural technology, co-operation, and innovation (Brazil 2010b: 1–2)

The second BRIC summit took place in April in Brasília and focused on identifying intra-BRIC cooperation initiatives and also included input from civil society. The joint declaration from this summit focused on exalting the financial contribution of the BRICS to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The declaration focused on increasing the voting quotas of the BRICS within the IMF and fostering greater involvement in the choice of leaders for the IMF and the World Bank (Brazil 2010a: 9–11). In a joint declaration a year later, BRICS members expressed their dissatisfaction with the method used to choose the new head of the IMF 5. Rather than simply calling for reform in global economic governance, the BRICS also undertook an agreement to increase cooperation between major domestic financial institutions (India 2010). In 2010, several BRICS banks—the National Bank for Economic and Social Development, the China Development Bank Corporation (CDB), the Export–import Bank of India (Exim Bank), and the State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank)—agreed to cooperate in the global economy. The development of this cooperation was the first step to institutionalise relations among the BRICS.

2010 marked a turning point in the development of the BRIC. It was the year when the cooperation on global affairs began to institutionalise among BRIC nations. In December 2010, South Africa was officially invited to join the group at the next meeting of the heads of state, which would take place in April 2011 in Sanya on the island of Hainan, China. The Sanya Summit had three clear focus points: new areas of cooperation, non-BRICS cooperation, and international conflict. In terms of new areas of cooperation, the BRICS expanded cooperation on the

development of clean energy and encouraged technical co-operation in this sector (Brazil 2011a: 18). Other areas of cooperation included meetings between representatives of international organisations, meetings of experts in agriculture, meetings of the heads of national statistical institutions, and financial co-operation between the BRICS Development Banks. Other issues included the establishment of new areas of cooperation: gatherings of sister cities and local governments; meetings of ministers of health; and support for joint research on economic and commercial issues and co-operation in the areas of culture and sport (Brazil 2011a: 10–12). In the Sanya Declaration (2011), the BRICS affirmed that they “are open to increasing engagement and cooperation with non-BRICS countries, in particular emerging and developing countries, and relevant international and regional organizations” (Sanya Declaration 2011: 6). A number of institutions and international agreements were listed in the declaration for support, including the UN, the G20, the IMF, the Millennium Development Goals, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Agenda 21, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, the NEPAD, and the WTO. Finally, the declaration included in the declaration suggested exploring the establishment of a BRICS-UNESCO Group (Sanya Declaration 2011: III.5). As highlighted by the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union (2012: 28), a number of EU/OECD bodies and agreements such as the Monterrey Process, the Paris Declaration, the AAA, and the European Consensus on Development were not included. The final focus of the Sanya summit was on issue of international conflict. The BRICS called for members of the group in the UN Security Council (UNSC) to focus on resolving conflicts by focusing on dialogue rather than on force. The Libyan crisis was taken as an example (Brazil 2011a: 7–9). The declaration highlighted that “the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of each nation should be respected” (Brazil 2011a: 9). This has become the BRICS central position on international conflict and has been reflected by the actions of its members who hold permanent position on the UN Security Council—that is, Russia and China (Duggan 2014). The BRICS continue to take this view on issues such as the Syrian crisis and Palestinian membership of the UN (Brazil 2011b: 1).

The 4th Summit of Heads of Government took place in New Delhi, India, in March 2012. The main focus of the summit was global stability, particularly security in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as a focus on climate change (India 2012). In terms of institutionalising, the biggest decision was that the BRICS would begin plans to establish a BRICS Development Bank (India 2012). The BRICS Development Bank was designed to reduce the bureaucratic frustration that developing countries have faced in accessing funds from the Bretton Woods Institutions (India 2012). The design and ethos of the BRICS bank was worked out further at the 5th summit, which took place in Durban in 2013. The 5th BRICS summit, entitled “BRICS and Africa—Partnerships for Integration and Industrialization”, focused on further development of institutional links between the BRICS members and on the role of the BRICS in the developing world (South Africa 2013). There was a further strengthening of the BRICS Development Bank at the summit, with a focus on lending for infrastructural projects in the developing world.

The BRICS members also agreed to set up a currency contingency fund to protect members' economies in times of crisis (South Africa 2013).

However, the bank itself did not come into fruition until the 6th BRICS summit in Brasília 2014, where the New Development Bank (NDB) was created. The bank, which would be based in Shanghai, would contribute to the efforts to eliminate infrastructure gaps and meet the sustainable-development needs of the BRICS member states and of other developing states. With capital of \$100 billion, including \$50 billion of equally shared initial subscribed capital, the bank would be one of the world's largest multilateral financial development institutions (Brazil 2014c). The concept of a currency contingency fund was also further developed. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement of \$100 billion is designed to help protect the BRICS countries against short-term liquidity pressures and international financial shocks. New areas of economic cooperation were also discussed at the 6th summit, including the development of a BRICS Export Credit and Guarantees Agencies, a BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism (Brazil 2014b) a BRICS Business Council, Strategy for Multilateral Economic Cooperation and the Roadmap for Investment Cooperation, a BRICS Banking Forum, and a BRICS Exchanges Alliance (Brazil 2014a). Driven by Russia, there was also a focus on increasing the inter-institutional relationship among the BRICS in the area of energy security. There is a proposal to establish a BRICS Energy Association, a Fuel Reserve Bank, and a BRICS Energy Policy Institute (Russian Federation 2014).

5 The Rise of the Rules and Norms of Global Governance

As the BRICS rise and become institutionalised, they have begun to affect the rules and norms that underpin the wider system of global governance. Within the context of global governance, they have adopted an alter role to the liberal model of development. Therefore, this role has meant that the rise of the BRICS have reduced the promotion of liberal-democracy values and have also defeated the position of the sovereignty states at the centre of global governance decision making (Keeler 2011; Stephen 2012; Stuenkel 2013; Laïdi 2012). It is in the area of global economic governance where the role the BRICS has adopted has had the greatest impact on the rules and norms that allow for collective action (Gray and Murphy 2013). The BRICS have attempted to challenge the architecture of liberal global economic governance (with the exception of the creation of the NDB) by engaging strongly in the existing structures of global economic governance (Strange 2011; Germain 2009; Kahler 2013). The main challenge to the liberal system of global economic governance is the nature of the BRICS economies themselves, which differ in many ways from the Western economies that created and designed the current system of global economic governance. Christopher McNally has outlined four main differences: (1) the implementation of interventionist industrial policy, (2) the prominence of sovereign wealth funds in internationalizing domestic capital, (3) the fostering/creation of "national champion" enterprises, and (4) a more "embedded" approach to financial regulation and

allocation, through state-controlled banks (2013: 37–40). The BRICS have undertaken a role as revisionist power within global economic governance, and it is the success of the BRICS model that has driven the BRICS to adopt this role. By creating a workable economic alternative, the state-led aspect of the BRICS economies, including managed currencies, export-oriented interventionism and active industrial policies, is a direct challenge to the neoliberal ideas of economic management, and in particular to the Washington Consensus policy of the Bretton Woods institutions of development (Stephen 2014; Breslin 2013). The success of the BRICS economies has also prevented Western powers from pushing their liberal agenda within global economic governance. This has occurred as the BRICS have increased their share of global markets and global capital reserves, which has allowed them to delay or de facto suspend increased trade liberalization and transnational financial flows (May and Nölke 2013; Narlikar 2010; Dierckx 2013; Yianni and De Vera 2010). The central position that state controlled banks and sovereign wealth funds take in the BRICS model of development also challenges the current system of global governance by reducing the influence of private capital in the global marketplace (Harris 2009; Overbeek 2012). It is clear that the state capitalist model of the BRICS is challenging many of the underlying rules and norms of the liberal system of global economic governance and will in itself force a restructuring of the system (Ikenberry 2011). However, it is clear that the BRICS have embraced and are fully engaged in the rules-based international order and have deepened their global economic exchange and interdependence. Within the institutions that allow for this rules-based international order, it is clear that the BRICS members are highlighting the need for a greater focus on developmental issues and a greater input from developing countries (Duggan and Tiberghien 2013; Duggan 2014). This is a reflection of the fact that as the BRICS institutionalised between 2006 and 2014, they adopted a clear focus on issues such as food security, global climate change, and the need for infrastructural development in the developing world. They have therefore adopted a role as leaders of the developing world. This has driven an evolution of the global governance agenda toward a greater focus on and consideration of developmental issues (Duggan and Naarajärvi 2012).

6 Conclusion

It is clear that the BRICS grouping began life without a collective identity but with an identity constructed by significant others. These countries share little in common in terms of identity, and they differ in terms of political, economic and cultural structures. This has often resulted in the BRICS's undertaking of different roles within global governance, and, as highlighted by Schirm (2010) and Hopewell (2015), the BRICS members have often failed to cooperate within institutions of global governance like the G20 and the WTO. However, in the 13 years since the coining of the BRIC (later BRICS) acronym, there is clear routinised foreign policy actions between the BRICS member states to support the historical narrative of the

BRICS. The BRICS have developed a large network of interactions and have institutionalised areas of cooperation. The basis for the development of these interactions has been a common self-identity as an emerging and developing power. Within this self-identity is a commonly held perception that the current system of global governance does not represent the interests of emerging powers and that without reform or the development of an alternative system, emerging powers would fail to develop fully. It is clear that through interaction, the BRICS members have developed layers of collective identity as emerging powers or at least nonliberal economic powers. This collective identity, together with the state capitalist model of the BRICS economies, has meant that the BRICS have adopted a revisionist role within global governance. However, the BRICS have not always adopted this revisionist role, and members' roles may differ depending on which realm of global governance is in question. Within global security governance, for example, the BRICS have undertaken a role as a status quo power, defending the position of the sovereignty state and the noninterference in the internal affairs of others. However, within global economic governance, the BRICS nations have adopted the role of revisionist states seeking to reform not only the structures of the institutions of global economic governance such as the IMF and the World Bank but also the rules and norms that allow for collective action within global economic governance. The BRICS members have performed role behaviour in order to underwrite their role as the leaders of the developing world. This has included the development of the NDB and a strong focus on development issues, such as food security. This has had a clear effect on the evolution of a new agenda within global governance, one that focuses far less on the spread of the liberal economic model and the values that entails and focuses far more on developmental issues.

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