



Who Fought the Algerian War? Political Identity and Conflict in French-Ruled Algeria

Author(s): Lizabeth Zack

Source: *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Fall, 2002), pp. 55-97

Published by: [Springer](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020148>

Accessed: 02/01/2015 04:26

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

Who Fought the Algerian War? Political Identity and Conflict in French-Ruled Algeria

Lizabeth Zack*

Why did settlers, natives, and metropolitan agents fight each other as “French” and “Algerian” during the famously brutal Algerian War of the 1950s? While scholars identify key factors in launching and escalating the war, they take for granted that it was fought between “the French” and “the Algerians” when evidence shows that those terms were also a source of struggle among the parties involved in the war. Drawing on insights from the fields of colonial studies and collective action, along with archival sources, the article explains why this particular set of terms framed the war, in other words, why the categories “French” and “Algerian” predominated in the political discourse, and why they were so opposed to each other. It contends that punctuated political conflicts among state authorities and social-movement organizations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, rather than indigenous cultural or social structural factors, played a key role in constructing this identity framework. The article concludes by challenging our basic definitions of the war and the prevailing theories about its course and outcomes.

KEY WORDS: identity; Algerian War; decolonization/colonization; social movement.

The Algerian War of the 1950s was one of the most brutal and exhaustive decolonization wars of the post-World War II period. The French state and groups associated with the *Front de libération nationale* (F.L.N.) mobilized massive resources to fight the war. Parties to the conflict adopted tactics ranging from protest, demonstrations, and secret negotiations to bombings, sabotage, and torture. The conflict involved all sectors of Algerian society, including the French-European settlers, Arabs, Berbers, and Jews, and soldiers and administrators of the French state, as well as successive French metropolitan governments, the public in France, and many European, American, and

*Department of Anthropology/Sociology, Rhodes College, 2002 North Parkway, Memphis, TN 38112; e-mail: zackl@rhodes.edu.

Middle Eastern outsiders. The 1962 Evian peace accords ended the eight-year war and the 132-year relationship between France and Algeria. Out of the war emerged two separate French and Algerian nations.

The Algerian War made a profound imprint on a whole generation of people and has continued, to this day, to haunt the political cultures, collective memories, historiographies, and people's psyches in both France and Algeria. Understandably, the impetus to make sense of the war has resulted in various theories about its nature and causes and just who was responsible for it. The "state-centered" school of thought highlights the opportunities missed by the French state during the colonial period to reform the regime and alter the distribution of rights and privileges in Algeria, thereby leaving the native population with no alternative but armed insurrection (Ageron 1979; Confer 1966; Cooke 1973; Julien 1964; Vatin 1974; Yacono 1955). The "nationalist" approach points to the repressive nature of French settler colonialism and the common cultural heritage of Islam and the Arabic language in uniting subject Arabs and Berbers in a movement for Algerian national independence (Gallisot 1987; Kaddache 1980; Nouschi 1962; Sahli 1965; Sa'adallah 1981; Stora 1987, 1991; Wolf 1969). A third "settler-centered" view identifies the settlers as an important intermediary group that exacerbated inequality and blocked reforms and possible political solutions, hence pushing the two sides toward a settler colonial war (Lustick 1985; Martini 1997; Nora 1961; Prochaska 1990; Sivan 1979; Weitzer 1990). These three schools of thought tend to direct attention to one of the important actors (the French state, the Algerian nationalists, or the settlers), they emphasize different underlying factors (missed opportunities for reform, the conception of an Islamic-Arabic nation, settler intransigence), and differ on who was most to blame.

Despite all this emphasis on the parties to war, the historiography does not account very well for *who* was actually fighting the war. Scholarly and popular works are rich, engaged, and treat many aspects of the war—the motivations, timing, points of escalation, tactics, and outcomes—but they often overlook the confusion and competition in the way groups identified themselves and others. On the eve of and during the war, evidence shows that settlers, natives, government officials, and others fiercely debated and fought over the criteria for belonging to "the true Algerians" and "the true French." These terms were at one moment defined by citizenship status, place of residence, or familial descent, and at another by language, religion and political commitment. At times, settlers competed with each other over who was "French"; at other times, *both* settlers and natives claimed to be "Algerian." Ideas about who was "French" ran from a core of Europeans connected to Parisian elites to all the inhabitants of the French empire; the notion of "Algerians" varied from Arab-Islamic elites to anyone committed

to an independent nation. Clearly, “French” and “Algerian” were important bases of political identification and solidarity, representing very different visions of a future Algeria. However, it was not clear yet which criteria would define those terms or which groups belonged in which category. Far from acting as already entrenched camps of “French” and “Algerians,” parties to the Algerian War struggled to define those very terms.¹

This essay seeks to provide an explanation of these broad patterns of political identification that emerged at the onset and during the Algerian War of the 1950s. It offers an account of why the two categories “French” and “Algerian” came to predominate in the political discourse surrounding the conflict, why such a deep and oppositional divide had developed between the two modes of identification, and why such confusion about those terms prevailed in the early years of the war. I draw on insights from current trends in colonial studies and the field of collective action, as well as historical evidence from secondary and primary archival sources, and attempt to trace the roots of this cluster of political identities that came to frame the Algerian War.² Existing approaches take these patterns for granted, as a natural outgrowth of 132 years of colonial rule, or as a direct expression of specific social groups, group culture and interests, whereas I focus on the role of punctuated political conflict among state authorities and social-movement organizations in constructing this identity framework. If most explanations of the Algerian War rely on an already existent sense of who the “French” and “Algerians” were, subjecting those terms to investigation can only improve our understanding of the causes and course of that war.

Colonial Identities and Collective Action

Scholars of modern empires, beginning with Marx and Lenin and on through D.K. Fieldhouse, Eric Hobsbawm, and Agnes Murphy, offer three general answers to the question of why empires emerge, persist, and decline: socioeconomic structures, political imperatives, and ideological systems (Fieldhouse 1971; Hobsbawm 1989; Murphy 1968). In addition to theories about the causes of colonization and decolonization, the paradigms provide, directly or indirectly, a particular way of understanding colonial identities. According to the first view, social and economic forces—demographic explosions, job competition, capitalization of industry, immigration, or increased wealth—organize colonial groups into a system of stratification, with colonizers on top and the colonized on the bottom. Group identities exist as functions of these socioeconomic structures and reflect a group’s position in it. Class and ethnic identities sometimes derive from the subdivisions within the colonizer and colonized groups.³ Others focus on political

imperatives—competition with other European powers, domestic unrest, or control of outlying territories, whether church missions, trading hubs, or military bases—in the creation and demise of empires (Fieldhouse 1967). Identities are rooted in the ethnic, tribal, and racial groups among the colonizer and colonized and become institutionalized during colonization through citizenship policies, divide-and-rule tactics, and management of communal conflict. A third paradigm highlights the role of ideological systems such as racism, Christian virtue, or cultural elitism in the development of empires, and the formation of alternative ideologies among native groups in casting off colonial oppression (Murphy 1968). Identities emanate from the ideologically opposed colonizers and colonized. These three paradigms differ on why colonizer and colonized groups came into contact with each other, which conditions allowed one group to dominate the other, and what brought those formal relations to an end. Together, however, they tend to see the colonial situation as created by colonizer and colonized groups; identities correspond first to one's position as colonizer or colonized and then vary in form based on socioeconomic, political, and cultural conditions.

Scholarship on the case of French-ruled Algeria and the origins of “French” and “Algerian” identities has followed similar patterns. As mentioned, the classical works on the Algerian War tend to root identities in the main social groupings: settlers and metropolitan administrators were “French” and natives were “Algerian.” Divisions among settlers, by class, national background, and culture, generated some special terms: the *français d’algérie*, neo-French, *Algérieniste*, or *pieds noirs* (Crespo 1994; Lorcin 1999; Martini 1997; Nora 1961; Prochaska 1990).⁴ Most, however, conclude that certain factors—time spent in Algeria, school, military service, hatred for the natives and Jews—eventually united all the European settlers as “French” by the early twentieth century. Divisions among the natives, by class, ethnicity, region, and gender, generated terms such as “Arab” and “Berber” and “*fellaghin*” and “*évolués*,” but most focus on the factors uniting them as “Algerians.” Most scholars locate the roots of “Algerian” national identity in groups and institutions of the 1930s—intellectual and religious elites, Koranic schools, immigrant workers in France, the peasants, or leftist working-class organizations—mobilizing to reform or eliminate the system of French rule (Ageron 1968; Christelow 1985; Gallisot 1987; Kaddache 1980; Koulaksiss 1987; Lazreg 1976; Nouschi 1962; Sahli 1965; Stora 1987; Wolf 1969).⁵ From the political perspective, the extension of the French state and metropolitan culture into Algeria, in the form of economic development, European settlement, and naturalization policies marked what was “French” and “Algerian” in Algeria (Brunswick 1994; Confer 1966; Cooke 1973). Metropolitan administrators and military personnel exploited ethnic differences between “Arabs” and “Berbers” in their use of divide-and-rule

tactics in nineteenth-century Algeria (Ageron 1967). Scholars argue that the civilizing mission justified “French” colonization of Algerian “*indigènes*”; the recognition of an integral Islamic culture or Enlightenment ideas of equality and liberty inspired the “Muslim Algerians” to overthrow their “French” oppressors.⁶ While useful for mapping important sociological, economic, cultural, demographic, and political trends in Algeria, this historiography does not account for certain patterns of identification. They do not explain the predominant use of “French” and “Algerian” in political contexts, that settlers were sometimes “French” and other times “Algerian,” that natives were sometimes “Algerian” and other times “Muslim” or “communist,” that French citizenship status converted people into “Jews” and “Algerians.” In other words, it does not capture some of the ways groups represented themselves and others in those broader trends.

A more recent generation of scholars has begun to revise and dismantle these classical paradigms of imperial history in favor of one that better captures the many complexities of colonial situations.⁷ Newer colonial studies have been marked by a decisive turn in attention toward the *culture* of colonial situations—the categories, the basic concepts, cultural frameworks, hierarchies, identities, and epistemologies—that have made modern empires and their disintegration possible (Cooper and Stoler 1997; Dirks 1992; Mitchell 1991; Said 1993; Stoler 1989). As key components of colonial situations, the categories themselves have become the object of analysis. The theoretical work of Michel Foucault and Joan Scott on the production and power of representations has inspired a vast literature on categories and representations in colonial societies (Foucault 1982; Scott 1988). In one of the most famous of those studies, Edward Said argued that the French and British discourse of Orientalism—the constellation of ideas about the colonized regions outside of Europe—generated “the Orient” and what and who were considered to be “Oriental” (Said 1979). This impetus has put identities of all kinds associated with modern imperialism at the forefront of analysis, from the making of “the West” to the making of “races,” “nations,” “genders,” and “classes.” In line with this general “cultural turn” in colonial studies, scholars of French-ruled Algeria have trained their attention on the basic categories and identities so crucial in anchoring and then dismantling that regime. They chart the historical construction of “Arabs” and “Berbers,” “Europeans” and “*indigènes*,” “Jews,” “genders,” and “French” and “native” (Clancy-Smith 1994; Colonna 1997; Lorcin 1999; Stoler 1995). Many have shown that the production of metropolitan “French” identity occurred in part in the colonies, in metropolitan discourses about the colonies, and in the interactions among groups in metropolitan and colonial locations (Conklin 1997; Cooper and Stoler 1997; Hargreaves and Heffernan 1993; Noiriel 1988; Stoler 1995). Instead of assuming the

existence of colonizer and colonized groups, as the classical paradigms do, and tracking how their interests and actions *resulted* in colonialism and decolonization, scholarship in this newer vein suggests that the modern and multifaceted processes of European expansion actually *created* the categories of “colonizer” and “colonized.” These insights have opened the way for thinking about the broad processes of political identity formation in French-ruled Algeria.

Parallel developments in the field of collective action offer insights for understanding the specific process of *political* identity formation and, hence, the making of “French” and “Algerian” political identities in Algeria. Political identities are the terms groups use to define themselves and others in power struggles when the state is involved (Tilly 1995). They are distinct from other social identities, such as gender, race, religion, or occupation, but they can certainly overlap or turn into social identities in certain circumstances. Recent work on social movements, revolutions, nationalism, riots and other forms of collective action has brought political identity to the forefront of analysis. If, over the decades, scholars have proffered irrational impulses, rational calculation, and political opportunity as answers to the question of why people engage in large-scale collective political conflict, a new—and what Jack Goldstone has called a fourth—generation has focused attention on the cultural dimensions of those kinds of action (Goldstone 2001). Frames, repertoires, toolkits, idioms, narratives, stories, discourses, and identities all refer in different ways to the shared and durable representations people use to identify themselves and others as they act together in and make sense of contests over power (Brass 1996; Johnson and Klandermans 1995; Laraña, E., H. Johnston, J. Gusfield 1994; McAdam, D. John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald 1996; Tilly 1995).

Political identities both construct and get constructed in the process of acting together with a group of people. While other theories suggest that identities exist as expressions of our nature or individual choices, as derivatives of our position within economic, social, cultural, or political structures, or as effects of diffuse discourses, the idea here is that identities are the product of social interactions and relations among groups. As groups enter domains of claim-making and contention with others, they must define the groups involved, the “us” and “them” out there on the field of political action. Many suggest that interactions among state authorities and social movement organizations play a particularly important role in the construction of political identities. State agents generate, define, institutionalize, and maintain the boundaries of all sorts of identity categories; social movement organizations select out, redefine, challenge, and affirm those categories as well as help routinize them into the everyday political culture (della Porta 1995; Roy 1994). Contentious interactions among movements

and state authorities, from lobbying to revolution, help refine the structure, meaning, and boundaries of those categories; the mediations, compromises, and resolutions of those contests often consolidate the clusters comprising those categories into dominant frameworks of political identity. In turn, these dominant political identity clusters frame subsequent rounds of political struggle. Political identities are the lenses through which we make sense of the political world; they define the limits of our communities, where we fit, our allies and enemies, legitimate grievances and political objectives, and acceptable methods for achieving them. As powerful categories of group identification, political identities set some of the constraints on our behavior and reveal opportunities when we enter new rounds of political contention. Once a dominant framework of political identities emerges within a specific context, social movement participants and state authorities tend to enter new rounds of conflict within this framework, not wholly determined by it but bounded by certain limits within it. New rounds of conflict then reconstruct and alter the framework, and so on. The relationship between collective action and identity ends up being processual and dynamic, where each facilitates and shapes the structure and significance of the other.

These insights from colonial studies and collective action theory offer a solid foundation for understanding the formation of “French” and “Algerian” political identities in French-ruled Algeria. Below, I trace broadly the formation of “French” and “Algerian” identities from the early decades of French rule up to the Algerian War of the 1950s. While a whole host of political identities circulated in Algeria in this long period of time, the dominant identity framework of the Algerian War took shape and acquired its key features in certain moments of large-scale political contestation among social movements and state authorities. Using primary and secondary sources, I focus on periods of intense political conflict already examined by many other scholars—the anti-Jewish crisis of the late 1890s and the controversy and mobilization around the Blum-Viollette bill of 1936—and highlight their impact on political identity formation.⁸ I argue that the two periods of conflict converted “French” and “Algerian” identities into predominant, mass-based, and oppositional modes of political identification. By the 1950s, “French” had come to represent an orientation to metropolitan France and a tight association between France and Algeria; “Algerian” had come to represent an orientation to local life and increased autonomy from France. Exactly which cultural and social groups belonged to those categories was not yet decided. Parties to the war of the 1950s organized and mobilized themselves within this framework; it was only the escalation and subsequent end of the war in 1962 that sorted out exactly who was “French” and who “Algerian.”

THE MAKING OF A POLITICAL IDENTITY FRAMEWORK IN ALGERIA

Political Identities Under Ottoman and Early French Rule

Algeria was part of the Ottoman Empire from the sixteenth century to the early nineteenth. Taking advantage of a weakened Ottoman authority in the provinces, the French military occupied Algiers in 1830. They encountered Turks, Arabs, Berbers, Jews, other North Africans, and some southern Europeans. In the 1830s and 1840s, the military met stiff resistance from a coalition of tribes and Sufi orders led by the famous Abd al Qadir. Once the military defeated that coalition, the French government and migrants from France and other southern European areas began to settle in and develop Algeria. In 1848, Algeria became an official part of France in the form of three *départements*.

The structure of Ottoman rule fostered the use of a diverse range of collective political identities in the Regency of Algiers. The system of tax collection, military defense, and legal institutions sorted inhabitants by religious group (“Muslim,” “Christian,” “Jew”), locale (town, province, pastoral community), and ruler and ruled (“Turks” and non-Turks) (AbuNasr 1987; Hourani 1991; Julien 1970). Since the Ottoman Sultan governed the Regency indirectly through multiple layers of bureaucracy and local representatives, Regency inhabitants also retained many of their local group affiliations with family, tribe, trade, Sufi order, and religion. Due to the rich cosmopolitanism of the city of Algiers and the migratory character of inhabitants and travelers in the interior of the Regency, place of provenance also was important in setting people apart from each other, evident in the frequent use of the terms “*baldi*” (local), “*gharbi*” (western), and “*afaqi*” (provincial) (Clancy-Smith 1994: 128). Ottoman rule thus tended to both reinforce some already existing patterns of social clustering, especially by religious group, tribe, and Sufi order, and organize newer relations as ruler/ruled as predominant modes of political interaction and identification.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, resistance to the Ottoman system in Algiers manifested itself in conflicts between the “Turks,” on the one hand, and Arab and Berber “tribes” and “Sufi orders” on the other. Once the French military began occupying the northern part of the Regency in 1830, similar patterns of collective resistance emerged. Abd al Qadir, of the western region of Oran, organized a loose federation of Arab tribes and Sufi orders. As a way to try to unite their efforts, al Qadir rallied them around the doctrine of Islam and holy war for the good of all “Muslims” against the infidel “French” military. Despite some successes,

al Qadir's efforts failed to transcend conflicts and antagonisms among these groups (Danziger 1977; Julien 1970; Abu-Nasr 1987). Nevertheless, "Sufi order" and "tribe" continued to be important bases for collective resistance to the "French" in the nineteenth century.

French rule heightened other political identities in Algeria. The Jews were longstanding inhabitants of North Africa and an official minority group under the Ottomans (Abu-Nasr 1987; Ayoun and Cohen 1982; Julien 1970; Martin 1936). In the early decades of French rule, Jews, clustered in distinct quarters of northern towns and cities, remained a small population relative to the large Arab and Berber majority. Out of necessity, the French administrators and military personnel turned to them for help because they had a history of working between local cultures and groups—European, African, and Ottoman—and because of their experience in commerce and credit (Boyer 1963: 173). Government personnel and commercial traders interacted as "Jews," or "Israelite natives" as they were sometimes called, and "French," and continued in formal and informal ways to cultivate these cozy relations.

Newer migrants and settlers from France and other European countries entered this complex set of social arrangements. While they clustered together in Algeria as "French," "*colon*," "Valencian," and even "African," depending on the circumstances, the French occupation of the Algiers Regency provoked the creation of a new group and a new political identity in the 1840s: the "Algerian" settlers. Settlers and the military were often at odds in their separate efforts to occupy and control the land. The settlers clamored for greater incorporation of Algeria into the French metropolitan system of administration as a way to bypass military control and gain easier access to land. In the 1840s, a small group of settlers formed an Algerian Lobby to plead their case before the French government in Paris; they continued to make demands as "Algerians" on the metropolitan government throughout the 1850s and 1860s. At this time, the total European population was at about 200,000, a tiny minority compared with the 2.5 million Arab-Berber Muslims (Hourani 1991).

Contrary to some claims, the rich cosmopolitanism and local affiliations that prevailed under Ottoman rule and the early decades of French occupation fostered a complex array of political identities rather than any unified and collective articulation of "Algerian" political identity (Danziger 1977; Hoexter 1998; Kaddache 1980; Ruedy 1992). Even if some collective terms or consensus existed about the name of the territory in different periods—"el djezair," "ifriqiya," the "*régence d'Alger*," "*barbarie*," and "*L'Algérie*"—none of these terms corresponded to a mass of people collectively engaged in political struggle (Thomson 1987).

Turning Republicans into Colonizers

In 1870, the new Third Republican government in Paris replaced the military regime in Algeria with a civil government run primarily by the French settler minority. In the 1870s and 1880s, the central government pursued an official policy of assimilation, which expressed the intention of folding Algeria into France, and facilitated all sorts of economic development. In its attempts to make Algeria “French,” the French government gave citizenship rights to the 30,000 Jews in Algeria in 1870 and, in 1889, to the European settlers from other countries (at the time, the majority of the 300,000 settlers were not of French origin but migrants from other southern European countries). Concomitantly, they absorbed and manipulated native local institutions—cultural, religious, tax, land-tenure, and legal-juridical—to the benefit of settlers and developers and to the detriment of Muslim Arabs and Berbers. By the end of the nineteenth century, of a total population of approximately 4.5 million, about 85 percent were Muslim natives, 7 percent European with French citizenship, 1 percent Jewish, and the rest foreigners from Europe and North Africa. Most of the Europeans and Jews by this time had French citizenship and lived in the towns and cities near the northern coast and plains; almost none of the Arab-Berber population had citizenship and most lived outside the coastal cities.

Ironically, the attempts to assimilate Algeria into France, to fold disparate elements into French civilization, especially after 1870, had the unintended effect of promoting group differences within the population. The process of political incorporation of Algeria into France in 1870–71 emphasized a sense of difference between settlers and metropolitan France. Initially unsatisfied with the reorganization, settlers protested again as “Algerians” against the “French” and even threatened separation from France. When the French state naturalized the native Jews in Algeria in 1870, they sparked anger and opposition among the majority native Arabs and Berbers, who protested as “Muslims” or “Arabs,” and among settlers who resisted as “*français de naissance*.” The new native institutions emphasized the distinction between the “French” and the “*indigenes*.” Immediately following the mass naturalization of European settlers as French, they became celebrated and scorned as “neo-French” or as “foreigners” by the “true French.” Over the course of two decades of assimilation-style rule, the state ended up instituting a set of discrete categories and lines of demarcation—between the “French,” on the one hand, and the “Algerians,” “Jews,” “natives,” and “neo-French/foreigners,” on the other—within the political culture of Algeria, a de facto reality that worked against the principles and intentions of integration. Moreover, these efforts to secure French hegemony in Algeria obfuscated the meaning of “French” national identity. By

1890, French citizens in Algeria had very little in common except their official status and the fact of living in a French territory. For some, the only additional commonality was their aversion to Jews and Arabs. If, as Rogers Brubaker claims, passage of the new citizenship laws in 1889 consolidated the basis of modern French national identity—a republican universalistic ethos and a territory-based (*jus soli*) idea of citizenship—the case of Algeria shows that increasing penetration of metropolitan institutions and culture created a mutable “French” identity, opened it up to competing definitions, and revealed highly particularistic principles of incorporation at work (Brubaker 1992).

As assimilation-style colonization in the 1870s and 1880s reshuffled land, rights, and a sense of place in colonial Algeria, it accentuated distinctions and solidarities among “French,” “Jews,” “natives,” “Algerians,” and “neo-French/foreigners.” The new laws and measures organized inhabitants into these groups and highlighted the boundaries around them. This is not to say that these categories were completely new; they were salient *because* they drew on everyday lived experiences. Nor is it to say that settlers, Arabs, Jews, and government authorities simply fell under the coercive spell of this framework of identities. A settler may have been “French” when requesting aid at the public assistance office in central Algiers, a “Valencian” at the cafe in his local Bab-el-Oued neighborhood, and an “Algerian” around election time. The point is that, by the 1890s, these bases for identifying oneself in relation to others in political contexts—as “Jew,” “French,” “neo-French,” “Algerian,” “native”—were becoming *formally* embedded within the conditions, practices, interactions, and institutions of every day political life in Algeria. Voting rights, land deeds, religious beliefs, language, job opportunities, even where one spent vacation all helped to make those categories real, as did the antagonisms and tensions among them.

This cluster of political identities shaped the way inhabitants responded to a growing sense of insecurity in Algeria in the 1890s. Economic depression, drought and famine in the rural agricultural areas, a downturn in the wine industry, the tumult of the Dreyfus affair, and pressures from Paris to implement reforms all contributed to this insecurity. In general, carving out advantages here and there often went hand in hand with proving one’s *qualité de français*. “Algerian” autonomist parties called for a separate constitution for Algeria. “French” socialist organizations demanded protection for workers. “French” and “neo-French” workers insulted each other as they competed for jobs. “Anti-Jewish” parties and organizations acted to rid Algeria of the “Jews.” “Jewish” consistories pleaded with the central government for protections. “Native Muslim” elites demanded more resources for schools and mosques. The press, politicians, and various organizations fueled a broad-based fear of a “foreign” peril. These identities did more than just shape the mood in Algeria; people had begun to organize politically

according to the lines of difference around them. As we will see, in the first phase of punctuated political conflict in Algiers of the late 1890s, participants drew on this cluster of political identities.

The *Crise Antijuive* in Algiers, 1897–1902

Actions against the Jews increased in the mid-1890s in Algeria following the onset of the Dreyfus Affair, the famous political scandal in France in which a Jewish army captain was convicted of betraying French secrets to the Germans. In 1895, European settlers engaged in a series of violent attacks against Jewish inhabitants and property in the western region of Oran. In 1895 and 1896, anti-Jewish candidates got elected to local office in the large cities of Oran and Constantine. In January 1897, brothers Max and Louis Régis, students at the Algiers Law School, led other students in strikes and protests against the hiring of a Jewish professor. By late 1897, a full-blown, European settler-dominated anti-Jewish movement was taking shape around the city of Algiers. At this time, the Algiers metropolitan city population had grown to about 122,000, with Europeans in the majority (55 percent) and Muslims (25 percent), Jews (10 percent), and foreigners (10 percent each) in the minority (Ageron 1991: 120, 125). Led by the *Ligue antijuive d'Alger*, these *antijuifs*, as the activists called themselves, organized protests, meetings, electoral campaigns, boycotts, petition drives, and violent attacks against the Jews in Algiers over the next few years against what they called the “*péril juif*.”⁹ The *Ligue*’s “fighting spirit” manifested itself most explosively when thousands of anti-Jewish protesters, including many students, took to the streets of Algiers *en masse* for several days in January 1898.¹⁰ They wreaked havoc in the city, shutting down businesses, destroying property, monopolizing the attention of security forces, and creating a general state of insecurity and near siege. Starting in February, they campaigned for seats in the legislative elections and succeeded when, in May, voters from Algiers elected Edouard Drumont, one of France’s most famous anti-Semites, as parliamentary deputy; settlers from other areas of Algeria elected three other anti-Jewish deputies. *Antijuifs* likened their cause to Cuba’s break from Spain and threatened secession from France. By mid-1898, this *crise antijuive* posed a serious threat to French state control in Algeria.

Reaction to the rise and success of the anti-Jewish movement in 1897–98 varied. Among the small population of Muslim natives, few participated in the events of the *crise*. For the most part, the Jews kept to the Jewish quarter to wait out the attacks. Leaders and elites of both Jewish and Muslim communities called on the government for protection and the restoration of calm. Initially, French central state authorities in Algeria—the Governor

General, the Prefect of the Department of Alger, and the Police Commissioner of Algiers—and ministers in Paris were caught off-guard; those on the scene felt powerless to contain this anti-Jewish political campaign and the civil unrest it inspired. In mid 1898, however, the government finally started taking steps to curtail the anti-Jewish movement. In 1899 and 1900, clashes between state authorities and radical *antijuifs* intensified. Two events in 1901—a riot in the city of Algiers and an attack by Righa tribe members on settlers in a nearby town—brought scandal and scorn to Algeria and helped bring the anti-Jewish crisis to an end in Algiers.

These turn-of-the-century events in Algiers have garnered a certain notoriety among historians, political commentators, lawyers, and Jewish intellectuals. Participants, observers, and scholars have often described this period of unrest as a “crisis” of one kind or another because of the intensity of the campaign, its widespread support, and the inability of French authorities to contain it (Ageron 1979; Ageron 1968; Dermenjian 1986; Hebey 1996; Martin 1936). Most have focused on the “anti-Jewish” dimension of the problem, notably the direct physical and verbal attacks by European settlers against the community of Jews (Dermenjian 1986; Gautier 1920; Iancu 1980; Hebey 1996). Commentators and historians differ on what they think caused the “crisis.” A “racial-religious” theory assumes a timeless hostility on the part of Europeans against the Jews and considers the *crise antijuive* in Algiers an expression of a collective mentality of prejudice and hatred among the European settlers (Bey 1898; Hebey 1996; Sivan 1980: 166). A “socioeconomic” approach contends that the political campaigns and violence were manifestations of competition, that the *crise antijuive* was a reaction by Europeans to the threat Jews posed to their socioeconomic status or position (Ageron 1979; Gautier 1920; Martin 1936). The “electoral” school of thought cites another source of competition—for political power—and views the hostility against the Jews in Algiers as a consequence of political party competition (Dermenjian 1986; Prochaska 1990). Most agree that, given these different background conditions, the *crise* was kicked off by and followed the ebb and flow of the Dreyfus Affair. Many agree, as well, that the crisis had the overall effects of uniting settlers against other groups—Muslims and Jews—and highlighting settler dependence on French state protection.

While all these theories go a certain distance in explaining aspects of the *crise antijuive* in 1890s Algiers, interesting patterns of political identification surrounding it need to be further analyzed. If the onset of the crisis was marked by the mixed use of the cluster of identities described above, “French” and “Algerian” had been converted into predominant, mass-based, and oppositional identities by the end of the crisis. How did a settler-dominated movement against the Jews accomplish this? Below, we

will see how the *rise* of the anti-Jewish movement helped popularize and politicize existing “French” and “Algerian” identities, how the *escalation* of conflict between state authorities and movement radicals polarized them, and, finally, how the *resolution* of the conflict helped entrench these polarized identities into the dominant political culture of Algeria.

The Rise of the Anti-Jewish Movement

As the Anti-Jewish Ligue of Algiers reinvented itself in early 1897 and brought together various settler concerns into their program of *antijudaïsme*, a term they adopted over anti-Semitism so as not to alienate Arabs, they did so by adopting an “anti-Jewish” identity. Those active in the campaign against the Jews took every chance to express their collective group identity as such. They called their organization the *Ligue antijuive*, their newspaper *L'Antijuif*, their electoral party the *Parti antijuif*, and attached the term “*antijuif*” to just about every commodity for sale in the city, from absinthe to cigarettes to haircuts.¹¹ In the streets, they regularly chanted “Down with the Jews!” They conducted petition drives, electoral campaigns, parades, raids on stores and houses, all in the name of getting rid of the Jews. The distinction between the “Jews” and those Europeans who were against them had existed since the naturalization of the Jews in 1870 and flared periodically as attacks against the Jews, but now there were two distinct categories in opposition—the “Jews” and a collective political entity called the “*antijuifs*.” The number and diversity of settlers active in the “anti-Jewish” campaign increased dramatically in this phase of the mobilization compared to earlier decades, making the political identity truly popular and mass-based.

The rise of the movement linked “anti-Jewish” identity to being “French.” Anti-Jewish *Ligue* president Régis and other *Ligue* leaders constantly called on “the French” to combat “the Jews.” It was common in their meetings for orators and audiences to shout “Down with the Jews!” in the same breath they yelled “France for the French!” or “Algeria for the French!”¹² The *Ligue*’s journal, *L'Antijuif*, launched on Bastille Day in 1897, had on its masthead “Algeria for the French!” Many products and services called for support for the “true French” and boycotts of “Jewish” products. Campaigning against the “Jews” in one way or another became *the* dominant mode for European settlers to express their “French” identity, for proving their *qualité de français*, for demonstrating their place in the family of “French” in Algeria, regardless of national background, language, culture, locale, and even bloodline. *Ligue* leaders and supporters painted a picture of a vast “French” community that stretched across Algiers, Algeria, and the Mediterranean, a network of enthusiasts and activists ready to campaign

against the “Jews.” This helped to downplay the distinctions between different groups of “French,” especially between those of metropolitan French background and those newly naturalized. One of the 1898 legislative candidates proclaimed, “The naturalized voters . . . French they are, French they’ll stay” (Sivan 1980: 168). In March 1898, *Ligue* president Régis, a naturalized Italian, said “all the French are united in combat against the Jewish peril.”¹³ Again, this phase of the mobilization connected “French” nation-building and the program of *antijudaïsme*, defining the basis of “French” identity as “anti-Jewish” and proving to be a quick and profound mode of political assimilation.

The early stage of the crisis also linked “anti-Jewish” identity to being “Algerian.” *Ligue* leaders realized in 1897 that they could rally the growing constituency of neo-French workers in the Spanish and Italian neighborhoods of the city to campaign against the Jews if they appealed to them as “Algerians.”¹⁴ If “Algerians” tended to be politicians, theorists, and law students discussing politics in conferences and party meetings in the mid 1890s, popular and mixed European crowds of Algiers residents were becoming “Algerians” in 1897–98. Though settlers acted collectively more often as “French” in this period of protest against the Jews and the state, many became “anti-Jewish” activists as they became “Algerian.” During the January Days of 1898, Governor General Louis Lépine pleaded for calm, saying “Algerians! I appeal to your patriotic sentiments” (Bey 1898: 45). In the legislative electoral campaigns of spring 1898, cries of “Algeria for the French” were accompanied by the slogan “Algeria for the Algerians!” (Hebey 1996: 158). Thus, the rise of the movement in 1897–98 in Algiers got settlers with closer ties to France to identify as “French *antijuifs*” and those of other backgrounds to identify as “Algerian *antijuifs*.” For the moment, hatred of the Jews made them allies.

Overall, then, this phase of the movement helped forge a strong association between being “French,” “Algerian,” and “anti-Jewish.” It broadened and popularized these modes of identification among settlers. As a social movement organization, the *Ligue antijuive d’alger* played a central role in this conversion of sentiment and sensibility into mass-based political identities. Though disparate political movements were forming in the mid-1890s—socialists, autonomists, anti-Semitic—the *Ligue* make a concerted effort to consolidate them into a single broader movement, to play down their differences, and to focus on the campaign against the Jews.¹⁵ Certainly, the Dreyfus Affair opened the opportunity for anti-Jewish political discourse and collective action, but it was the *Ligue* that capitalized on that opportunity and forged a full-fledged and politically sophisticated movement out of it. The reaction of other groups in Algiers reinforced this constellation of settler political identities. Native Jewish and Muslim elites appealed to the Prefect

and Parisian Ministers as “Jews” and “Muslims” to protect them against the dangerous “French,” thereby reinforcing the distinctions between the “Jews” and the “French” and between “Muslims” and the “French.” Since state authorities in Algeria and in Paris, up through mid-1898, had done little to curtail the rising success of the anti-Jewish movement, they, in a sense, allowed groups of “French,” “Algerians,” and “*antijuifs*” to mobilize across Algiers. Governor General Lépine, the famous Paris Police Commissioner sent to Algiers to help out, could only inform the Paris ministry that anti-Jewish agitation had grown to worrisome proportions in Algiers and that the Municipality and police refused to control the disorder.¹⁶ The momentum of the alliance of “French *antijuifs*” and “Algerian *antijuifs*” after their victories in the legislative elections of May 1898 seemed unstoppable. Thus, the response of Algiers community leaders and the lack of state action in the city helped foster the formation of a framework of political identities.

Escalation of Conflict Among State Authorities and Movement Radicals

Things changed in mid-1898. A new central government in Paris finally took action to reassert metropolitan control and neutralize the anti-Jewish movement. They dispatched the new Governor General Laferrière to Algeria and authorized him to carry out that mission. Armed with decrees, he instituted a number of changes, including a new governing council, restrictions on naturalized voters, and tougher security. He also sought to divide and conquer the anti-Jewish movement, to break it into camps of moderates and radicals, and to win over the former and marginalize the latter.¹⁷ Within a short time, they had succeeded in splitting the movement and, as a result, sparked a series of clashes between state authorities and movement radicals.

The new government and its allies worked hard to redefine who the “true French” were in Algeria. In speeches, Laferrière played on existing tensions among metropolitan and naturalized French settlers by lumping the latter together with the Jews as “questions of nationality.” In October 1898, Laferrière issued a memo to the prefects in Algeria recommending that they give preference to “French” (of metropolitan birthright) workers on public works projects, not “foreigners.”¹⁸ The workers who petitioned for job protection told the Governor General: “Have you . . . seen . . . the thousands of foreigners . . . We—the true French—are enraged to be dragged in the mud.”¹⁹ They dubbed the “foreigners” as “part of a famous conspiracy in favor of Italy or Spain,” “foreign vermin,” “foreign lava, corrupt and nauseous,” and less civilized than the Arabs.²⁰ In the municipal electoral

competition in November, where Anti-Jewish *Ligue* president Régis led a popular ticket for mayor and city council, Laferrière supported an alternative ballot, what he called the “French party of order” against Régis’ “extremist” party.²¹ As Laferrière put it in a discussion of the fall elections, “Régis’ extremist gang of *antijuifs*” soundly defeated the “French and republican element.”²² And finally, though Régis and his allies swept the city elections, the Governor General quickly expelled him from local office.

Toward late 1898 and early 1899, many groups inside and outside Algiers fell in step with the trend and projected a narrowing definition of the “French.” In December 1898, after the anti-Jewish victories in the Algiers city elections, a newspaper declared Algiers “Régis’ fief, a boulevard of anti-Semitism,” and called for more electoral limitations on the “cosmopolitan” constituency and “anti-French agents.”²³ Another insisted that the radical *antijuif* electorate “is not French Algeria . . . The true French and their sons are not with them . . . look at the difference between Laferrière’s *Délégations Financières* (the new governing council) and that of the Algiers municipality.”²⁴ In January, Charles Sudraud, a former ally of Régis, published a pamphlet of principles for the *Parti républicain français-antijuif*. Sharing many of the same ideas with Régis about excluding the Jews in Algeria, Sudraud parted ways on who could be an “*antijuif français*” when he wrote that “all the naturalized . . . cannot all be French.”²⁵ In February, the newspaper *La Parole Française Anti-juive et Anti-séparatiste* appeared, claiming to be the “paper of French interests in Algeria.” Together, all these groups, in their efforts to assert some control and to separate themselves from Régis, the *Ligue antijuive*, and the neo-French settlers, helped draw a clearer and more formal distinction between the “French” and those who were not.

The *antijuifs* around Régis and the *Ligue* affirmed the growing divide between the “French” and those who were not. In reaction to the voter restrictions, Régis and his many neo-French allies protested as “Algerians,” not as “French *antijuifs*,” as they had done a few months before. Their newspaper *L’Antijuif* celebrated the “Algerian people” and “Our Algerian Revolution” (Ageron 1979: 64). In letters between Max Régis and his brother Louis, they agreed that, “Nothing is more natural than strong defiance against the French” (Ageron 1979: 65). In January 1899, Régis condemned the French parliament as “rotten to the core.” They invoked the principles of 1789 and cast themselves as “*le peuple*” and claimed to be the true representatives of “*la Patrie*.” Régis insisted that “the tricolor flag between the hands of a *naturalisé* is better placed than between the hands of the French of origin.”²⁶ In Paris, *antijuif* deputy Edouard Drumont, who went before the Parliament to defend Régis, expressed an even more profound sense of difference between the “French” and “Algerians” in Algeria when he stated: “a race

deeply French has formed, but one that differs a little from the elements of France; this race is composed of soldiers sons, sons of farmers . . . and sons of naturalized Italians and Spanish . . . who have created a new *patrie* . . . The Algerians—and there is such a thing as Algerians and an Algerian spirit—differ from the actual French . . . These are new French in a new France . . . the majority of whom shout “Down with the Jews!”²⁷

State authorities and anti-Jewish *Ligue*-affiliated activists entered into a cycle of marginalization and repression throughout 1899 and 1900. By early 1899, it was clear that the wider anti-Jewish coalition had broken up and moderates were disassociating themselves from Régis and the *Ligue*; the *Ligue* had diminished in size and diversity. As *Ligue* activists took up again an “anti-French” and “Algerian” revolutionary stance, it made them a clearer target for harsh state action and further marginalization. Local administration officials made repeated arrests and increasingly assertive demands to do something about the *Ligue*. At the same time, each arrest and release of anti-Jewish activists and leaders, especially Régis, was followed by a huge reception replete with anti-Jewish cheers and singing of the *Marseillaise Antijuive*. In September 1899, the rising tensions culminated in a siege at Régis’ *Villa Antijuive* on the edge of town, after which he escaped in the night. Once Régis returned to Algiers in 1900, the cycle started again. The end result was the isolation and criminalization of the *Ligue*. Along with the denouement of the Dreyfus Affair and in-fighting among *antijuifs* in the Algiers municipal government, this cycle led to a decline in the cogency and credibility of any formal political campaign against the Jews.

As anti-Jewish settlers split into camps of moderates and radicals in 1898, they also split into camps of “French” and “Algerian.” If “French” and “Algerian” settlers had rallied together in 1897 and early 1898, they competed with each other in the following years. State intervention and the strategies to subdue the anti-Jewish movement facilitated the development of two distinct political camps in Algiers—the “French,” on the one hand, and a clustered group of “Algerians,” “neo-French/foreigners,” and “extreme *antijuifs*” on the other; the ensuing political competition and escalation it inspired hardened the divide between those two camps. Along the way, “French” and “Algerian” took on new meaning and began to refer to different worlds, even if all the settlers using those terms were French citizens. “French” became more associated with the administration and moderation, with metropolitan France, French culture, and republicanism, while “Algerian” referred to *antijudaïsme*, excess, and antirepublicanism, to Algeria and local Algerian culture. If settlers moved more freely between expressing themselves as “French,” “Algerians,” and “*antijuif*” during the rise and peak of the anti-Jewish movement in 1897 and early 1898, this phase and the divide it created made that too difficult to do thereafter.

The Resolution of the Anti-Jewish Crisis

In April 1901, two events helped bring the anti-Jewish crisis in Algiers to a close. The first occurred on April 26 when a Righa tribe attacked the settler town of Margueritte outside of Algiers. Some Europeans were killed and harsh repression of the *indigènes* followed. A few days later, on April 29–30, a riot broke out in an Algiers cafe, sparked by Régis and a rival, and spread to the streets. The simultaneity of the two events created a sense of instability and anarchy in and around Algiers. The government blamed all radicals, settler and native. A shower of condemnation fell on both the *antijuifs* and *indigènes* and state authorities took decisive and harsh action against them. On May 8, Prefect Lutaud closed two *antijuif* cafes and dissolved their two main organizations—the *Comités antijuifs* and the *Jeunesse Antisemite Nationaliste*.²⁸ They organized more intense surveillance of *indigènes* around the city.²⁹ Recriminations against the already diminished *Ligue*-led anti-Jewish movement pushed it out of business: by 1902, advocates of anti-Jewish programs and organizations across Algeria were voted out of office, disappeared, or laid low for a while. Meanwhile, the attacks had created quite a scandal in France. Inquests and investigations followed, along with lengthy parliamentary debates. Trials of the Margueritte insurgents took place in France, so the publicity they garnered informed mainland French people about conditions in Algeria. This resulted in a flurry of debate on what to do with Algeria and the creation of many reform-oriented newspapers and organizations. As a way to avoid criticism about French rule in Algeria, the government opted to give Algeria more autonomy in governing its affairs, and endorsed a new policy of association over assimilation, which favored the development of a people within their own culture over assimilating them into French culture. In essence, France left Algeria alone.

What impact did the closing of the crisis have on the framework of political identities? First and most obvious, “anti-Jewish” political identity fell away in disrepute. The diminished campaign against the Jews and the constriction and criminalization of the *Ligue*, along with the end of the Dreyfus Affair, diluted much of the salience of “anti-Jewish” political identity. Expressions of “anti-Jewish” identity had come to be directed less and less toward the Jews in Algiers and more and more against other perceived enemies of the *antijuifs*—the *Maison du Peuple*, the central government, and “false republicans.” Being “anti-Jewish” was coming to signify a deep sense of alienation on the part of the radical *antijuifs*, a departure from the sense of strength and power it gave them in 1898. In a November 1900 meeting, Régis condemned the Jews for invading the nation “all the way to our literature and language . . . they’ve taken our soil, our gold and our language.”³⁰ These conditions also separated “anti-Jewish” identity more and more from being

“French” and associated it more tightly with other marginal groups—the “non-French/Algerians/foreigners” and later with “bandits,” “criminals” and “anti-Republicans.”³¹ On May 5, a newspaper article lamenting the “anarchy reigning in the beautiful city of Algiers” labeled Régis and his followers “The Bandits,” a term often used in reference to rebellious natives.³² By early 1901, police reports show how much a dichotomy between a sense of being “*antijouif*” and being “French”/“republican” entered common consciousness: an example is when Prefect Lutaud said “the anti-Jewish party is really the anti-Republican party.”³³ If being “anti-Jewish” had helped assimilate one into the community of “French,” it now made one an enemy of the state. Discredited from the outside and eroded from the inside, “anti-Jewish” identity went from being a viable, popular, institutionalized political identity to a constricted, marginalized, negative, and criminal label. It fell out of the political identity matrix in the early years of the 20th century.

The end of the crisis helped center “French” as a first-order political identity. “French” became *the* main basis for associating oneself with the metropole when engaged in political action in Algiers. It suggested attachment to metropolitan France and its institutions and acculturation to “republican” sensibilities and traditions. The *crise* helped redirect the diffuse and ill-defined category of “French” and orient it toward the metropole. In sum, it helped connect Algeria to France. Despite this shift, however, the social and cultural groups at the foundation of “French” identity in Algeria remained vague. Cultural sensibility, class, ethnic community attachments, and political alliances often confused the official lines of citizenship in determining who was “French.” Instead, the definition of “French” identity remained dependent on who was *not* French. The *crise* did accomplish the task of setting the “French” apart from all who were not—“Algerians,” “Jews,” “native Muslims,” “criminals,” “subversives,” and “clerics.” Even if the *crise antijouive* did not draw a clear line *around* the group of “French,” it helped consolidate a boundary *between* the “French” and other groups.

“Algerian” identity (along with “Jewish” and “Muslim” identities) became second-order political identities. While “Jewish” and “Muslim” referred to officially recognized cultural and religious communities, “Algerian” had become the main way to identify broadly in political contexts with local autonomy, Algeria and Algerian culture, and against the “French” and France. Most clearly, the crisis entrenched “Algerian” political identity as *the* main basis of resistance to France and the “French.” “Algerian” identity continued to define the rancorous relation between metropolitan French officials and the radical *antijouifs* but it also invoked a dimension of the more general relationship between “Algerians” and “French,” between Algeria and France. Holed up in his *Villa Antijouive* before the siege, Régis declared to his diminishing number of supporters: “*Algériennes, Algériens* . . . it’s the

moment of the Revolution!”³⁴ Sometimes referred to as the “savage Algerians” by Parisians, the term signified a cultural gulf between the metropolitan French and the settlers in Algeria. From the perspective of the “Algerians,” it was a marker of solidarity for those neglected or betrayed by France and a righteous claim to garner some semblance of local control in Algeria. In November 1900, Algiers Councilor General Lionne, a strong ally of Régis, recognized that gulf when he thanked “*les Algériennes et les Algériens*” at a meeting and promised to “go all over France to teach them about these slandered Algerians.”³⁵ Settlers were now in the position of identifying as *either* “French” or “Algerian,” not both. “French” and “Algerian” had come to represent different orientations to the wider world.

Reactions among Jews and Muslims followed parallel patterns. The state intervention and discrediting of the *Ligue*-led anti-Jewish activists opened the opportunity for some Jewish and Muslim elites to move away from the position of being “anti-French” (in reference to the “French” European settlers wreaking havoc in the streets and in local city government) and toward reasserting their identity as “French” or champions of some kind of “Franco-Muslim” rapprochement. They were still recognized as distinct from the “French” but the close of the crisis allowed for a range of association. “Jews” could drop that identity and get back to the business of being “French” while “Muslims” could foster tighter or looser versions of a “Franco-Muslim” union. The new opportunities exposed tensions within both Jewish and Muslim communities in Algiers. Internal factors, such as class and education, and external pressures—broader, transnational movements of the Islamic renaissance and Zionism—pushed “Jews” and “Muslims” to choose between two orientations, between two worlds—“French” on the one hand, and “native” or “Jewish” and “Muslim,” on the other. Competing cultural-political camps of “*Vieux*” (old guard) and “*Jeunes*” (new, younger guard) and emerged within communities of Jews and Muslims around the time of the crisis and after it ended. Though the crisis itself did not create the tensions, the end of it opened the chance to formally express them in the political arena. By the end of the crisis, “Muslim” and “Jew” had become official political identities, albeit elite ones, not mass-based.

The French government on the mainland affirmed and helped institutionalize the prevailing sense of divergence between the “French” and “non-French.” During the parliamentary debates, Algerian Senators Etienne and Thomson lumped together the perpetrators of Margueritte and Algiers—*antijouifs* and *indigenes*—as “*tous les violents*” when they “reproved all fanaticisms, all the racial and religious quarrels” (Ageron 1968: 969; Hebey 1996: 272–73). In 1900, when French metropolitan government officials adopted the policy of association, they promoted and institutionalized the boundaries among various groups in Algeria. The law was directed explicitly toward the

separate development of “French” and “native Muslim” cultures but the spirit of it confirmed a wider separation between the “French” and all others “not-quite-French.” Again, the crisis and its resolution did not put the idea of association in the minds of government officials, but it did prove the necessity of it and gave officials a platform for more outspoken endorsement of the policy. As Waldeck-Rousseau insisted in the wake of the Margueritte trials, it was wrong to have wanted to “lead the natives to our civilization”; he preferred to let them “evolve within their own” (Ageron 1968: 969).

The cultural divide between the “French” and “Algerians” expressed throughout the crisis also translated into an increasing sense of distance between France and Algeria by the end of it. If policymakers and imperialists had wanted to fold Algeria into France through a system of assimilation-style development, in essence, to make Algeria “French,” many were now declaring Algeria a civilization *à part*.³⁶ After these events, Prefect reports emphasize how *different* France and Algeria were from each other, that, in Algeria, they encounter “difficulties that we experience in no metropolitan city,” that “nowhere do we find such a diversity of races . . . all in conflict.”³⁷ They insist, “we must recognize that Algeria is not composed of French departments, that it constitutes a Colony.” The city of Algiers, the Prefect wrote, deserved the title of “grand African and Muslim capital.”³⁸ Algeria was no longer an extension of France, Algiers no longer the preeminent French city of the empire, and the Mediterranean no longer a “French lake.” Algeria and its first city were outlaws, the Mediterranean a vast ocean between two civilizations.

The resolution of the *crise antijuive* produced a configuration of identities in the political life of Algiers. This configuration was recognized by and utilized by certain sectors of society in France and Algeria, especially settlers and the government but also by Muslim and Jewish elites. It was inscribed in the political practices, institutions, and modes of protest around Algiers. It was confirmed in and formalized by official government policy. By the early twentieth century, “French” and “Algerian” had become predominant but very different answers to the question ‘Who are you?’ and ‘Who are they?’ for those active in the political life of Algiers. Future rounds of struggle attest to the enduring power of this configuration.

Political Identities in Early Twentieth-Century Algeria

In subsequent decades, “French” and “Algerian” remained important bases of political identification. A bit of anecdotal evidence shows persistent use of those terms in the years following the *crise antijuive*. In 1906, census takers complained that some settlers insisted on identifying themselves as

“Algerian” though it was not an official census category. Educators, colonial theorists, and policymakers in Algeria and France worried, and wrote prolifically, about the inability of the “Algerian” settlers to ever become “French.” Authors such as Robert Randau, Louis Bertrand, and the creator of the *Cagayous* serial depicted “Algerian” and “French” types in their popular novels and essays. Government authorities eliminated the separate category of “Jews” from the census in 1911 and put them into the category of “French” or “naturalized French.” Policy makers set up separate “native Muslim” apprenticeship schools so the natives could practice their own traditional trades and crafts. The coterie of native reformers in Algiers, along with reformers, intellectuals, and tourists from France, celebrated an Arabic and Islamic culture and emphasized “Franco-Muslim” association, indicated in the names of new clubs, organizations, and newspapers. Before and after World War I, debates flared about conscription and French citizenship rights for “native Muslims.” Politics in the aftermath of the crisis kept “French” and “Algerian” as primary bases of identification, brought “native Muslim” identity to the forefront and, for the time being, pushed “Jewish” identity to the background.

In the post-World War I period, the economic, political, social, and cultural trends affecting the European mainland and other European colonies helped to recalibrate the political environment for inhabitants of Algeria as well. The Muslim population increased dramatically to approximately 5 million in 1926 (up from 4 million in 1900), and moved steadily to land and towns of the interior, to coastal cities of Algeria, and some on to France. Alongside the impoverishment of many Muslims, a small, urban, educated middle class (called the *évolués*) grew. By contrast, the European population increased more slowly to about 800,000, and moved steadily off the land to the major cities of Algiers and Oran (Ageron 1991: 82–83). Many settlers, Arabs, Berbers, and Jews in Algeria got wind of fascist and communist ideas and were exposed to those transnational political movements and international networks. The initial support for colonial independence by the Communist International inspired some natives of Algeria to mobilize. For example, Messali Hadj, living in Paris, began organizing North African workers in France. In 1926, he helped bring thousands together around the Communist Party-associated *Etoile Nord Africaine* (E.N.A.). Hadj and the E.N.A. reflected another trend common in this period: the migration of Algerian natives to the metropole for work and education. Economic developments of the 1920s fostered the growth of native middle and working classes. In 1927, Ferhat Abbas and Ben Djelloul, from the eastern region around the city of Constantine, formed the *Fédération des Elus*, from which they advocated an extension of French citizenship rights to an elite native Muslim core. In the late 1920s, native Muslim dockworkers organized strikes in the port city of

Algiers. As well, some native religious elites continued to celebrate Islamic and Arabic culture and make demands for greater cultural autonomy. Emir Khaled initiated this sort of political advocacy in the early 1920s; it coalesced in the formation of the Association of Reforming Oulema in May 1931 by thirteen Muslim scholars in Algeria seeking to return their people to an Islamic purity. They summed up their position in the famous motto—"Islam is our religion, Algeria is our country, Arabic is our language"—and introduced new words into Arabic such as "Algerian nation."

Economic collapse in 1929 inspired a broader wave of political mobilization among both settlers and natives in Algeria. The range and scope of organizations that became active in the early 1930s was striking. French national and international organizations, such as the *Parti Communist Français* (P.C.F.), *Action Française*, the *Ligue internationale contre l'antisemitisme*, and the *Ligue des droits de l'homme*, opened local offices in Algeria. The native groups described above increased membership as they edited newspapers, led meetings, and delivered petitions. In addition to these larger movements, a whole host of smaller groups were born or became more active. In Algiers, there were, for example, the *Cartel des Services Publics*, the *Front Algérien du Commerce, de l'industrie et de l'artisanat*, the *Comité de Défense de Chomeurs*, the *Cercle du Progrès*. Some groups had exclusive European settler or native Muslim membership, while others were genuinely mixed. They called for a variety of measures and solutions such as more public works projects, nationalization of industry, reduction of state taxes, and job protections and training. All types of political programs were offered, from the corporatism of the *Ligue pour le Droit au Travail et le Progrès Social* to the imitation of Soviet-style communism. Some adopted the strategy of public meetings, electoral campaigns, and publications, while others adopted strikes, protests, and demonstrations. The variety of organizations, agendas, proposals, and tactics was remarkable.³⁹

Political mobilization in Algerian towns and cities in this period drew on the existing framework of identities in obvious ways. Based on discourses, organizational names, manifestos, and agendas, it was clear that some inhabitants continued to utilize the categories "French," "native-Muslim," "Algerian" and sometimes represented those worlds as very different. Yet, this period of mobilization also reshaped that framework. In addition to "French," "native-Muslim," and "Algerian," participants represented themselves and others as "North African," "communist," "fascist," "socialist," "progressive," "dockworker," "Islamic," "reformist," "Arabic," "elected official" (some natives could vote and be elected for local office), "Francophile," "artisan," "industrialist," and "unemployed." "Muslim" was becoming a popular political identity, adopted by elites and followers. Political identities overlapped with class, regional, professional, and cultural identities and were

therefore infused with new meaning. Moreover, some of those terms, such as “unemployed” and “elected officials” served to bring settlers and natives together, even if their association was superficial and intermittent. Even “Jew” and “anti-Semite” reentered the field of political discourse and identification. This meant that inhabitants in Algeria (at least in the towns and cities of northern Algeria) acquired a wider set of options for identifying themselves and others while engaged in political action. It introduced some modes for bridging native and settler worlds, at least in the realm of politics. And this period of political organization and agitation reopened the question of how the inhabitants of those two worlds might identify themselves and others. Momentarily, in the atmosphere of fluctuating identities, “French” and “Algerian” were somewhat disconnected from the settlers and “native-Muslim” from the natives, and the strength of opposition between the two social groups reduced.

The climate in Algeria shifted dramatically in May 1936 when the Popular Front government came to power in France. The new Leftist government raised expectations about improving conditions in Algeria for all those adversely affected by economic depression, including workers, farmers, small shopkeepers, and native elites. In June, the Popular Front opted to back a proposal extending citizenship to a tiny sector of the native Muslim elites. The reaction was immediate and strong from all corners of Algeria. The proposal provoked a storm of reaction both in support and in opposition; groups took one side or the other. Patterns of protest and mobilization shifted as well. When everyone got word of the Blum-Viollette bill, many of the organizations active in the early 1930s abandoned other reform efforts and took sides in favor or opposition to it. They shifted their discussions from a mix of economic, political, and cultural concerns to a honed battle over citizenship rights. The wide spectrum of groups and activities in Algiers in the early part of 1936 gave way to a mass politics in the latter half of the year. Larger organizations, such as the P.C.F., the *Parti Social Français* (a new political party), and the *Congrès Musulman* (a coalition of Muslim-native/Arab-Berber groups), rallied as umbrellas for smaller groups. Small-scale modes of organization, such as meetings, soup kitchens, club gatherings, and protests gave way to large-scale, mass-based stadium rallies and demonstrations. Many of the disparate organizations mentioned above, including the national and international organizations as well as the local mixed groups, eventually fell in line with one side or the other, or simply disappeared. The bill never even made it to the parliamentary floor for a vote before it was dropped. Soon after, the encroaching war in Europe diverted attention away from the problems of Algeria.

Not surprisingly, this phase of intense mobilization in the summer of 1936 and the ensuing months altered and realigned the framework of political

identities in Algeria. Forced to take sides on the issue, many inhabitants put aside differences and clustered into camps of “French” and “Muslims.” Many native elites and their supporters rallied together in the Muslim Congress and made their case in favor of the bill as “Muslims,” as representatives of a special Islamic-Arabic cultural heritage, whose contribution to “French” civilization in Algeria merited political reward. In other words, out of the range of possible labels such as “North African,” “Algerian,” “worker,” “Arab” or “Berber,” native elites and their followers elected to rally as “Muslims.” It was an old mode of solidarity and the most popular and effective rallying point in Algeria at the time, for the “Frenchified” middle class was in the minority, the “North African” workers were in Paris, and the regionalism of a pan-Arabic or pan-Islamic movement gave way to a focus on national rights. Opponents of the bill, which included many of the settlers, rallied into various “French” parties as defenders of “French” culture and civilization and, ironically, as protectors of “Muslim” culture. They opted to organize and present their case as “French,” rather than through any of the other modes of group solidarity, such as “Algerian,” “progressive,” or “worker.” Since the Socialist and Communist parties of the Popular Front in Paris had chosen nationalism over internationalism, currying favor with the “French” was the safest bet for the settlers. Certainly, social, economic, demographic, and cultural trends of the interwar period contributed to the array of identities that were available and resonant with inhabitants, but it was a state-led action—the proposed citizenship reform—and the decision of social movement organizations to rally their forces on one side or the other that converted those tendencies into the broad popular use of “Muslim” and “French” identities by late 1936.

This push to choose sides over the citizenship reform bill and the sense of victory and disappointment for settlers and native elites served to rebuild the walls between native and settler worlds and to reinforce the divide between “French” and “Muslim” identities. It made “Muslim” into a mass-based political identity, as it converted a wide sector of culturally or religiously oriented Muslims (especially elites, workers, educated professionals, the unemployed, and shopkeepers in northern towns and cities) to the cause of the Muslim Congress. Finally, the political mobilization in the late 1930s widened the use and recognition of this framework of political identities beyond the city of Algiers to towns and cities across northern Algeria, to urban areas where Muslim elites and workers were active and where most settlers lived. In sum, reaction to and dismissal of the proposed Blum-Viollette reforms consolidated particularistic and varying tensions among and between various groups of natives and settlers into broader, antagonistic “French” and “Muslim” political communities.

Another effect of the mobilizations of 1936 was to open the possibility of associating “Algerian” identity with the Muslim natives. The anti-Jewish crisis constructed “Algerian” political identity as one of settler-based resistance. In the decades following the crisis, settlers continued to identify as “Algerians,” especially in contests with the “French.” For example, in the early 1920s, “Algerian” settlers renewed their cries for more autonomy from France; authors created an *Algérieniste* literary movement. In the 1930s, they led and supported powerful local organizations in Algiers, such as the *Union Republicaine Democratique et Sociale d’Alger* (the local political machine of Raymond Laquière) and the lobby for the Algiers petite bourgeoisie, the *Front Algérien du Commerce, de l’Industrie et de l’Artisanat*. When the Blum-Viollette reform bill was proposed in 1936, however, many settlers abandoned this stance in favor of mobilizing together as “French” against the “Muslims.” It momentarily undercut “Algerian” identity as a basis for settler political mobilization because it put them in the position of having to choose. Around the same time, Messali Hadj and supporters from the *Etoile Nord Africaine* opted out of the Muslim Congress and called for more broad-based changes and national independence. They did so as “Algerians.” Having broken with the Communists, Hadj returned from Paris to Algeria in 1936, formed a new group in March of 1937 and named it the *Parti du Peuple Algérien* (Algerian People’s Party). Again, as in the anti-Jewish crisis of the late 1890s, contestation among state authorities and social movement organizations helped anchor the oppositional orientation of “French” and “Algerian” identities, the former toward the metropole and the latter to local resistance. This time, however, “Algerian” shifted away from being a strictly settler identity and opened up an association with native Muslim Arabs. For the moment, World War II put these concerns to the side without settling who would ultimately belong to either the “French” or the “Algerians.”

Political Identities in the Post-World War II Period

The *question d’algérie* was reopened in the post-World War II period. Again, social, demographic, economic, cultural, and political trends altered the political environment in Algeria. Anticolonial movements were forming and mobilizing, sometimes successfully, nearby in Morocco and Tunisia and in other parts of the world. In Algeria, the Muslim population continued to expand exponentially, to about 8 million, half of which was under the age of 20 and most of whom were living in a subsistence economy. A large number had lived in France, as workers or soldiers, and now resided in the cities of Algeria, experiences that raised awareness of the deep disparities between the lives of Europeans and Muslims in Algeria. Europeans had

reached nearly a million, 70 percent of them born in Algeria, and almost all of them living in the major cities of Algiers and Oran. Continuing debates on the official status of Algeria and the rights of native Muslims resulted in a few changes right after the war: a new status for Algeria (the *Statut d'Algérie*), the institution of a separate governing body for the territory (the *Assemblée Algérienne*), and rights to vote in it for Muslim inhabitants. These changes were too much for some, too little and too late for others. Corruption undermined them. In 1945, the outbreak of violence and repression in the town of Sétif raised the tensions in Algeria. On November 1, 1954, a small, armed group launched an insurrection in eastern Algeria and the *Front de libération nationale* (F.L.N.) proclaimed leadership of a movement for the end of colonial rule. State officials and inhabitants in France and Algeria, along with outsiders and anyone with something at stake in Algeria jumped into the fray.

Many parties involved in debate and action in the early years of the war did so within the political identity framework that had formed at the turn of the century and had been transformed during the late 1930s. The terms “French” and “Algerian” pervaded much of the discourse in the early years of the war. Settlers, natives, state officials, and outsiders, for the most part, referred to themselves and each other as “the Algerian people,” “*nous Algériens*,” “the French.” While “French” and “Algerian” were predominant bases of political identification and solidarity, people also identified as “Muslim,” “student,” “Jew,” “Arab,” “Berber,” “worker,” and “woman,” among others. As was the case in previous rounds of political mobilization, people utilized these terms in certain patterned and recognizable ways.

The meaning of “French” and “Algerian” tended to remain anchored in a particular orientation to the relationship between France and Algeria. Those who identified as “French” tended to look to metropolitan France and advocate the maintenance of a strong relationship between France and Algeria. Some championed an *Algérie française*, others a federal or associationist solution, or further integration of Algeria into France. On January 14, 1956, the *Front Français d'Algérie* formed the *Comité d'action de défense de l'Algérie française* and called for “equal association of the two Algerian communities.”⁴⁰ Alain de Sérigny, a leader of the *Comité de salut public d'Alger* and owner of the widely read *Echo d'Alger*, promoted ties between “our metropolitan compatriots” and “the French of origin living in Algeria.”⁴¹ Followers of the rightist presidential candidate Pierre Poujade and the Federation of Algerian mayors spoke for “Our people—the French people of Algeria, the Algerian group of French people” as members of a larger “*Union française*” and called for keeping “French” influence in North Africa.⁴² The *Comité d'action pour une République fédérale française* lobbied for a federal solution because it respected “the particularisms” of the

two communities and associated “the two populations in the management of their common interests.”⁴³ The *ultras*, such as Joseph Ortiz’s *Front National Français* and Pierre Lagailarde’s “Group of Seven,” considered themselves the “great army of the *maquis*” as they fought to save their *Algérie française*. Settlers were not the only ones to advocate strong association with France and to represent themselves as part of the community of “French.” Some native elected and appointed officials (*élus musulmans*) from Constantine demanded “total and immediate integration” of Algeria into France; some from Oran, namely Sid Cara, advocated an increase in their “French” rights and for Algeria and France to stay united.⁴⁴ From metropolitan France, Charles de Gaulle stated, “France believes that in Algeria there is only one category of people, there are only French people” (Chevallier 1958: 22, 24).

In contrast to those advocating the preservation of an *Algérie française*, those identified as “Algerian” generally shared the idea that major reforms were necessary, especially for the majority native Muslim population, and advocated more autonomy from France. The F.L.N. addressed their initial proclamation of war for national independence on November 1, 1954, to “the Algerian people.” Certain *élus musulmans*, more far-thinking than those mentioned above but less *indépendentist* than the F.L.N., rejected integration and demanded recognition of “the idea of an Algerian nation” but without total divorce from France. Rather, they envisioned “autonomy for Algeria within the framework of interdependence.”⁴⁵ Not ready to back full independence either, the Algerian Communist Party did, nevertheless, begin to speak of an “Algerian people” (Ageron 1979: 601); Jacques Duclos of the French Communist Party demanded that the “legitimate aspirations of the Algerian people” be recognized.⁴⁶ Frantz Fanon, the famed theorist of Third World revolutions, claimed that he “belonged to an Algerian community” (Fanon 1965: 175). In his book *Nous, Algériens . . .*, Jacques Chevallier, the former mayor of Algiers and a strong advocate of reform, argued that “Algerians” are “conscious of the evolution of people and ideas” (Chevallier 1958: 10).

“French” and “Algerian” were associated more with the above political orientation than with a clear set of social groups or cultural attributes. In fact, participants projected varying criteria for belonging to either group. The groups who rallied behind a “French” Algeria projected different images of “the French,” “France,” who belonged, where the boundaries were and why. Some projected a picture of the community of “French” as including Europeans all over the French empire. Others considered the “French” to be all Europeans with “French” citizenship status, regardless of cultural background. Still others viewed the “French” as of metropolitan origin regardless of citizenship. Some Muslim politicians in Algeria, and politicians and intellectuals in mainland France, offered a picture of the “French” that included

the large Muslim population in Algeria. In speeches, DeGaulle referred to “all the French, including the ten million French in Algeria,” suggesting that everyone in Algeria was French (Chevallier 1958: 22, 24). Those not included in the “French” ranged from those of Muslim faith, those naturalized as French, and those outside the borders of mainland France or the empire.

Like their “French” counterparts, the parties for greater autonomy projected different images of “the Algerians.” Groups that came under the umbrella of the F.L.N., such as the *Mouvement de la triomphe pour la liberté démocratique*, the *Parti du Peuple Algérien*, the ulemas, unions, and cultural associations fiercely (and sometimes violently) debated the core of that nascent nationality (Abbas 1962; Horne 1987; Quandt 1969). Duclos of the P.C.F. claimed that the “Algerian nation” comprised “Muslim Algerians and those who come from France.”⁴⁷ Fanon adopted a rather broad, multiracial, and socially grounded notion of “Algerian” nationality that included Europeans, Jews, and outsiders. According to Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism* is a description of “an Algerian European’s awakening to a consciousness of his Algerian nationality” (Fanon 1970: 163). As for the Jews, Fanon writes, “there is no problem: they are Algerians” (Fanon 1970: 157). Fanon concluded that, “Language, culture—these are not enough to make you belong to a people. Something more is needed: a common life, common experiences and memories, common aims . . .” (Fanon 1970: 175).⁴⁸ The *Union Générale des Etudiants Musulmans Algériens* declared to Fanon and other European supporters, who expressed worry about banishment at independence, that “You are Algerians, just as we are” (Fanon 1970: 172). Chevallier described the “Algerians” as those whose ancestors had toiled on the land for many generations, those “who could no longer leave” (Chevallier 1958: 12). To be “Algerian” was to be special, it was to speak “not only in French, but in Algerian”; the Algerian community was “unique in the world” and must be defined “by the Algerians themselves” (Chevallier 1958: 12, 34). He concludes that “We are all there, on the same line, together the Muslims and us . . . and because it’s our common land and we its inhabitants, whatever our origin, we are first and foremost Algerians” (Chevallier 1958: 169). If the “we” was broad, so was the “they”—those not included in the “Algerians” ranged from the “French,” “war criminals,” “torturers,” and “jackals” (Fanon 1970: 152). The “Algerians” are not, as Chevallier says, the “extremists,” those who have a “nostalgic and anachronistic” view of the past (Chevallier 1958: 10).

Political orientation to the metropole, more than any particular social or cultural group, explains why mixed groups of settlers, Jews, natives, metropolitans, and outsiders were able to claim to be “French” or “Algerian” early on in the war. If the social and cultural foundation was rather broad in the early years of the war, that openness quickly gave way to other

narrower foundations. After 1956, F.L.N. activists, settler groups, and the military stepped up their campaigns of violence, intimidation, and mass protest. The violence peaked in the Battle of Algiers in 1957. In the aftermath of that battle, more and more Arabs, Berbers, and Muslims lined up behind the F.L.N. and secession from France as “Algerians”; as more settlers demanded military action and protection, they did so as “French.” In 1961, after DeGaulle announced the prospect of independence for Algeria, a block of settlers, considering themselves betrayed by the “French,” formed the famous *Organisation de l’armée secrète* (O.A.S.) and led a series of violent underground operations against both the French military and the F.L.N. In alliance with French army generals, they lay claim to Algeria and prepared to lead their own breakaway state. At this point, all parties had to make the choice between separation and integration, between France and Algeria, between being “French” or “Algerian.” Outsiders, such as the U.N., the United States, and other Arab nations, began to recognize the F.L.N. as the legitimate leadership of the “true Algerians” and an independent Algeria. By mid-1962, so too did the French government. It was only in the waning moments of the war that the “parties” to the war became clear. The final phase of the war solidified the association of “Algerian” with the F.L.N., native Muslims, Arabs, and Berbers, and a sovereign Algeria, and the association of “French” with the settlers, metropolitan France, and Europe. The end of the war and the Evian Accords formalized the separation of the two countries and marked the “French” and “Algerians” as worlds apart.

As in earlier phases of conflict in French-ruled Algeria, key conditions contributed to the construction and reconstruction of political identities articulated during the war. A predominant cluster of salient political identities framed the way people initially got involved in debates over the *question d’algerie*. This essay has traced the historical formation of that framework of identities and pinpointed where the terms “French” and “Algerian” first became mass-based and oppositional political identities, and where they shifted from being primarily settler-based identities to being associated with either settlers or native Muslims. This identity framework, with its delimited categories of “French” and “Algerian,” and the deep divide between them, undergirded the first phase of the war and was not open to debate. Once framed this way, the broadening of conflict from a punctuated insurrection to widespread war reconstructed those terms as even more mass-based and oppositional political identities. Two cycles of marginalization and repression among the French military, the F.L.N., and the O.A.S. further divided the “French” and “Algerians” and compelled more people to line up on either side. Outside pressure and recognition helped forge the cultural attributes of and the permanent divide between those two communities. Certainly, social conditions, demographic features, and cultural traditions were

reflected in dominant group identities in Algeria, but it was these key political factors—actions among social movement organizations, state authorities, and outsiders—that consolidated the meaning and boundaries of “French” and “Algerian” political identities throughout the long period of French rule in Algeria.

As described earlier, the three dominant paradigms for understanding the Algerian War—“state-centered,” “nationalist,” and “settler-centered”—offer compelling accounts of many of its aspects: the motivations for launching an armed conflict; the reasons for supporting and opposing it; the sequence of events and conditions that escalated it; the location and timing; and why some sectors of the population in Algeria and France took part in and led certain actions. While rich and informative, these accounts do tend to take an important dimension of the war for granted—who fought it. They simply assume the existence of “French” and “Algerians,” of “settlers,” “natives,” and “the state” at the onset of war and build their explanations on top of these categorical frameworks. Building on insights from a newer generation of scholarship, this essay has made those categories the object of analysis. I have analyzed a dimension of the war not covered by the existing historiography—the patterns of political identification on the eve of war, the root origins of the framework within which people identified themselves and others, and why those patterns changed during the war. I have explained how and why people opted to fight the war as “French” and “Algerians,” in these terms rather than as “Muslims,” “Europeans,” “Arabs,” “workers,” “settlers,” or “Africans,” and why it was nearly impossible to be both “French” and “Algerian” by the 1950s and even more so once the war had begun. In other words, I have sought to unearth the reasons why a small-scale armed insurrection in 1954 eventually escalated into a full-scale war between “French” and “Algerians.” In sum, an examination of these categories of political identification tells us who fought the Algerian War.

By answering these sorts of questions, the analysis actually challenges our current definitions of this large-scale violent conflict. There are three common ways of defining the conflict: as a case of decolonization, of revolution, or of settler colonial war. The definitions correspond to the historiographical schools of thought. From the “missed opportunities” perspective, France’s painful and brutal loss of Algeria in this never officially declared war constitutes a very difficult moment of postwar “decolonization.” From the “nationalist” perspective, the coming together of collective consciousness and mobilization by native Arab and Berber Muslims to overthrow the repressive nature of French rule makes it a “revolution.” The presence of a sizable settler population made the 1950s Algerian conflict into a classic “settler colonial war,” according to the “settler-centered” view. Each of these paradigms and their corresponding definitions of the conflict depend

on the existence of rather clear-cut social camps at odds and motivated to go to war with each other. Certainly, these social groups—settlers, natives, and state officials—existed and were separated from each other in important ways. In fact, inhabitants of Algeria lived within a complex grid of formal and informal social differences that organized peoples' everyday lives, within communities separated and made unequal by language, occupation, religion, class, citizenship status, region, gender, and many others. But inhabitants did not enter the conflict in 1954 according to these lines of division. Settlers were not all mobilized together as "settlers" or as "French": as Fanon asserts, the Europeans in Algeria were far from a monolithic block (Fanon 1965). Nor were all the native Arabs and Berbers rallied around being "*indigène*," "Muslim" or "Algerian." The onset of the conflict activated another important and durable difference—one's relationship to the metropole—and compelled people to identify with one of two communities, those more closely tied to the metropole and those more oriented to local Algerian life. "French" and "Algerian" identity corresponded to these communities; the divide between "French" and "Algerian" corresponded to the divide between those two communities. This analysis suggests that we rethink some of our current definitions of the conflict in Algeria, based as they are on certain categorical frameworks, and be wary that they do not overdetermine our explanations of the war and misrepresent some of the dynamics of struggle during the war.

The essay suggests that beneath the conceptions of the conflict as decolonization, revolution, and settler colonial war was a basic struggle to define the relations between a core state and peripheral territory. From the beginning of French rule in 1830, Algeria and its inhabitants existed somewhere between being a real part of France and a special territory of the empire. The status of Algeria vis-à-vis France was constructed on contradictory and particularistic principles, sometimes assimilationist, sometimes associationist. Some institutions and practices made it mirror a French department while others made it more like a colony. The balance of elements shifted back and forth over time, sometimes through a course of negotiation and political lobbying, as was the case around 1936, other times through violent confrontations, evidenced in the anti-Jewish crisis of the late 1890s. Certain conditions in the post-World War II period—other successful national liberation struggles around the globe, the receptivity of the French state to some reforms, the increased level of dissatisfaction among native Muslims, and corruption and repression in Algeria—reopened those debates and the opportunities on the part of various groups to redefine or reset the balance of those relations of power among them. The spectrum of positions stretched from total integration to total separation, and mixed options in between; positions were based on whether local or national authorities would have more say in governing

Algerian affairs, especially regarding the disenfranchised Muslim majority. All along the way, from the *crise* to the 1950s war, the construction and reconstruction of the boundary between France and Algeria went hand in hand with constructing and reconstructing the “French” and “Algerians.” When France and Algeria were ill-defined, so were the “French” and “Algerians”; when groups fought over the relationship between France and Algeria, they fought over the nature of being “French” and “Algerian”; when forced to choose sides between integration and separation, they became “French” or “Algerian.” This conceptualization of the war as a core-periphery conflict opens up, rather than predetermines, our interpretation of it. It also broadens the comparative possibilities for the Algerian War, from other cases of decolonization, settler colonial, and anticolonial nationalist revolutions, to long-term core-periphery struggles elsewhere, for example, between Spain and Catalonia and the Basque country, between the US and Puerto Rico and Hawaii, and between the Canadian state and Quebec.

Could the war have turned out differently? All three paradigms suggest to varying degrees that things had gone too far, for too long; the war could not have been prevented. The nationalists and settler colonial war accounts contend that the economic and social inequities, segregation, and monopolies of power built into the settler-dominated system of rule precluded the chance for political reforms to stave off armed revolt by a disenfranchised majority population. The “missed opportunities” approach argues that political reforms in earlier periods (1936 especially) could have fostered a larger liberal voice bent on preventing war and national liberation. By the mid-1950s, the argument goes, the liberal minority was too small and drowned out; the third way, the middle ground was gone. Much scholarship, then, focuses on the factors bringing people to the brink of war.

They are right that many options had closed down by the mid-1950s, but not all had. This analysis of political identities helps sort out the nearly inevitable from the issues still open to negotiation even during the war. Which identities would prevail in the war was fairly well set by the 1950s. As far back as 1902, in the wake of the anti-Jewish crisis, the salient modes of identification in political contests involving the state had become “French” and “Algerian.” “French” had become the most effective way of allying oneself with the metropole and central state; “Algerian” had become the dominant mode of resistance to the “French.” This dominant identity cluster animated future political conflicts including the war of the 1950s. In a struggle over the relationship between France and Algeria, participants would, again, opt to fight in those terms, as “French” and “Algerian.” Second, the anti-Jewish crisis also instituted the deep divide between those two communities, making them incompatible and worlds apart. One was “French” or “Algerian,” depending on the circumstances, not both simultaneously. This extended

into the 1930s, the post-WWII period, and up through the 1950s war. By then, “French” and “Algerian” signaled such different visions—of the relationship between France and Algeria, of one’s ties to the metropole, of one’s attachment to Algeria, of the distance across the Mediterranean. The dividing line between the “French” and “Algerians” was already so deeply drawn by formal laws as well as informal perceptions and routines that full separation or integration seemed to be the more plausible options. As the war drew the line more deeply, it drew the choice between total integration and total separation ever more starkly. Total integration was highly unlikely since metropolitan French people had never conceived of Algeria as truly part of France and were unprepared to fully integrate it. As Ian Lustick has argued, the French state had never fostered a “hegemonic conception” that incorporated Algeria (including the settlers) as part of France (Lustick 1993). Because of the enduring boundary between the world of what was “French” and that which was “Algerian,” separation of France and Algeria was a much more likely outcome of the conflict. These features of the identity framework—its delimited categories and the deep divide between them—undergirded the conflict but were not open to debate, neither on the eve of war, nor as the war proceeded.

The only feature open to debate in the early years of the war was *who*—which social and cultural groups—inhabited the categories of “French” and “Algerian.” The anti-Jewish crisis of the 1890s established “French” and “Algerian” as primarily settler-based identities; the 1936 political mobilization helped close off “French” to Muslims and Islamic culture and opened “Algerian” to them. The same reasons that made total integration of Algeria into France unlikely also made it improbable that “French” identity would truly incorporate native Muslims and settlers. Things were different for “Algerian” identity. When the *question d’algerie* reopened in the post-World War II period and numerous parties competed to define who belonged among the “true Algerians” and on what basis, they demonstrated that the issue was not yet settled. “Algerians” *could* be represented as Muslim, but also as European, sympathetic outsider, Jew, a toiler on the land, an advocate of change. This is not to say that all individual settlers, natives, Jews, metropolitans, and outsiders could freely choose to identify as “French” or “Algerian,” or that they all *did*, or *could*, live, work, and play side by side in mixed communities across Algeria. It just means that a certain universe of possibilities, a range of options for defining “Algerian,” were wider in the early years of the war than in 1960 or 1962. If confrontations among state actors and social movement organizations, the double cycle of repression and marginalization, and outsider pressures produced this shift, then different actions on their parts could have pushed “Algerian” identity in different directions.

In other words, state authorities, the F.L.N., and settler-based organizations *could* have established a different foundation for being “Algerian,” one that referred to the territory and time invested there, one that included both Muslim natives and settler Europeans. This is not to say that simply with a greater number of reform-minded liberals like Chevallier they could have tipped the balance in favor of a more inclusive and less contentious Algeria. Rather, in the early years of the war, the French state, under the leadership of Fourth Republic presidents or Charles DeGaulle, along with the F.L.N. and important settler political organizations, as well as outsiders like the United Nations and the United States, with the backing and legitimacy they carried with them, could have brokered an agreement that defined an independent Algeria and “the Algerian people” differently from the definition that emerged in 1962. The French state had the power to initiate independence earlier on the condition that certain power-sharing institutions were in place; settler-based organizations and the F.L.N. could have agreed to that; outsiders could have pressed for it. This scenario is not unlike the transition that has occurred in the last few years in Northern Ireland. Instead, both “French” and “Algerian” identities became more exclusive.

If identities are powerful mechanisms for constructing action, as this essay has shown, and those identities—their breadth, salience, degree of inclusivity and exclusivity—shape the way people get involved in the conflict, which goals they set, which methods they use to achieve those goals, who they perceive to be their allies and enemies, then the closure of “French” and “Algerian” identities helped set the war on a course toward the actual outcome. Rather than fostering the construction of an “Algerian” identity more inclusive of both Europeans and Muslims, settlers and natives, the war made the “French” into European colonizers and the “Algerians” into native Muslim colonized. Chevallier hints at what is coming when he wonders, “isn’t our role to be the bridge between France and Islam?,” when he claims that Algeria is supposed to be “the avant-garde of Islam in the West and also of France in Islam” (Chevallier 1958: 176–78). So does Fanon when he argues that shared experiences and political consciousness, not blood, language or religion, define the “Algerians.” Thus, counter to the assumptions of many scholarly and popular accounts that the Algerian war was practically inevitable, sorting out the conditions of political identity formation shows that not all aspects of it were so determined.

The Present and Future of Post-Independence

Like any devastating crisis of violence on a grand scale, the memory of the Algerian war has lingered for a long time on both sides of the

Mediterranean. Officially speaking, the French refer to it as the never-declared “*guerre d’algérie*,” while successive F.L.N.-dominated administrations in Algeria keep alive the idea of the “Revolution.” Despite ongoing ties between France and Algeria in the years since the war, especially economic interdependence and the waves of migration to France, current controversies regularly build on and reinvigorate the durable distance between the “French” and the “Algerians.” The civil war in Algeria in the 1990s coalesced around camps of Francophone and Arabic-speaking military generals, moderate and radical Islamic organizations, secularists and fundamentalists, and Arab and Berber culturalists, creating an imperative to choose between Islam or the West, between an orientation toward France or Algeria (Addi 1994; Ciment 1997; Harbi 1994; Stone 1997; Willis 1997). Similar difficult choices must be made in France in regular culture wars over such issues as Muslim girls wearing the veil in school, immigration policy, and the degree to which the World Cup Soccer players of various cultural backgrounds were French. Not surprisingly, *ultra* settler activists of the Algerian war like Jean-Jacques Susini, forced to migrate to France after 1962, form a solid network of support for the *Front National*, an organization on the front lines of a battle to define “French” identity in fundamental opposition to the presence of millions of “Algerians” living in France today. Though the war has died down in Algeria and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin has openly celebrated the “multicultural” face of French nationality, the sense of distinction and even antinomy between “French” and “Algerian” cultures and societies continues.

It is this framework that shapes the way we look back on the intertwined pasts of these two countries, especially the period of the Algerian War of the 1950s. In both countries, the historical narratives organized the war as a conflict of intractable warring blocs of “French” and “Algerians,” or of *colons*, *fellaghin*, and soldiers, each entrenched in a high-stakes struggle to realize an exclusive vision of Algeria’s future, be it *Algérie française*, an Algerian nation, or *la plus grand France*. As the actual events themselves recede, these images and historical narratives continue to feed our contemporary collective memory and keep alive the tensions among people in France and Algeria today. The inability to exit this feedback loop running between a brutal war and its equally cruel reminders has left us with a stagnant and selective view of the past and present, what Benjamin Stora calls “gangrene and amnesia,” and an incapacity to overcome the sense of a vast gulf between the world of what is “French” and that which is “Algerian” (Stora 1998).

This project has been an attempt to come at the same questions in a more oblique manner. My examination of the process by which “French” and “Algerian” identities formed in Algeria over the last two centuries shows that the history of those two communities is, indeed, much more intertwined than

our collective memories suggest. The rounds of conflict and mobilization in Algeria, from the *crise antijuive* at the turn of the century, to the mass demonstrations around the Blum-Viollette reform in 1936, to the war in the 1950s, drove “French” and “Algerians” further apart at the same time the developing structures of each community identity became more dependent on the other. Contrary to the idea of two discrete historical trajectories, this study shows that to be “Algerian” is to sustain a mix of historical influences from European settlers, Arabs and Berbers, and the wider Islamic world of the Mediterranean. Similarly, to be “French” is to live in a melting pot of different cultures—African and Islamic, European and Mediterranean (Noriel 1996). If history closed down some of those options along the way, knowledge of that history can translate into alternative possible futures.

ENDNOTES

1. Here and throughout, I use quotations around terms of collective group identity like “French” and “Algerian.” The use of quotation marks is meant to heighten sensibility to the fact that terms of group identification are social constructs, representations of social life, not the same thing as the experience of social grouping. I use other terms, such as natives, Europeans, and Jews (problematic terms in and of themselves) without quotation marks, to make reference to general sectors of the population. It is important to keep in mind the distinction between identity representations, on the one hand, and social groupings, on the other.
2. The essay is based on primary sources gathered at the Centre des Archives d’Outre-mer in Aix-en-Provence, France, an annex of the French national archives and the repository for the documents of the national-level Gouvernement générale d’algérie (GGA). Sources utilized included daily police records from 1897–1902 and 1933–37, as well as government correspondence and newspapers from the same periods.
3. Janet Abu-Lughod describes a four-tier system: the minority of white/European colonizers on the top; poor whites beneath them; just above the middling natives; with the mass of poor natives at the bottom (Abu-Lughod 1980).
4. Settlers had an “Algerian” cultural identity, based on the melding of a mixed European ancestry and expressed in a common language, popular literature, an Algérieniste literary movement of the late 1920s, and celebrated by authors and characters like Louis Bertrand and Cagayous.
5. Alternative views about the roots of “Algerian” identity exist. Some date “Algerian” identity to the early twentieth century and associate it with the Arab, urban, educated middle classes in Algiers and Constantine and the coterie of Young Algerians among them (Sa’adallah 1981). Others suggest that political, ethnic, and gender divisions plagued the Muslim natives more broadly (Harbi 1980; Stora 1987; Clancy-Smith 1994; Lazreg 1994).
6. Many of the books in the “nationalist” school follow this idea.
7. The frustration and disillusionment of post-independence realities in both the core and peripheral regions of previously existing empires have pushed analysts to rethink the role of colonial rule in shaping those contemporary problems. The coming of age of a generation without the immediate experience of decolonization has offered a different standpoint for analyzing those processes. Furthermore, younger scholars have been influenced by deconstructionist, poststructuralist, and postmodernist theories, paradigms that perhaps have helped them break out of the strict binary mental constraints of colonizer domination and colonized subjection and resistance.

8. I track the use of terms of group identification (esp. "French" and "Algerian") in political discourse found in primary archival records, such as newspapers, police records, government correspondence, and documents of political organizations, but also in other primary sources such as published treatises and journals, and evidence from secondary sources.
9. The leading beliefs, rhetoric, and methods of the movement congealed into a program they called *antijudaïsme*, a term adopted over the conventional one of *antisémitisme* because they could target the Jews without penalizing the Semitic Arabs (GGA, June 20, 1897, 7G10, 215).
10. Descriptions of the January days are taken from first-hand accounts such as Bey 1898, police reports from 7G9 and 7G10, press releases from F80 1686, and secondary sources such as Hebey 1996.
11. F80 1687, April 26, 1898, unsigned, 15.
12. F80 1684–88.
13. "Rapport, Ville d'Alger, Police, Commissariat Central," March 17, 1898, 7G13.
14. The first articulation of "Algerian" identity apparently occurred on June 19, 1897, when about 400 people gathered at the Chalet Ombrage in the St. Eugène commune of Algiers for a meeting of the *Ligue Antijuive d'Alger*. When *Ligue* president Max Régis mounted the podium to rally the crowd around the French flag and yelled "Algeria for the Algerians!" the police officer taking notes mentioned being puzzled by it. It was the first time he had heard the phrase "Algeria for the Algerians" (7G10, 215, June 20, 1897; 7G10, June 21, 1897).
15. In early 1897, leaders of the *Ligue radicale-socialiste anti-juive* in Algiers conscientiously worked to reinvigorate the "old activist spirit" and broaden the appeal of the program: they shortened the name to the simpler *Ligue antijuive d'alger*, emphasizing the anti-Jewish part and de-emphasizing the socioeconomic dimensions. They appointed the young, charismatic law student Max Régis, who had been active in anti-Jewish and autonomist politics around Algiers and Sétif, to the presidency (7G9, 342, March 29, 1897; "Rapport" from C.S.C.F.P. to GGA, Oct. 16, 1897, 7G9, N. 336; "Rapport, Ville d'Alger, Police, Commissariat Central," Oct. 16, 1897, 7G10; F80 1685, 26).
16. Letter from GGA to President du Conseil, Ministry of Interior, Paris, July 16, 1898, F80/1687.
17. Letter from GGA to Ministry of Interior, "Sur les décrets de 23 aout," October 28, 1898, F80 1687.
18. Circulaire du Gouverneur General, "Relative a l'emploi de la main-d'oeuvre française dans les ateliers ou sur les chantiers ouverts par l'administration," October 5, 1898.
19. *Le Combat Algérien*, September 4, 1898, p. 1.
20. *Ibid.* p. 2.
21. Letter from GGA to President du Conseil, 99, Alger, September 19, 1898, F80 1687; "Une Liste," *La Vigie Algérienne*, November 8, 1898, p. 140, F80 1687; Letter from GGA to Interior Cabinet, 106, October 11, 1898, F80 1687; Letter from GGA to President du Conseil, 99, Alger, September 19, 1898, F80 1687.
22. Letter from GGA to Interior Cabinet, November 11, 1898, F80 1687.
23. "Chose d'Algérie," *La Cloche*, December 16, 1898, p. 124.
24. "Le Péril Algérien," *Liberté*, December 17, 1898, p. 125.
25. Charles Sudraud. "Les Antijuifs Algérois: Pourquoi nous sommes Antijuifs - Notre Programme, Notre But," 1899. Alger.
26. Report from Commissaire de Police, Chef de Service à Mustapha to Contrôleur General des Services de police et de Sureté d'Algerie, Alger, Mustapha, January 8, 1897, G10, Doc 187; Rapport special from Commissaire Speciale, Alger, January 8, 1899, 7G10; Report from Commissaire de Police, Chef de Service, Mustapha, to Contrôleur Général des Services de Police et de Sureté, Mustapha, January 11, 1899, 7G10, doc 289; Report from Commissaire Speciale des Chemins de Fer et des Ports, January 11, 1899, 7G10, doc 58.
27. *La Dépêche Algérienne*, January, 1899.
28. "Actes Officiels," *La Dépêche Algérienne*, May 9, 1901, 7G11.
29. Report, Commissaire Central, Ville d'Alger, May 10, 1901, F14.

30. Report, Commissaire Central, Alger, November 16, 1900, 7G11.
31. Report, Commissaire speciale sureté, CFP, 1630, Alger, February 23, 1901, F14a.
32. "Les Bandits," *L'Education Sociale*, May 5, 1901, n. 18, F14.
33. Letter from Prefect Lutaud to President du Conseil, Ministry of Interior, Algiers, June 25, 1899.
34. Report, Cabinet du Commissaire de Police, M CCP, September 19–20, 1899, Ville de Mustapha, F80/7G10; Report, Commissaire de police to Controleur général, 7331, Mustapha, September 21, 1899, 7G10; Report, Commissaire de police to Controleur Général, 7422, Mustapha, September 23, 1899, 7G10; "Questions principes manifestations, diverses," Parquet to Procureur, Case 32, 2324, Alger, September 26, 1899, 7G11.
35. *La Dépêche Algérienne*, November 18, 1900; Report, Commissaire centrale, Alger, November 16, 1900, 7G11; Report, Commissaire de police, 7877, Mustapha, September 5, 1900, F14.
36. Title, date unknown. F14.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Information on these political organizations comes from secondary sources as well as some police and government records of the early 1930s.
40. *La Dépêche Quotidienne*, January 16, 1956.
41. A. Sérigny, paper from September 4–5, 1957 (Chevallier 1958: 22).
42. *La Dernière Heure*, January 20, 1956 (Chevallier 1958: 22).
43. Marc Lauriol, "Le Federalisme et l'Algérie," October 1957, B2472.
44. *Le Journal d'Alger*, September 26, 1955; *La Dépêche Quotidienne*, October 14, 1955.
45. *Le Journal d'Alger*, September 27, 1955.
46. Ibid, October 12, 1955; *La Dernière Heure*, January 20, 1956.
47. *Journal d'Alger*, October 12, 1955; *La Dernière Heure*, January 20, 1956.
48. Fanon conceives of colonial groups differently in various texts. In *Wretched of the Earth*, for example, he uses a Manichean conception of colonizer and colonized, European and native, quite different from the more socially grounded and multiracial conception of "the Algerians" in *A Dying Colonialism*. This could be in part because the two books are quite different in purpose, scope, and content. *Wretched* is a very abstracted and generalized picture of the colonial world and the experience of colonialism. Fanon looks specifically at the devastatingly negative psychic effects on the colonized, using the cases of Algerian psychiatric patients. *Dying* is an account of the fifth year of the Algerian War; it is closer to reportage and closer to an analysis of the specific political situation of the war. For the purposes of my argument, it is irrelevant whether Fanon believed in any one conception of "Algerian" identity; it was important that he could represent the "Algerian" nation as more inclusive when *A Dying Colonialism* was published in 1959.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archives and Other Collections

Archives du Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie (G.G.A.), Archives Nationales, Section d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France, Series F9, F14, 7G9, 7G10, 7G11.

Published Materials

- Abbas, Ferhat. *Guerre et revolution d'Algérie, T. 1. La nuit coloniale*. Paris: Julliard, 1962.
- Abu-Lughod, Janet. *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Abun-Nasr, Jamil M. *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

- Addi, Lahouri. *L'Algérie et la démocratie*. Paris, Découverte, 1994.
- Ageron, Charles-Robert. *Les Algériens musulmans et la France (1871–1919)*. Vols. I, II. Paris: P.U.F., 1968.
- Ageron, Charles-Robert. *Histoire De L'Algérie Contemporaine: Tome II*. Paris: P.U.F., 1979.
- Ageron, Charles-Robert. *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1991.
- Ageron, Charles-Robert. "La politique kabyle sous le Second Empire," *RFHOM* (Sept 1967): 67–105.
- Ansky, M. *Les Juifs d'Algérie du Décret Crémieux à la Libération*. Paris: Editions du Centre, 1950.
- Attal, Robert. *Regards sur les juifs d'Algérie*. Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1996.
- Ayoun, Richard and Bernard Cohen. *Les Juifs d'Algérie: 2000 ans d'histoire*. Paris: Jean-Claude Lattès, 1982.
- Baroli, Marc. *La vie quotidienne des français 1830–1914*. Paris: Hachette, 1967.
- Bey, Eugene. *La vérité sur les émutes d'Alger de janvier 1898*. Alger, 1898.
- Birnbaum, Pierre. "La France aux Français: Histoire des Haines Nationalistes." Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993.
- Birnbaum, Pierre. *La France de l'affaire Dreyfus*. Paris: Gallimard, 1994.
- Blet, H. *Histoire de la colonisation française*. Paris: B. Arthaud, 1950.
- Boyer, Pierre. *La Vie Quotidienne à Alger à la Veille de l'Intervention Française*. Paris: Hachette, 1963.
- Braudel, Fernand. *The Identity of France*. New York: Harper & Row, 1988.
- Brass, Paul, ed. *Riots and Pogroms*. New York: New York University Press, 1996.
- Bredin, Jean-Denis. *The Affair: The Case of Alfred Dreyfus*. New York: George Braziller, 1986.
- Brubaker, Rogers. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992.
- Brunschwig, Henri. *La Colonisation Française*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1949.
- Chevallier, Jacques. *Nous, Algériens. . .* Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1958.
- Chouraqui, A. *Les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952.
- Christelow, Allan. *Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial State in Algeria*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985.
- Ciment, James. *Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge*. New York: Facts on File, 1997.
- Clancy-Smith, Julia. *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800–1904)*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
- Colonna, Fanny. "Educating Conformity in French Colonial Algeria," in *Tensions of Empire*, eds. Frederick Cooper, Ann Laura Stoler. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Confer, Vincent. *France and Algeria: The Problem of Civil and Political Reform, 1870–1920*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966.
- Conklin, Alice. *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997.
- Cooke, James J. *New French Imperialism 1880–1910: The Third Republic and Colonial Expansion*. Hamden, Conn.: David & Charles Archon Books, 1973.
- Cooper, Frederic and Ann Stoler, eds. *Tensions of Empire*. Berkeley: U of Cal Press, 1997.
- Crespo, Gerard and Jean-Jacques Jordi. *L'Immigration Espagnole Dans L'Algérois de 1830 à 1914*. Versailles: Editions de l'Anthrope, 1991.
- Danziger, Raphael. *Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation*. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1977.
- Demontès, V. *Le peuple Algérien, étude de démographie Algérienne*. Alger: Imp. Algérienne, 1906.
- Dermenjian, Geneviève. *La Crise Antijuive oranaise, 1895–1905*. Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1986.
- Dirks, Nicolas, ed. *Colonialism and Culture*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992.
- Fanon, Frantz. *A Dying Colonialism*. New York: Grove, 1965.
- Fanon, Frantz. *Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove Press, 1963.

- Fieldhouse, D.K. *Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century*. New York: Delacorte Press, 1967.
- Galliot, René. *Maghreb-Algérie, Class et Nation, Tome I*. Paris: Arcantère Editions, 1987.
- Gautier, E.F. *L'Algérie et la Metropole*. Paris: Payot, 1920.
- Goldstone, Jack. "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 139–87.
- Harbi, Mohammed. *Le F.L.N.: mirage et réalité*. Paris: Editions j.a., 1980.
- Hargreaves, Alec and Michael J. Heffernan, eds. *French and Algerian Identities From Colonial Times to the Present: A Century of Interaction*. Lewiston, N.Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1993.
- Hebey, Pierre. *Alger 1898: La grande vague antijuive*. Paris: NiL Editions, 1996.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. *The Age of Empire: 1875–1914*. New York: Vintage Books, 1987.
- Hoexter, Miriam. *Endowments, Rulers and Community: Waqfal-Haramayn in Ottoman Algiers*. Leiden: Brill, 1998.
- Horne, Alistair. *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–62*. New York: Penquin, 1987.
- Hourani, Albert. *A History of the Arab Peoples*. New York: Time Warner Books, 1991.
- Iancu, C. "Du nouveau sur les troubles antijuifs en Algérie a la fin du XIXème siècle." *Les Relations entre Juifs et musulmans en Afrique du Nord, XIXe - Xxe siècles*, Actes du Colloque International de l'Institut d'histoire des pays d'outre-mer, abbaye de Sénanque, Oct 1978. Paris: Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, 1978.
- Johnston, Hank and Bert Klandermans, eds. *Social Movements and Culture*. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1995.
- Julien, Charles-André. *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine. Les débuts 1830–70*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964.
- Kaddache, Mahfoud. *La Vie Politique à Alger, 1919–39*. Alger: SNED, 1970.
- Ibid. *Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien: Question nationale et politique Algérienne 1919–1951*. Tome I et II. Algiers: S.N.E.D, 1980.
- Koulakssis, Ahmed and Gilbert Meynier. *L'Emir Khaled: Premier za'ïm? Identité algérienne et colonialisme français*. Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1987.
- Laraña, Enrique, Hank Johnston, Joseph Gusfield. *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994.
- Lazreg, Marnia. *The Emergence of Classes in Algeria: A Study of Colonialism and Socio-political change*. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1976.
- Lazreg, Marnia. *The Eloquence of Silence*. New York: Routledge, 1994.
- Lespes, Rene. *Alger, étude de géographie et d'histoire urbaine*. Paris: F. Alcan, 1930.
- Lorcin, Patricia. *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria*. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995.
- Lustick, Ian. *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Martin, Claude. *Les Israélites Algériens de 1830 à 1902*. Paris: Editions Herakles, 1936.
- Martini, Lucienne. *Racines de papier: essai sur l'expression littéraire de l'identité pieds-noirs*. Paris: Publisud, 1997.
- Marx, Anthony. "Race-Making and the Nation-State." *World Politics* 48 (1996): 180–208.
- McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Mitchell, Timothy. *Colonising Egypt*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
- Murphy, Agnes. *The Ideology of French Imperialism 1871–1881*. New York: Howard Fertig, 1968.
- Noiriel, Gérard. *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship and National Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
- Nora, Pierre. *Les Français d'Algérie*. Paris: Julliard, 1961.
- Nora, Pierre. *Les lieux de memoire*. Paris: Gallimard, 1984–92.
- Nouschi, André. *La naissance du nationalisme algérien*. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1962.

- della Porta, Donatella. *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Prochaska, David. *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bone, 1870–1920*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Roberts, S. *The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870–1925*. London: P.S. King & Son, Ltd., 1929.
- Roy, Beth. *Some Trouble With Cows: Making Sense of Social Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
- Ruedy, John. *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- Saadallah, Abu al-Qasim. *La montée du nationalisme algérien (1900–1930)*. Algiers: Entreprise Nationale du Livre, 1985.
- Saadallah, Abu al-Qasim. “The Rise of the Algerian Elite, 1900–14.” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 5: 1 (1967):69–77.
- Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1978.
- Saadallah, Abu al-Qasim. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994.
- Scott, Joan. *Gender and The Politics of History*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
- Sivan, Emmanuel. *Communisme et nationalisme en algérie, 1920–1962*. Paris: PFNSP, 1976.
- Sivan, Emmanuel. “Colonialism and Popular Culture in Algeria.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 14 (1979): 21–53.
- Sivan, Emmanuel. “Stereotypes antijuifs dans la mentalité pied-noir.” *Les relations entre juifs et musulmans en afrique du nord, XIXe–XXe siècles*, Actes du Colloque International de l’Institut d’histoire des pays d’outre-mer, Abbaye de Senanque, Octobre 1978. Paris: Editions du C.N.R.S., 1980.
- Stoler, Ann. “Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31:1 (1989):134–161.
- Stone, Martin. *The Agony of Algeria*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
- Stora, Benjamin. *Nationalistes Algériens et Revolutionnaires Français au temps du Front Populaire*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1987.
- Stora, Benjamin. *Histoire de la guerre d’algérie, (1954–62)*. Paris: La Découverte, 1993.
- Stora, Benjamin. *La gangrène et l’oubli: la memoire de la guerre d’algérie*. Paris: La Découverte et Syros, 1998.
- Thomson, Ann. *Barbary and Enlightenment: European Attitudes towards the Maghreb in the 18th century*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1987.
- Tilly, Charles. “Political Identities.” CSSC Working Paper 212, 1995.
- Vatin, Jean-Claude. *L’Algérie politique. Histoire et société*. Paris: Armand Colin, 1974.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. *The Modern World-System*. New York: Academic Press, 1976.
- Weitzer, Ronald. *Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
- Willis, Michael. *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria*. New York: New York University Press, 1997.
- Wolf, Eric. *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.
- Wolf, John B. *The Barbary Coast: Algiers Under the Turks, 1500 to 1830*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1979.
- Yacono, Xavier. *Histoire de la colonisation française*, Paris: PUF, 1973.