CHAPTER TEN

Hegemonic Failure and Regime Crisis in Israel

Hegemonic Breakdown and Construction in Israel: Comparisons with Britain and France

In Part I, analysis of wars of position produced explanations for the fate of hegemonic projects regarding Ireland and Algeria. These explanations were based on the interaction of three variables, summarized as the presence or absence of (1) severe contradictions between the conception advanced as hegemonic and the stubborn realities it purports to describe; (2) an appropriately fashioned alternative interpretation of political reality capable of reorganizing competition to the advantage of particular groups; and (3) dedicated political-ideological entrepreneurs who can operate successfully where fundamental assumptions of political life have been thrown open to question, and who see better opportunities in competition over basic "rules of the game" than in competition for marginal advantage according to existing rules. Now, on the basis of the previous chapter's analysis of the Israeli case, we can see whether establishment of the 1949 armistice lines as ideologically hegemonic boundaries (1957–67), breakdown of the hegemonic status of these borders (1967–77), and the failure (thus far) to establish annexationist definitions of the state as hegemonic are explainable by apposite configurations of the three variables identified as decisive in the British-Irish and French-Algerian cases.

Establishing Hegemony of the 1949 Armistice Lines

In 1949 the State of Israel could lay convincing claim to having been established according to Zionist myths and to having achieved the central objectives of classical Zionism. Jewish independence in the Land of Israel had been attained and enjoyed wide recognition in the international community. Distinctive social, scientific, cultural, and economic achievements were a source of both pride and reassurance. Zionism had created, or revived, a new Jewish personality and, perhaps, a model society. Enough of "Jerusalem" lay under the state's control for the Israeli government proudly to declare the city as the capital of the country. All Jews, anywhere in the world, enjoyed rights to citizenship upon arrival within the borders of the Jewish state. Nor did any outside power exercise limits on Jewish immigration.

Though small by many standards, the state included undeveloped areas in the Galilee and the Negev and had sufficient room to accommodate as many immigrants as could be expected to arrive. Israel also corresponded, within the 1949 boundaries, to an effectively enforced legal state of affairs that established orderly life, relative security, and relative prosperity on one side of its boundaries, in contrast with danger, squalor, and disorder across them, in "enemy territory." With the flight and expulsion of seven-eighths of its Arab population during the 1948 war, Israel was also relatively homogeneous from a demographic point of view. Eighty-five percent of Israel's inhabitants were Jewish; virtually all were citizens. In these ways belief in the permanence and appropriateness of Israel's 1949 borders cannot be seen as standing in severe contradiction to psychological, ideological, legal, or existential realities.

Of course the 1949 lines were far from "historical" or "natural" boundaries. In fact, as demarcated by the conclusion of hostilities in 1948 and 1949 and as ratified in the armistice agreements of 1949, the Green Line separated the State of Israel from most biblically significant portions of the Land of Israel. This was the biggest problem facing the Green Line as a candidate for hegemonic status. It was also, however, its most significant advantage to the political elites most closely associated with the founding of the state it delimited.

The hegemonic belief in the armistice lines as bounding the geographical shape of the political community was thus quite obviously a constructed belief, requiring political entrepreneurs capable of packaging an appropriate mix of symbols and appeals to promote and establish it on a hegemonic basis. Both Ben-Gurion and the Mapai party (along with its successor, the Israeli Labor party) benefited enormously from the removal of irredentism from respectable Israeli political discourse. Ben-Gurion's

ardently promoted formula of *mamlachtiut* (étatisme) disadvantaged his personal and political rivals by enshrining the State of Israel itself, its military and governmental institutions, its geographical frontiers, and its economic and cultural accomplishments, as the culmination of Zionism and the permanent framework for the expression of Jewish nationalism. Taking into account both passionate ideological attachments to the idea of the whole Land of Israel present within every major segment of the pre-1948 Zionist movement, as well as the military superiority enjoyed by Israel over both Jordan (in the West Bank) and Egypt (in the Gaza Strip), it is easy to appreciate how great a political achievement was the pre-1967 exclusion of the territorial issue from the Israeli national agenda. Each of the three most important threats to Ben-Gurion/Mapai dominance of Israeli politics—militant Labor Zionist activism, Revisionism, and, *in potentis*, messianic religious Zionism—was thereby deprived of a defining issue without which claims to national leadership were difficult to justify.[1]

Breakdown of the Green Line as a Hegemonic Conception

In the British-Irish case, British rule of Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom emerged as a problematic issue in British politics. Memories of the Great Famine, Fenian terrorism, and nationalist organized land wars in Ireland produced a severe discrepancy between palpable realities and the claims of the previously hegemonic belief,—that Ireland was as fully and integrally a part of the United Kingdom as was Wales or Northumbria. New visions of Ireland's proper political status, woven from historicist, social Darwinist, and imperialist themes prominent in Victorian culture, were available to interpret this discrepancy in satisfying ways. Finally, political elites, including Gladstone, Salisbury, Chamberlain, and Randolph Churchill, saw exciting and extremely profitable political opportunities in the public problematization of Ireland's future political status.

The 1967 war in Israel produced a comparable set of conditions within Israeli politics. These, in turn, broke down the previously hegemonic conception of Green Line Israel, and prompted emergence of the issue of whether the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be considered and absorbed as integral parts of the state.

The severe discrepancy that was a direct consequence of the Six Day War was the extension of control and jurisdiction of the Jewish state over territories that formed the heartland of biblical Israel. Significant sites within the West Bank included the city of David in Jerusalem, the remnant of the ancient Temple courtyard (the Wailing, or Western Wall—also in

Jerusalem), the city of Hebron (where, according to Genesis, in the cave of Machpelah, are buried Abraham, Sarah, and Isaac), the tomb of Rachel in Bethlehem, the place of Jacob's dream, in Beth-El, and Joseph's tomb in Nablus (biblical Shechem). It was impossible to deny the genuine emotional and ideological attachments to these areas and to the idea of resuming Jewish life in and near them by the same sort of "pioneering" settlement activity that had been, according to established Zionist mythology, largely responsible for the renaissance of the Jewish people and the establishment of the state.

Before 1967 the separation of the West Bank from Israel had been profitably treated by Ben-Gurion and Mapai as a necessity made into a virtue. Between 1949 and 1967, an onerous burden of proof lay on the shoulders of the irredentists. Although for a time they tried, they failed completely to persuade Israelis that until the entire Land had been liberated, the state established in 1948 could be neither secure nor honored as the culmination of Jewish nationalist aspirations. Once Israel's control of biblically significant portions of the Land of Israel had been accomplished, however, once Jewish settlement of these territories had begun, and once their Arab population had been coerced into relative docility, the burden of proof shifted dramatically. In the years following the Six Day War, and certainly by the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the burden had come to rest on the shoulders of those Israelis who argued that the restricted and "artificial" borders which had "invited attack" were both virtuous and necessary.[2] A gross discrepancy had thus appeared—a severe contradiction between professed commitments of Zionism and the state of Israel to the Jewish people's security and biblical heritage, and official boundaries and legal demarcations which treated mythically peripheral areas as core territories and mythically central and security-significant areas as dispensable, even burdensome "occupied" territories.

In the British-Irish case new ideas about culture and politics achieved prominence between 1860 and 1885. As shown in Chapter 5, these ideas provided formulas with which to recast the British-Irish relationship in ways that could, without insulting the amour propre of the British public, explain the gross discrepancy between an old hegemonic conception and severely contradictory realities. In the Israeli case the ideas that emerged after 1967 to recast the relationship between the State of Israel and the Land of Israel were not new. They were latent formulations resting within the repertoire of Zionism. Until a severe contradiction arose, however, between hegemonic views of the shape of the Israeli state and "stubborn realities," they could not be used to promote the political interests of those who could most credibly articulate them.

Not long after June 1967, Revisionist, religious, and activist Labor Zi-

onist political entrepreneurs realized how fundamentally the outcome of the war had changed the contours of the political terrain. By emphasizing instead of suppressing irredentist sentiments, they could launch a war of position over the proper conception of the State of Israel—a struggle whose outcome promised opportunities to remove the chiefs of the Labor party from the commanding heights of the polity and replace them with their own candidates for national leadership. Just as the leaders of the British Conservative party and of the Radicals used problematization of Ireland's status to shift the focus of British politics from politically inconvenient class issues to questions of national prestige and to the passions and prejudices of urban workers, and just as de Gaulle found in the image of France retreating from Algeria an ideal way to exploit his reputation as the champion of French greatness against the party politicians of the Fourth Republic, so too did those who had suffered at the hands of Mapai see in the problematization of Israel's boundaries an issue with which to reverse their political fortunes.

Revisionists had always celebrated a Jewish state whose territorial expanse would correspond to the world-historic destiny and regional if not global power potential they ascribed to the Jewish people. The results of the 1967 war seemed to confirm that the path to national greatness lay in territorial expansion and the elevation of those who had been most faithful to this principle (i.e., the Revisionists) to national leadership. With the expansion of the territory controlled by the Jewish state an accomplished fact, Menachem Begin's record of espousing this expansion could no longer be used as convincing evidence that he was too reckless to be trusted with the premiership. Using his impeccable credentials as a whole Land of Israel loyalist and his substantial oratorical talents, Begin donned a yarmulke (orthodox Jewish head covering) and made religiously traditionalist, populist, and hardline anti-Arab appeals to Israel's emergent oriental Jewish plurality.

Leaders of the militant "young guard" faction of the National Religious party also found in the territories issue a road to national prominence and eventual control of the NRP. They envisioned a geographically "completed" State of Israel acting as the instrument and sign of a culminating messianic-redemptive process. The results of the war were interpreted as a giant step forward in the process, a process that could be facilitated by political leaders sensitive to the cosmic implications of policies to be implemented in and toward the territories. Exploiting their intimate links to Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook and their instrumental role in establishing and supporting Gush Emunim, these men tapped a painful sense of inferiority and unfulfilled mission experienced by a generation of religious Zionist youth. They represented young orthodox Israelis who were proud to have

served in the army for the first time in substantial numbers during the 1973 war and who were anxious to prove their worthiness by winning the whole Land of Israel for the Jewish people, as the previous secular-sabra generation had won Jewish statehood.

The third group of political entrepreneurs to raise the banner of the whole Land of Israel were hundreds of second-echelon personalities within the Labor Zionist apparatus—"activists" who had been forced to lay aside their territorial maximalism in order to participate in governing the country and who had, even so, never achieved positions of supreme leadership in the military or civilian branches of the state. They saw in the post-1967 resumption of settlement and pioneering activities in the West Bank and Gaza an opportunity to revive the slumbering national genius of the Jewish people and trigger new waves of immigration, making Zionist ideology and "pioneering" commitment again respectable instead of a favorite subject for satire. They explained the powerful emotional response of Israeli Jews visiting East Jerusalem and other portions of the territories as an expression of the normalness of the Jewish people's existential attachment to their patrimony and as a mystical but organic bond that would build and redeem the Jewish people while the people themselves built and redeemed the land.[3] This group was the animating force behind the Movement for the Whole Land of Israel (established in August 1967). After its demise, the ascendancy of the Likud, and the latter's alliance with the National Religious party, the more ambitious and daring elements within the activist wing of Labor Zionism chose one of three paths. They either joined Gush Emunim as nonreligious fellow travelers, supported Moshe Dayan in his alliance with the Likud, or formed small ultranationalist parties such as Tehiya (1979), Tzomet (1983), and Moledet (1988). These latter parties have seen themselves as candidates for national leadership and hope to achieve it by an uncompromising commitment to the whole Land of Israel, a sharpening conflict with the Arab world (including the "transfer" of large numbers of Palestinians out of the country), and the need, eventually, to establish a *pur et dur* regime capable of protecting Israel's sovereignty and security within its enlarged borders.

In the Israeli case, then, a gross discrepancy materialized after the 1967 war between the previously hegemonic image of the constricted shape of the state and the realities of effective state control over the greater Land of Israel. This condition, favoring hegemonic breakdown, was accompanied by alternative and compelling interpretations of the proper domain for the exercise of Israeli sovereignty. It was reinforced by the presence of strategically placed, ambitious counterelites able to benefit greatly from fighting a war of position. The configuration of these three variables is the same as that advanced to explain hegemonic breakdown in the British-

Irish case. My findings about hegemonic breakdown in Israel are thus fully consistent with my analysis of breakdown in the hegemonic status of mid-nineteenth-century British conceptions of Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom. Although this correspondence cannot, of course, confirm the validity of the general hypotheses, it lends them substantial support.

Failure to Establish a Hegemonic Conception of the Whole Land of Israel

Despite the best efforts of the three groups identified above to build a hegemonic conception of the greater Land of Israel, their fate has remained controversial. Few politically active Israelis have chosen to speak (for more than a few weeks or months at a time, at any rate) as if the fate of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were no longer an issue in Israeli politics, that is as if these areas had been absorbed as completely into Israeli beliefs about the shape of their state as had beliefs about the Galilee or the Negev. What accounts for the failure, to date, of hegemonic construction in the post-1967 Israeli case?

In Chapter 5 I hypothesized that the *presence of only one* of three appropriate conditions would be *sufficient* for an existing hegemonic belief to be *defended* successfully. The three conditions (simply the obverse of those relevant to explaining hegemonic breakdown) were (1) reasonable correspondence between the substance of the hegemonic belief and realities purportedly described by it; (2) unavailability of alternative but reassuring accounts of those realities; and (3) absence of ambitious political elites able to benefit greatly from challenging hegemonic beliefs. To explain *breakdown* of a hegemonic conception, I hypothesized that *each* of three appropriate conditions (again, the obverse of those useful in its defense) would be *necessary*. A successful defense occurred in Britain (1834 and 1843). Breakdown occurred in Britain (1867–85) and in Israel (1967–74). We have seen that each of these cases of defense and breakdown is consistent with the hypothesized implications of different combinations of the three conditions (or their absence).

As my explanation for the breakdown of the hegemonic conception of Ireland's status within the United Kingdom provided an analogous explanation for the breakdown of the Green Line's pre-1967 hegemonic status in Israel, so too does consideration of the same group of variables after 1967 explain the failure of a new program of hegemonic construction—the State of Israel as the whole Land of Israel. This failure is analogous to the failure of partisans of *la plus grande France* to establish the French

Union or Algérie française on a hegemonic basis within metropolitan France.

To explain the *establishment* of a belief as hegemonic, as occurred in Israel with respect to the 1949 armistice lines (1957–67), I hypothesized (in Chap. 5) that at least one of the appropriate conditions would be necessary. This is, of course, a rather weak claim. Nevertheless it is supported by the Israeli case in the pre-1967 period, where I have suggested how effectively Ben-Gurion was able to marginalize elites offering competing constructions of the state established in the borders of 1949. On the other hand, consideration of the French case vis-à-vis Algérie française, together with the Israeli case regarding annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, suggests that building a new hegemonic conception may require more than the presence of just one "appropriate" condition.

Failure of the first, pluralist and democratic version of the French Union can be explained not only by the gross discrepancy between the lofty visions espoused by its native and metropolitan exponents and the prevailing realities of oppression and prejudice, but by the absence of strategically placed elites able to benefit greatly from campaigns to establish the "Union of free consent" as a hegemonic image of France. The second, hierarchical version of the French Union, the "Union of tutelary subordination," that was incorporated into the constitution of the Fourth Republic, did have important political elites associated with it—such as Bidault and even de Gaulle, to an extent. But France's weakened international position and the pressures toward decolonization throughout "overseas France," including violent struggles in Indochina and Madagascar and severe unrest in black Africa, North Africa, and the Levant, fatally controverted official claims of natural and permanent French leadership over grateful yellow, brown, and black peoples.

Only the third postwar hegemonic project, portraying the metropole plus Algeria as "France," enjoyed some real prospect of success. By 1956 and 1957, opposition leaders such as de Gaulle and Poujade, governing party chiefs such as Mollet and Bourgès-Maunoury, Conservatives such as Duchet, the colon leaders in Algeria, and a majority of high-ranking officers in the French army, saw in the formula of Algérie française a key element in satisfying their personal and political objectives. Drawing on the long history and great size of European settlement in Algeria, the country's relative proximity to the hexagon, and the powerful sense that France needed Algeria and the resources of the Sahara to reestablish its status as a great power, an elaborate and, for most French people, persuasive conception of Algeria as a prolongation of France was developed. However, despite the army's eventual military success in eliminating the threat of an FLN battlefield victory, the tremendous discrepancies between

the resources required to defend and maintain French control over Algeria and the political and economic capacities of France under the Fourth Republic prevented the idea of Algérie française from ever being established as the common sense of French political life.

A somewhat similar though not identical array of forces seems present in the Israeli case, especially since the early 1980s. The predicament arising from this state of affairs is also similar. The basis for an alliance of settlers, Revisionists, religious Zionists, and militant segments of the Labor Zionist movement is their uncompromising commitment to build the West Bank and Gaza Strip into the Israeli state as thoroughly as possible. The ideological and cultural basis for this alliance blends religious, security-related, and integral nationalist motifs. They combine within a hegemonic project that has inspired a large proportion of Israel's Jewish population to believe the exercise of Jewish political rights in and over Tel Aviv can be no more valid or secure than the exercise of those same prerogatives in and over Hebron, Ramallah, expanded East Jerusalem, and Gaza.

Although this political bloc is strong enough to have controlled the Israeli government for all but two and a half years between 1977 and 1992, it has not succeeded in establishing its annexationist program as hegemonic. Despite massive settlement activity and sometimes convincing images of irreversible incorporation, the controversy over what to do with the territories has continued. The biggest obstacle to hegemonic construction has been the vast Arab majority in "Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District," specifically the severe contradiction between the presence of the angry and sometimes violent opposition of nearly two million noncitizen Arabs and claims that these portions of the Land of Israel had been transformed into integral parts of the state of Israel. The strategic problem confronting their hegemonic project was clearly recognized by many Gush Emunim leaders at the end of 1986. As an editorial in *Nekuda* stated,

> We must all understand that the struggle for the completeness of the Land will be won after the great majority of the public in this country supports the idea with active political support. To attract this kind of support we must persuade the public to believe what we believe, that our idea is eminently practical....
>
> The key question, perhaps the question of questions, that the wider public requires us to answer, bears upon our ability, as a people and a state, to establish a quiet and normal sovereignty in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, despite the fact that Arabs living there still comprise an unchallenged demographic majority.[4]

These words were written as an immediate response to scattered attacks of Arabs on Jews in the occupied territories. One year later, however, the

memory of such sporadic outbursts was wiped away by the eruption of the intifada—the Palestinian uprising and civil rebellion which began in December 1987. Although Jewish casualties of the uprising were relatively light (thirteen soldiers and thirteen civilians killed between December 1987 and February 1991), they represent, along with the severe economic dislocations and international outcry associated with Israeli repressive measures, an order-of-magnitude increase in the costs Israel had to pay for maintaining its hold over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Instead of the usual scattered array of small units, the Israeli army was forced to deploy tens of thousands of soldiers to disperse demonstrations, break strikes, enforce curfews and school closings, patrol refugee camps, build and guard large new detention centers, and prevent popular committees from making villages and towns into zones of "liberated Palestine." To permit new recruits, who had been transferred en masse to the territories, to continue their training, the defense ministry increased the average length of annual reserve duty from thirty to sixty days. Without workers from the territories, construction was brought to a standstill on hundreds of projects throughout the country. In the first four months of the intifada, according to government sources, the Israeli economy lost approximately $350 million. This figure stood at $500 million for all of 1988, equaling 1.4 percent of Israeli's GNP, and more than $1.1 billion by December 1989.[5]

The intifada resulted in very heavy casualties among Palestinians. According to an Israeli human rights group Btzelem, Israeli soldiers killed 750 Palestinians in the territories from the beginning of the uprising in December 1987 to the end of February 1991. During the same thirty-nine-month period, 37 Palestinians were killed by Israeli civilians (usually settlers) and 349 Palestinians were killed by other Arabs, under conditions of general lawlessness or "on suspicion of collaborating with the authorities."[6] Between December 1987 and October 1989, according to Btzelem, 60,000 Palestinians were arrested, leading to a widely publicized breakdown in the military government's legal system.[7] The Likud minister of justice announced that in the first two years of the uprising, 350 Arab homes had been demolished, 60 people deported, and 40,000 placed in administrative detention (i.e., without indictment or trial)—practices Israel had largely abandoned in the years preceding the intifada.[8] In September 1990 the Israeli army released its own comprehensive set of statistics showing that 13,100 Palestinians had been wounded in the first one thousand days of the uprising, compared to 2,500 Israeli soldiers and 1,100 Israeli civilians.[9] Palestinian sources reported much higher casualty levels, showing that more than 100,000 Palestinians suffered serious injuries during the first three years of the uprising.[10] Whatever the exact figures, the political costs Israeli annexationists were forced to pay as a result of the harsh and prolonged crackdown were substantial. No longer could the

government claim to have achieved conditions of "coexistence" between Jews and Arabs in the territories. It was also confronted with what one Israeli cartoonist depicted as the virtual "resurrection" of the Green Line, not only in the minds of ordinary Israelis but also among stalwarts within the annexationist camp.[11]

One of the most reliable signs that the annexationist camp realized early on how dramatically the intifada had impacted on their hegemonic project was the strained but untiring efforts by Arik Sharon and other Likud and Gush Emunim leaders to portray the intifada as waged against Jews on *both* sides of the Green Line. To the extent that solidarity activities and sporadic violence of Israeli Arab citizens of Israel, within the Green Line boundaries, could be construed as equivalent to the massive unrest within the territories themselves, the annexationist camp could use the intifada to advance their hegemonic project, to convince Israeli Jews that no viable distinction could be made, by Arabs or Jews, between territories ruled by Israel before 1967 and those acquired as a result of the Six Day War.[12]

Indeed the contradiction between annexationist claims that the Green Line had been erased, and the categorical differences between life within "Israel proper" and life within the intifada-ruled West Bank and Gaza, was impossible to ignore. Even in areas within Israel proper most heavily settled by Arabs, and where numerous rock-throwing incidents were reported, Jewish inhabitants made clear their own sense of the existence and practical importance of the Green Line by insisting that a security fence be built along it, regularly patrolled by the army, to shield their settlements from intifada-related sabotage and violence spilling over from the West Bank.[13] During periods of particularly intense intifada activity or following bloody acts of terrorism, these realities have led many annexationist leaders to abandon the principle of the erasure of the Green Line in favor of measures to seal off "the territories" and their inhabitants from "Israel," both to punish the Palestinians and to protect Israelis from them. Even Arik Sharon's ordinary language showed how alive and well the Green Line was in his cognitive map as a demarcation of "Israel." Demanding that thousands of West Bank and Gaza Arabs who had been living inside Israeli Arab villages be sent back to their homes in the occupied territories, Sharon warned that if this were not done, "control of a significant slice of Israel's territory" would be lost.[14]

Prospects for a New Hegemonic Conception of Israel's Borders

British rule of all of Ireland and French rule of Algeria are ideas no longer advanced by any serious contender for political power in Britain or France. In Israel, efforts to incorporate the Palestinian territories into

the State of Israel on a hegemonic basis are continuing. What are the requirements and prospects for success?

Traditionally, one of the most important resources available to Israeli annexationists has been the identification of the territories as vital security assets. Security arguments were also of enormous salience to British elites contemplating Ireland's status in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and to French military experts discussing NATO requirements in North Africa after 1945. But changing circumstances substantially lessened Ireland's importance for British security after World War I; they also lessened the credibility of French claims in the 1950s about the vital military importance of holding on to Algeria. In like manner, Israeli thinking about the security significance of the territories has been affected by the moderating trend in the foreign policies of most Arab states and the acquisition of long-range missiles and unconventional warheads by Iraq, Syria, and Iran.[15] For annexationists out to create hegemonic presumptions about the territories rather than contingent commitments, their diminishing security significance has highlighted the importance of providing an ideological (Zionist, historicist, or religious) underpinning to the state-expansion process.

Indeed the historical, ideological, and emotional links between Israel's Jewish majority and the disputed territories *are* strong and widely shared. Also significant is that there are no geographical barriers separating pre-1967 Israel from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hence the "map image" of the country as including the occupied territories is at least as appealing and "natural" (probably more so) than the shape of the state within the Green Line boundaries. Certainly no body of water, such as the Irish or Mediterranean Sea, exists to inhibit the establishment of routinized contacts between "core" and "periphery."

From the point of view of hegemonic construction, however, these advantages are unlikely to be decisive. The failure of governing elites in Britain and France to defend or establish the hegemonic status of enlarged visions of their states suggests the importance of another factor. In each case hegemonic failure was directly linked to the intense and pervasive dissatisfaction of indigenous inhabitants of those territories targeted for absorption into the state-building core. Sustained opposition by Irish Catholics and Algerian Muslims produced gross discrepancies between claims of integration advanced as part of expansive hegemonic projects and radical differences between conditions of life in the outlying territories and conditions within the state-building core.[16] In the Israeli case the 1949 boundaries of the state were hegemonically established, but only after forcible evacuation of Arabs during the 1948 war had reduced the Arab population of the area within those boundaries by 85 percent. By contrast

the West Bank and Gaza Strip are inhabited by large and cohesive Arab populations.

With annexationist elites and attractive, expansionist ideological appeals available, the key to successful incorporation of the territories into the Israeli state will be elimination of the gross discrepancy between *expectations* of continuity between different parts of the national domain and *realities* of sharp discontinuities. Since these discontinuities are mainly expressions of the presence and antagonistic sentiments of the Arabs of these areas, the model of hegemonic construction offered in this study (supported by analysis of the British and French experiences) leads to the conclusion that to establish a hegemonic conception of the State of Israel encompassing the whole Land of Israel, annexationists must either satisfy the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip or remove them. These are the two conditions under which the ideological hegemony threshold can be crossed, entailing a qualitative change in the collective perception of these areas as just as irreversibly and unproblematically integrated into the Israeli state as are any other regions of the country.

To be sure, many Israelis believed, before the intifada, that the enormous coercive potential of the Israeli army, the careful surveillance of potential troublemakers, and the economic benefits accruing to Palestinian workers commuting into Israel were sufficient barriers to the expression of political resentments or nationalist frustrations festering beneath the surface. A public opinion survey conducted by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in 1986 reported that 93 percent of respondents "were convinced Israel would be able to deal with a revolt of the Arabs living in the territories."[17] Those concerned about the uneven rates of natural increase between Arabs and Jews, and the specter of an Arab majority crystallizing within the country over a twenty-to-thirty-year period, predicted and then welcomed the massive immigration of Soviet Jews as an effective solution to the "demographic problem." The general view, often stated explicitly by then Prime Minister Shamir, was that the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the Palestinian problem in particular were not "burning" issues requiring urgent or imaginative consideration by the Israeli government.

In the territories, however, vast changes were occurring, unbeknown to most Israelis and unappreciated by those aware of them. A generational shift, associated with greater militancy among better-educated, underemployed nationalists and Muslim fundamentalists, had removed virtually all the traditional elites with whom the Israeli authorities had enjoyed a working semi-collaborative relationship. Large numbers of youthful nationalists were inspired by hundreds of PLO activists released by Israel as part of its 1985 prisoner exchange with Ahmed Jibril. Armed with a sophisticated understanding of Israel and appreciating the kind of pressures

to which it would be sensitive, they had forged a thick network of associations and organizations. With assistance from the PLO on the outside, these had been gradually built up as a nonmilitary infrastructure of a Palestinian "state on the way."

For Israelis, eruption of the intifada, so unexpected, so resilient, and from so narrow a resource base as existed within the Palestinian community, was a great shock. Even if the army could stamp out large-scale disturbances, it could not prevent stone throwing and other forms of harassment from making the West Bank and Gaza Strip into zones of personal insecurity for Israelis. With no confidence that future uprisings could be deterred, images of returning to the status quo ante quickly disappeared, even from most discussions within the annexationist camp. What had been, prior to the intifada, a rather popular option on opinion surveys regarding preferred policies for the future in the territories, namely, "maintaining the status quo," lost almost all its support, at least during the first two and a half years of the intifada.[18] No longer did Israeli government officials, or other advocates of maintaining Israeli rule over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, characterize the occupation as "benign," blame disturbances in the territories on PLO "troublemakers" or agitators, or argue that the Palestinians there were not demanding independence from Israel.[19] Five years after its initial outburst, though the intifada may have faded away as a coordinated array of strikes, committees, and demonstrations, the depth of the anger it expressed and generated, and the mobilization of virtually the entire society in acts of resistance it produced are understood by the vast majority of Israelis to mean that ruling the Arabs of the territories will require repeated use of harsh, sustained, and politically costly repressive measures.

The expectation that Palestinian Arab discontent will continue to disrupt all efforts to promote images of "normal" life for Jewish Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is strengthened by comparing international support for Palestinian demands with the kinds of international support enjoyed by Irish nationalists in the late nineteenth century and Algerian rebels in the 1950s. The long process of Irish political mobilization that helped break the hegemonic conception of Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom moved from the Fenian terrorism of the late 1860s and early 1870s, to the Land League and the Land War of the late 1870s and early 1880s, to the appearance of a disciplined, countrywide nationalist party under the leadership of Parnell and Redmond. Important elements in each of these waves of Irish discontent were the funds, political support, and conspiratorial leadership provided by the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the Clan na Gael, and the large population of Irish Catholics in the United States who rallied around these groups in support of whatever

demands for land or independence their brethren in Ireland were willing to make. Although hardly decisive, the Irish lobby in the United States encouraged the U.S. government to make some diplomatic efforts on behalf of more considerate British treatment of Ireland, efforts which interfered with Unionist promotion of the idea of Ireland as a strictly domestic affair.

The FLN's revolutionary struggle against French rule of Algeria, which played a crucial role in the failure of the Algérie française hegemonic project, was even more reliant on international support than was the mobilization of Irish discontent in the late nineteenth century. Nasser's Egypt in particular was a vital source of arms, encouragement, training, and funds in the early years of the struggle. Eventually Morocco and Tunisia served as key training and staging areas for the Algerian Liberation Army and as safe havens for the FLN's "external" leadership. In the international arena as a whole, and in the Soviet bloc in particular, diplomatic and material assistance for the struggle was readily available. The great wave of decolonization that swept Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in the fifteen years following World War II, sponsored and legitimized by U.N. support for the principle of national self-determination, eventually forced France's NATO allies, including the United States, to pressure France to withdraw from Algeria. Even before significant international leverage was brought to bear against the French government in early 1958 and before explicit resolutions were passed in the United Nations in support of the Algerian rebels, attempts by the Faure, Mollet, and Bourgès-Maunoury governments to treat Algeria as if it were an integral part of France were substantially harmed by the need regularly to defend French rule of Algeria, at the United Nations and in the pages of the international press on an instrumental, utilitarian, or legalist bases.

In the Palestinian case, the range of international support available for the struggle to end Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is broader and deeper than in either the Irish or Algerian cases. For forty-five years the United Nations Relief and Works Agency has fed, cared for, and educated millions of Palestinians in refugee camps throughout the Middle East, including inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Excepting Iran, Sudan, and Libya, every county in the world has endorsed the principle of trading "territories for peace." United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 have enshrined the principle of "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force" as the basis for almost all serious diplomatic efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab and Muslim countries regularly treat the Palestine question as the most pressing foreign policy issue on their agendas. The Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, the European Community, and dozens of other international organizations have regularly condemned Is-

raeli government policies of settlement, land expropriation, discrimination, and refusal to address the Palestinian refugee problem. Israel's announced annexation of expanded East Jerusalem, with its shrines and pilgrimage sites for billions of Christians and Muslims, is rejected by virtually the entire world, insuring global interest in any protests or violence that occur in the "holy city."

Though the PLO's diplomatic fortunes wax and wane with notorious frequency, it enjoys a recognized position on the international scene as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." The Palestinian problem itself has become a fixture of contemporary international politics. Increasingly Palestinians are seen as victims of Israeli intransigence, fanaticism, or paralysis rather than as perpetrators of bloody and unnecessary acts of terrorism. In countless international fora, the broad consensus that settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict will require a "just solution to the legitimate national rights of the Palestinians," and that it will require a Palestinian state based in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, compels Israelis, whether annexationists or not, to defend their country against those who use continued occupation and repression to question Israel's commitment to peace, democracy, and humane values.

Israel is also a smaller country than either Britain or France and relatively more dependent on networks of economic, technological, political, military, and cultural links to every continent. Because of Israel's thoroughgoing involvement in the international system, neither the government of Israel nor Israelis can avoid confronting the worldwide refusal to view incorporation of the territories into Israel as acceptable, let alone proper, natural, or commonsensical. Whether or not the force of international opinion, the exertions of diplomats, or the threat of economic sanctions could ever remove Israel from the territories, the international context of Israeli state expansion is such that Palestinian opposition from within the territories, as long as it exists, will find sources of support and encouragement for its effective expression. This is yet another reason to expect that Israeli policies of de facto annexation will *not* eliminate Israeli perceptions of a gross discrepancy between life on either side of the Green Line.

Therefore crossing the ideological hegemony threshold in the state-building direction will require a substantial change in Israeli policies. Israel must either offer West Bank and Gaza Palestinians arrangements capable of eliciting their acquiescence in the absorption of those territories into Israel or accomplish the wholesale removal of Palestinians from those territories. A deal with the Palestinians would remove the source of mass discontent which would otherwise sustain prolonged resistance struggles. Removal of the Palestinians could mobilize Arab and world opinion so

violently against the Jewish state, regardless of its borders, that demands for Israeli disengagement from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in return for peace, demands supportable now by many, perhaps most Israelis, would be displaced by demands for Israel's isolation and defeat which no Israeli Jews could entertain.

Even in comparison with British and French stances toward the natives of Ireland and Algeria, however, Israel would seem unlikely to be able to promote a formula for incorporating the target territories which would remove the basis for sustained opposition from their indigenous inhabitants. As in the two European cases, Israel has settled the territories with its own nationals, who in large measure have been self-selected for ideological and cultural perspectives, political ambitions, and economic interests that encourage them to oppose extending local Palestinians any substantial protection of property or political rights. In 1992 the proportion of Jews to Arabs in the West Bank (including expanded East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip was approximately 12 percent, roughly equal to the proportion of Europeans in Algeria to Muslims in Algeria in the 1950s, though somewhat less than half the proportion of Protestants to Catholics in early twentieth-century Ireland.

To be sure, despite the opposition or sullen acquiescence of Irish Protestants and pieds noirs, both British Unionists in the 1890s and early 1900s and Soustellian integrationists in the mid-1950s promoted expensive projects to foster native loyalties to Britain and France rather than to Irish or Algerian nationalism. In Ireland, Balfour sought to "kill home rule with kindness." Soustelle's plan, and the official policy of French governments from Faure and Mollet to de Gaulle, was to extend massive economic aid and equal political rights to Algerian Muslims in order to drain the independence movement of mass support. But French investments and political reforms made hardly a dent in popular support for the independence struggle, and although far-reaching land redistribution schemes were implemented in Ireland, from a political point of view both these efforts were classic cases of "too little too late."

There are cultural and historical reasons to believe, and evidence to suggest, that Israeli emulation of these efforts will fail, on the political level at least, even more spectacularly. In Britain and France the *formal* legitimizing myths standing behind state claims of authority over both populations and territories included primary commitments to citizenship and political equality for all adults (or adult males). Neither the British nor the French states were, officially and legally, envisioned as representing the interests of one nationally or religiously distinct body of citizens to the exclusion of Irish Catholics or Algerian Muslims. No matter what the real obstacles raised by prejudice, differential mobilizational capacities, or

de facto discrimination, the images of Britain and France sponsored by those who sought hegemonic integration of Ireland and Algeria included the *eventual* attainment of social and political equality for their majority populations within a larger British or French political community. Annexationists in Israel, on the other hand, regardless of differences among them on a variety of issues, agree that the state into which the West Bank and Gaza Strip are to be incorporated is, and will always be, a Jewish-Zionist state—a state with a mission to serve and represent the interests of the Jewish people; a state within which formal citizenship, even if granted to the Arabs of the territories, would mean less for determining access to status honor, political power, and economic resources (such as land, water, and employment) and more for enforcing their identity as non-Jews. Nor, consistent with Judaism's norms against proselytization, have any elements within the annexationist camp suggested that eventually the Arabs of the territories, along with the Arab citizens of Israel proper, could be assimilated into the Jewish population through conversion or intermarriage.[20]

Furthermore, Palestinian Arab national consciousness is, if anything, even more completely defined in opposition to Jewish Israelis than was Irish national consciousness in opposition to Britons, or Algerian national consciousness in opposition to the French. After a hundred years of Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine/the Land of Israel, conducted almost entirely within an international and Middle Eastern political culture recognizing national identities as the only ones constitutive of internationally accepted rights to territory, the national consciousness of Palestinian Arabs as separate from, not to say intrinsically opposed to, Jewish nationalism seems at least as unlikely to fade as was Irish nationalism in the early twentieth century or Algerian nationalism in the 1950s.[21]

It is therefore unsurprising that halting attempts by various Likud governments to strike a bargain with credible Palestinian elites in the territories have either failed miserably or been withdrawn as soon as some Arab interest was displayed. Between 1979 and 1981 the first Begin government conducted negotiations over "full autonomy" for the West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs with the United States and Egypt as part of the Camp David "Framework for Peace." Whatever small degree of interest some Palestinian notables had in the formula evaporated when the Likud's highly restricted definition of "full autonomy" became known.[22]

Subsequently some efforts were made to cultivate village notables and heads of clans in rural areas of the West Bank who might help isolate the PLO and provide a nonpolitical basis for cooperation with Israel. The Village Leagues, as they were called, however were dissolved as soon as their leaders began making political statements, such as publicly identifying

themselves as Palestinians, demanding recognition of the PLO, and endorsing U.S. peace initiatives.[23] In response to the intifada the Likud again offered to discuss an arrangement with the Palestinians based on "interim autonomy," which was the basis for Shamir's participation in talks with Palestinian representatives following the Madrid peace conference. After the Likud's defeat in the 1992 Israeli elections, however, Shamir publicly admitted that he had never contemplated offering Arab inhabitants of the territories any arrangements they might have found acceptable. "I would have conducted the autonomy negotiations for ten years," he said, "and in the meantime we would have reached half a million Jews in Judea and Samaria."[24] As Shamir himself plainly understood, Palestinian political mobilization in the territories is so broad and intense, and the rejection by Israeli annexationists of Palestinian claims so absolute that no basis exists (or is likely to exist) for negotiating mutually acceptable arrangements between annexationist Israeli governments and Palestinians.

In light of the dismal prospects for removing, obscuring, or safely containing Palestinian discontent, it should not be surprising that removing the Palestinians themselves has crystallized as the preferred option of Israelis committed to the hegemonic institutionalization of Jewish rule throughout the whole Land of Israel. Since the mid-1980s, the idea of transferring Arabs en masse out of the country, whether through offering financial inducements, exerting indirect pressures, or implementing state-supervised coercion, has passed from the realm of the unthinkable to the plausible, and from the plausible to the policy of choice for a plurality if not a majority of annexationists. A particularly elaborate survey conducted in 1986 asked respondents to indicate which of ten different options for dealing with the territories and their Arab populations were both favored and found acceptable. The most extreme option in the annexationist direction was outright annexation plus expulsion of all Arabs. Of all the ten options, this option was deemed acceptable by more Israeli Jews than any other (42.9 percent). A plurality (29.7 percent) chose the same option as the one they most favored.[25] Beginning in spring 1989, the Hanoch Smith Institute reported a sharp increase in support for "transfer"-type solutions. Between May and November 1989 the percentage of Jewish Israelis answering yes to the question "Are you prepared to consider the deportation of Palestinians if a way is not found to make peace?" rose from 38 percent to 52 percent.[26]

The individual most closely identified with popularizing the expulsion of Arabs as a solution to Israel's demographic and political problems was Rabbi Meir Kahane (assassinated in New York City in 1991). Kahane demanded that every Arab in the country either leave or sign a form renouncing all claims to citizenship or any other form of national or

political rights. His successful 1984 campaign to enter the Knesset was based on two slogans: "Let me deal with them!" and "I say what you think!" While a member of Knesset he introduced legislation forbidding sexual intimacy between Jews and non-Jews and banning all non-Jews from living within Jerusalem.[27]

The Likud and its "respectable" allies on the fundamentalist and ultranationalist right were disturbed by Kahane's popularity but open to his message. While helping to ban Kahane and his followers from subsequent elections, they began indicating their own support for, or refusal to rule out, the mass "transfer" or "repatriation" of Arabs.[28] In 1985, books and articles describing the evacuation of Arabs from the country as humane and fully compatible with Zionist principles began appearing on publishing-house lists and in the journals and newspapers associated with Herut, its ultranationalist allies, and Gush Emunim.[29]

In October 1987, Yosef Shapira, a National Religious party cabinet minister closely identified with Gush Emunim, proposed a program of $20,000 grants for all Arabs willing to leave the Land of Israel and permanently renounce the right to return. A survey of 120 rabbis who participated in an antiterrorism conference in a West Bank settlement in 1987 showed that 62 percent believed "the foreigners" should be encouraged to emigrate while 15 percent supported forcible expulsion.[30] At the beginning of 1988 a survey of two thousand members of Herut's central committee showed that 41 percent of respondents favored "a transfer (of the Arab population outside the boundaries of Eretz Yisrael)... if the demographic situation in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza worsens."[31] Only after months of intifada, however, did leaders of Herut, Tehiya, Tzomet, and Gush Emunim speak publicly of their support for various schemes of population transfer. In 1988 the new Moledet (Homeland) party based its appeal entirely on its commitment to engineer the departure of all Arabs from the territories.[32]

Many Irish historians describe the purpose of Britain's laissez-faire policies in Ireland during the Great Famine of the 1840s as designed to reduce drastically the island's Catholic population. Some small attempts in French Algeria were made, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to encourage Muslim emigration. Neither case, however, provides a useful basis for evaluating the plausibility of an Israeli-sponsored evacuation of Arabs from the occupied territories. Though no one can know what exactly the response of the anti-annexationist camp would be to a government-ordered policy of transfer, some Peace Now leaders have declared that policies of mass deportation would trigger explosions within the army caused by refusals to follow orders and by violent resistance. Indeed even many annexationists, citing political and logistical problems, have warned

that however attractive "transfer" options may appear, they have no realistic chance of implementation.[33] The only scenarios entailing mass expulsions depicted by observers as plausible are those associated with major wars in which large-scale fighting erupts in or near the West Bank. It seems best, therefore, to assume that deportations will not take place on a scale able to reduce significantly the size of the Arab population of the territories and thereby eliminate the basis for a "gross discrepancy" between life in Israel proper and life in the occupied territories.

The inability of Israeli annexationists to either satisfy the Arabs of the territories or remove them means it is unlikely the annexationists will be able to construct a hegemonic view of the whole Land of Israel. This is a judgment about the implausibility of an annexationist victory in a war of position—a victory necessary to relocate the question of the fate of the occupied territories across the ideological hegemony threshold and thereby remove it from the Israeli political agenda. Certainly a state-building victory in a war of position seems at least as unavailable to Israeli annexationists as it was to partisans of Algérie française in France or to supporters of various schemes for a "Greater Britain," or a reconsolidated Union, in late nineteenth century Britain. But if Israeli annexationists are unable to win a state-building victory in a war of position, then the problem of the occupied territories will continue to burden the Israeli polity unless annexationists can win a state-contracting victory in a war of maneuver.

Prospects for State Contraction in Israel

From 1983 to at least the early 1990s, Israel's relationship to the West Bank and Gaza, as a problem in Israeli politics, has been located to the left of the ideological hegemony threshold, but to the right of the regime threshold. The Israeli-Palestinian relationship during these years should therefore be expected to resemble the British-Irish relationship between 1886 and 1914 and the French-Algerian relationship between 1946 and 1961. In this location, according to analysis of the European cases, changing domestic and international constellations of power can be expected to produce repeated opportunities for elites favoring state contraction to fight a war of maneuver against those willing to challenge the regime itself rather than permit disengagement from the target territories. What then do the patterns discovered during analysis of wars of maneuver in Britain and France over disengagement from Ireland and Algeria suggest about the circumstances under which such struggles are likely to erupt in Israel, the relative plausibility of different strategies for "rescaling" the problem

which are available to Israeli anti-annexationists, and the prospects for their success?

An Israeli War of Maneuver in Comparative Perspective, 1988–1990

Labor's ouster of Likud in the 1992 elections gave anti-annexationist elites new opportunities to contract the state. To exploit these opportunities, however, decision makers will confront crucial questions about the likelihood of decisive engagements in a war of maneuver over withdrawing Israeli authority from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the strategies and circumstances that could help avoid or win such engagements. An excellent opportunity to address these questions, by tapping my analyses of British and French wars of maneuver regarding Ireland and Algeria, is provided by the crisis in early 1990 surrounding the fall of the second Likud-led national unity government and the desperate and prolonged attempts by Peres and Shamir to form narrow governments of their own. This was not the first time that annexationist threats to state authority were made in connection with the dispute over the territories, but it was the first time that such challenges, and public fears about the possibility of regime failure, played an important role in the political calculations of Israeli political elites.

I noted in Chapter 5 that not until the political status of Ireland had been problematized did regime-level barriers to British disengagement from Ireland become visible. Even so, threats to the regime associated with movement toward the separation of Ireland from Britain did not manifest themselves except when governments committed to such a policy sought to implement disengagement policies or appeared poised to do so. The climactic phase of this war of maneuver was reached in the years between the Parliament Act's elimination of the House of Lords veto in 1911 and the outbreak of World War I in September 1914.

This decisive political battle was prefigured by minor skirmishes in 1886 and 1892. Before the defeat of Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill by the House of Commons in 1886, Ulster Unionists, drawing encouragement from Randolph Churchill, reacted with defiant gestures, violent rhetoric, and rudimentary preparations for armed resistance. Six years later Gladstone's rise to the premiership, in alliance with the Irish nationalists, resulted in passage of his second Home Rule Bill by the Commons. As we have seen, this success roused both Irish Protestants and British Conservatives to a wider-ranging, more explicit, and more coherent mobilization along regime-challenging lines than had occurred in 1886. With the crushing defeat of home rule in the House of Lords in 1893, however, the

regime-threatening dimensions of the Irish problem were again submerged beneath the froth of "normal" British political life. Landslide election victories by the Unionists in 1895 and 1903 and by the Liberals in 1906 made Irish nationalists irrelevant for coalition formation, while the certainty of rejection by the Lords assured Unionists that even passage of a Home Rule Bill by the House of Commons would not result in Irish political autonomy. However, when two elections in 1910 produced razor-thin margins between the Liberal and Unionist parties, the Irish nationalists were once again able to bring their issue to the fore. After passage of the Parliament Act in 1911, both Irish and British Unionists confronted the real prospect of an authoritative decision to separate Ireland, in most significant respects, from the British state. These were the circumstances, prefigured in 1886 and 1892, that led to the full-scale, regime-challenging mobilization of Ulster Protestants and British Unionists.

The fierce war of maneuver analyzed in the French case had its climax in the overthrow of the Fourth Republic, while Pierre Pflimlin was premier, and strong but unsuccessful challenges to the Fifth Republic in 1960 and 1961. As in the British case, this decisive engagement in the struggle over Algeria's relationship to France was prefigured by earlier, milder confrontations. In summer and fall 1955, Prime Minister Faure's government was induced to recall its resident minister from Morocco, abandon its reform program, and escalate coercion in Algeria. These steps were taken in direct response to mass resignations by French officers in Morocco and violent threats of revolt by European settlers supported by right-wing metropolitan critics of the both the government and the regime. All three groups were reacting to what they sensed was a weakening commitment to maintaining the French protectorate in Morocco and French sovereignty in Algeria. The regime survived, but Faure's government collapsed. Following new elections in January 1956, Mollet's Socialist-led, "Republican Front" government was faced with violent riots by the pieds noirs of Algiers. With the Moroccan debacle fresh in his mind, Mollet drew back from what had seemed to be the inclination of the Socialists to implement sweeping changes in France's Algerian policy. The relatively long tenure of Mollet's government and the temporary alleviation of explicit threats to the regime were due, above all, to its partnership with partisans of Algérie française and strict adherence to the rhetoric and military policies demanded by them.

By late 1957, however, economic distress, international pressures toward negotiations with the FLN, and an increasing inclination among politicians in the center and on the left to entertain Algerian self-determination as an acceptable option made forming a stable government committed to Algérie française seem a doubtful prospect. Potent threats to the regime quickly

reemerged. Neither Gaillard's ministry nor Pflimlin's could withstand the virulent and sustained attacks. Antiregime mobilization and conspiracies within the army, among the Europeans of Algeria, and within the Gaullist movement brought down both these short-lived governments and the Fourth Republic itself.

In Israel no war of maneuver has yet been fought to a conclusion, but some skirmishing has occurred. As in the British and French cases, the production and severity of regime crises in Israel appear directly linked to the emergence of constellations of political power, suggesting that a winning coalition of state contractors is taking, or is about to take, legal-authoritative decisions to disengage from the territory(ies) in question.

When the Peres-led version of the rotating national unity government tried in 1985 to engineer a deal with King Hussein and the PLO, right-wing politicians and settlers loudly declared their unwillingness to accept the authority of the Knesset to loosen Israeli ties to the territories. Accompanying some of these declarations were threats to take up arms, if necessary, against the government. According to an official pronouncement by the Gush Emunim—controlled Association of Jewish Local Councils in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District (Yesha), Peres's plans and proposals were "a prima facie annulment of the State of Israel as a Zionist Jewish state." The leaders of the settlements characterized any return of territory to foreign sovereignty as an "illegal action" and declared that they would treat "any regime in Israel which perpetrates [this crime] as an illegal regime, just as de Gaulle treated the Vichy government of Marshal Pétain . . . which surrendered most of France's historic territory." A petition for signature by masses of Israelis was prepared, addressed to the prime minister, declaring that "any Israeli government which hands over the sovereign governance of Jerusalem, Judea, Samaria, Gaza, or the Golan, in whole or in part . . . will be considered by me to be illegal, and I shall not recognize it."[34] Members of Knesset belonging to the Land of Israel lobby endorsed the Yesha Council's declaration.[35] While Attorney General Yitzhak Zamir criticized it as "political criminality" and "seeds of a catastrophe which will lead to a civil war," Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir condemned the attorney general, describing the resolution as part of the "political and ideological arguments in the country."[36] Aware of the political support enjoyed by the settlers, and the fact that they had approximately ten thousand weapons in their personal possession, Attorney General Zamir informed the defense minister that although the Yesha declaration was illegal, he advised not indicting its authors in order to avoid aggravating the situation. Then Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin took the attorney general's advice and satisfied

himself with a warning against issuing similar incitements against state authority in the future.[37]

But not until 1988, following the outbreak of the intifada and the expectation of new elections later that year, did the struggle over the fate of the territories begin to display itself clearly as a war of maneuver. The elections of that year again resulted in a stalemate between the two major camps. After lengthy and intense bargaining with ultra-orthodox parties, the Likud and the Labor party failed to form a narrow annexationist or anti-annexationist government. The result was another government of indecision—a second national unity government between the two major parties. In March 1990, however, the coalition broke apart under pressure from the intifada, vigorous U.S. diplomacy, and extreme unease within the Likud that the unity government was being dragged into real negotiations. With a lame-duck Likud-controlled government in power, Israel experienced a two-month political crisis which ended in May when the Likud finally succeeded in forming an extreme annexationist government, supported by fundamentalists, ultranationalists, the ultra-orthodox parties, and two renegade Labor party deputies.

From the outbreak of the intifada in December 1987 to the establishment of the narrow Likud-led government in May 1990, Israelis paid unprecedented attention to the question of the Palestinians, the costs of the occupation, and the options for the eventual disposition of the territories. For the first time Israelis from all walks of life were spending month after month directly exposed to the hatreds generated among Palestinians by prolonged occupation, the solidarity of an entire population in various stages of active and passive revolt, the often brutal methods used in response, and the fear and fury of Jewish settlers (directed at both soldiers and Palestinians). Returning home on leave or upon completion of their unit's reserve duty, men told family and friends about what they had seen and done in Palestinian towns, villages, and refugee camps, in army prisons, and in large, hastily constructed detention and punishment facilities. These personal reports for the most part corroborated what Israelis were hearing and reading every day in the Israeli press and in reports from hundreds of foreign journalists attracted to Israel by the uprising.[38] Travel to the territories by Israelis, for pleasure, house-hunting trips, convenience, or even to visit relatives, virtually ceased.[39]

Polarization among Israeli Jews over how the problem might be resolved, combined with the evenness of the split between those favoring annexationist versus anti-annexationist solutions, and repeated government crises provoked fears among annexationists that "irreversible" steps toward Israeli disengagement from the territories might be the result of any one

setback or misstep. On the other hand, many anti-annexationists believed that if only their forces could be mobilized effectively, and if only they were prepared to be as ruthless as they perceived their opponents to be, they could form a government ready for serious negotiations and save the country from the disaster they identified with its continued rule over the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Although not a decisive engagement, this juncture in the history of the relationship between Israel and the territories fairly resembles the acute phases of wars of maneuver in Britain and France, when both sides of the fierce dispute within the center viewed the problem of Ireland or Algeria as located just to the right of the regime threshold. Among Israelis during this period, the question of whether illegal political action would be decisive in determining Israel's future relationship to the territories became a central and explicit topic of political debate. Special attention focused on threats of revolt by armed settlers, anti-Arab provocations, terrorism and assassination threats directed at public figures, the politicization of the army, organized refusal by reservists to serve in the territories, a new savagery in public debate, and much worried discussion of the likelihood of civil war.

Settlers complained that Israeli reporters and officers characterized the intifada as a civil rebellion rather than terrorism or war. With support from all the right-wing parties, settler activists organized a furious campaign against Israeli journalists—People against the Enemy Media as it became known, with thousands of bumper stickers appearing throughout Israel. Virtually every night Israeli television and radio received hundreds of telephone calls complaining about the use of "unpatriotic" terminology. Violent attacks on journalists and camera crews became a regular feature of life in Israel, particularly in the aftermath of Arab attacks on Jews.

Minor clashes also occurred between army units and groups of settler vigilantes. Some resulted in injuries and arrests; some were brought to an end only following the army's use of tear gas. Bitter confrontations between settlers and soldiers were common. In several instances, IDF officers were insulted, spat upon, and even beaten by angry settlers who accused them of sympathizing with the Arabs and held them responsible for Jewish casualties.[40] Gush Emunim leaders went on a hunger strike in front of the prime minister's office to warn that pressures among the settlers and their supporters elsewhere in Israel were leading to a resurgence of a terrorist underground even more widespread than the one uncovered in 1984.[41]

In fact by 1989, private militias had already formed a semisecret underground network, based in the settlements, that was conducting regular, well-organized raids on Arab villages. These groups united Gush Emunim activists with the "nonideological" but frightened and often furiously anti-

Arab residents of the new West Bank towns. The new underground had a variety of objectives, including initiating retaliation and deterrent attacks on Arabs, patrolling roads, establishing and maintaining a Jewish presence in all areas of the West Bank (no matter how likely to provoke clashes with local Arabs), providing security for businesses and residents in Jewish settlements, and laying the political, administrative, military, logistical, and technical infrastructure for maximum resistance in the event of developments deemed threatening to the continuation of Jewish rule over the territories.[42]

Beni Katzover, a Gush leader living in the Nablus area of the West Bank and a member of Knesset for Tehiya, estimated that 75 percent of the (then) eighty thousand settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would resist evacuation nonviolently, but that 5 percent would take up arms.[43] In a poll of settlers in the northern bulge of the West Bank, in November 1988, 26 percent said they would carry their resistance to evacuation as far as civil war.[44] In 1990 a book of questions and answers commonly asked of him was published by a prominent West Bank rabbi for use by religious settlers in guiding their understanding of and responses to the intifada. Included in the book were several questions about whether "it would be permissible to fight against army units sent to evacuate settlements" in the event of a government decision to withdraw from parts of the Land of Israel.[45]

Following the PLO's declaration of the "State of Palestine" in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in fall 1988, hundreds of activists associated with Rabbi Meir Kahane formally and publicly declared establishment of the "State of Judea," with a flag, an anthem, stamps, and passports. The stated purpose of the organization was to operationalize its founders' condemnation of the State of Israel as "traitorous" and to seize control of any areas abandoned to Arab control. Included within its clandestine "security" branch were said to be reserve officers from elite units, including Shlomo Baum.[46] A shadowy group (or groups) linked to both Kahane and Tehiya called itself the Sicarii (after the band of assassins who killed Jews it considered traitors during Roman rule of Judea). The Sicarii specialized in arson attacks and bomb and murder threats against (Jewish) journalists, politicians, and other public figures accused of lowering national morale or favoring negotiations with the PLO.[47]

The outrage of the settlers and other elements within the ultranationalist and fundamentalist right, against the media and the army high command, was based in part on the fact that Israel's most prominent journalists, and the decisive majority of the upper echelons of the army, were drawn from social and political backgrounds (Ashkenazim, secularists, graduates of high-prestige schools, and kibbutzniks) strongly suggesting their anti-

annexationist sentiments.[48] Indeed representatives of the general staff did publicly and repeatedly insist that a political solution to the problem was the *only* way to end disturbances in the territories, since the fundamental problem was political not military. The army's mission, as the leaders of the IDF construed it, was to "contain" the uprising in order to allow the political echelon to act and to negotiate without having to do so under the pressure of violence. Chief of Staff Dan Shomron compared the situation in the territories to that in Algeria during the French war there and observed that in such situations, absent a political settlement, order and stability could be restored only through starvation or mass deportation of the population.[49]

Contrary to the position of the general staff, the settlers, joined by rank and file activists within the Likud, leaders of ultranationalist parties outside of the governing coalition, and several Likud ministers willing to strain the principle of "collective cabinet responsibility," insisted that the IDF be ordered to fight the intifada as a war, that it define the uprising's liquidation as victory, and that it commit itself with the same determination and willingness to make sacrifices that it always did in order to achieve victory in war. During a Knesset committee meeting in April 1989, one Likud deputy, a former chief of Israeli military intelligence, accused Shomron of purposely refusing to end Palestinian unrest and of "forging the *intifada* with his own hands."[50] Repeatedly, in public comments offered from January 1989 to May 1990, Shomron went out of his way to emphasize that the army would disintegrate if ordered to "quell the uprising. . . . This would lead to a rift in Israeli society and subsequently in the IDF, which encompasses the entire political spectrum in Israel. The moment the IDF stops operating within the national consensus—which includes people on the fringe who think differently—the IDF would weaken and tear apart."[51] It was in response to such remarks, reflecting not only Shomron's views but those of the large majority of senior commanders, that Uzi Landau, a leading Likud parliamentarian, called for a systematic purge of the army and the security services.[52]

Labor party leader Yitzhak Rabin, who was defense minister until the end of the second unity government in November 1989, stood by his policy of containing rather than defeating the intifada, despite vehement and not altogether inaccurate charges from the annexationist camp that he and other anti-annexationists were welcoming the continued revolt as a spur to their political objectives.[53] When the Likud assumed control again, with Moshe Arens as defense minister, there was considerable speculation that the standing orders to the army would change, that the order to treat disturbances as terrorism or aggressive war, and to liquidate rather than contain the uprising, would be given. The evidence strongly suggests that

Sharon was not appointed defense minister, and sweeping changes were not made in the standing orders for responding to the intifada largely because the cabinet doubted many IDF generals and colonels would obey a command to fight the uprising as a war entailing the mobilization of artillery and armor, wholesale expulsions, tens of thousands of fatalities, and the destruction of villages and towns.[54]

During the height of the intifada, midrank officers and ordinary soldiers were also affected by the politicization of army policy. The pressures which politicized the IDF and produced serious internal strains came from the anti-annexationist camp as well as from the right. Army service in the territories during the intifada was, at best, a frustrating experience. Combined with the violent techniques used to subdue, punish, and intimidate Palestinians and the unorthodox methods employed by secret "disguised" units operating with unclear lines of accountability, the army's modus operandi produced daily situations in which strict application of written orders would expose many soldiers and/or officers to potential prosecution.[55] Cover-ups and pressures to participate in cover-ups of "deviant" behavior became a regular part of military life.[56] In addition, political differences among soldiers and reservists, between enlisted men and midlevel officers, and between midlevel officers and the high command fostered distrust and caused operational difficulties. The upper echelons were particularly concerned about deteriorating standards, morale, and fighting ability associated with prolonged, brutalizing confrontations with civilians and about extremist and "antidemocratic" tendencies emerging among midlevel officers, more of whom were now drawn from previously underrepresented segments of Israeli society—Middle Eastern and North African Jews.[57] Yesh Gvul (There Is a Limit), an organization that supported soldiers who refused service in the Lebanon War, reemerged as one of dozens of new anti-annexationist groups embracing more radical critiques of the occupation than Peace Now or established political parties had traditionally articulated.

The violence of the Sicarii and the settler militias, the extreme but portentous posturing of the "State of Judea," and the increasingly obvious political strains within and upon the army appeared especially salient against a background of political immobilism and an explosive escalation in the rhetoric of debate. The editor of a serious right-wing journal quoted from *The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* to prove that Shulamit Aloni and other "radical leftists" were certifiably psychotic.[58] West Bank settlers insulted high-ranking army officers by calling them "kapos."[59] One leader of Tzomet called Labor leader Yitzhak Navon, formerly president of the State, a "quisling."[60] Over 250,000 Israelis demonstrated at a massive Tel Aviv rally organized by Gush Emunim in March

1988. Prominent banners were raised decrying Shimon Peres as Israel's Neville Chamberlain and warning those who would "stab the Jewish state in the back."[61] Ron Nahman, mayor of the Ariel settlement, a Likud member of Parliament, and known previously for his insistence on building bridges to all sectors of Israeli society, said in February 1988 that eventually the problem of the Arabs would be solved by their wholesale expulsion in the midst of a war with the Arab states. "First of all, however, we must have a civil war in this country, to purify the blood of the people. Shulamit Aloni, Dedi Zucker, and their friends will be happier anyway in New York and Paris."[62] Similarly, from the podium of the Knesset, Tehiya member Geula Cohen used the names of three prominent liberal-dovish Knesset deputies when she condemned "all the Sarids, the Dedi Zuckers, and the Tzabans, who are victims of national AIDS, who have lost their immunity mechanism, and are full of germs and think that they will spread them among the people."[63]

Of course annexationists were not the only ones to contribute to the polarization of Israeli political life or to use such vitriolic language. In April 1988 the left-wing Mapam party refused to invite Prime Minister Shamir to the festive opening session of its decennial conference, while pointedly inviting Palestinian leaders from the occupied territories. Amos Oz is Israel's foremost living author and one of the most respected personalities in the anti-annexation camp. Before a large Peace Now rally in Tel Aviv in June 1989, Oz declared that

> A small sect, a cruel and obdurate sect, emerged several years ago from a dark corner of Judaism; and it is threatening to destroy all that is dear and holy to us, and to bring down upon us a savage and insane blood-cult. People think, mistakenly, that this sect is struggling for our sovereignty in Hebron and Nablus, that it wants the Greater Land of Israel, and this end justifies all the means at their disposal—including those dripping with blood. But the truth is that, for this cult, the Greater Land of Israel is merely a sophisticated ploy to disguise its real aims: the imposition of an ugly and distorted version of Judaism on the State of Israel.

Oz went on to justify his words as a warning that the left in Israel had its own "red lines," that it too cherished values more important than avoidance of civil war, and that its willingness to fight in the ranks of the armed forces was ultimately conditional. "These warnings must be sounded in unambiguous language," he stated, "we do not want the nation to be ripped apart—but under no circumstances whatever will we acquiesce in the transformation of our country into a monster. And we will not allow them to use us to serve as the fangs and claws of the monster." Oz chal-

lenged the Likud to "rehabilitate" the rule of law and the principle of humane treatment of Arabs. "If you do not do this at once, our blood is on your heads; and, at the end of the road, your own blood as well. You have been warned."[64]

Surrounded by such rhetoric, the public's affirmative response to a June 1989 poll is no surprise. Fifty-eight percent answered yes to the question "Could the exacerbation of domestic controversies lead to civil war?"[65] In September 1989, one of Israel's leading newspapers, *Hadashot,* responded to the bitter political atmosphere by commissioning a major polling organization to conduct a survey among Israeli Jews asking respondents to identify the "most hated person in the country." Two doves led the list—Shimon Peres (21.3 percent) and Yossi Sarid (16.9 percent)—followed by two leading hawks, Ariel Sharon (15.2 percent) and Meir Kahane (10.3 percent).[66]

During this period many private and public meetings were held between representatives of Gush Emunim and various peace groups with the express purpose of finding common ground and lessening fears of political violence between the two camps. None were successful.[67] In fact, questions about civil war and the likelihood of regime breakdown became a regular feature of interviews with politicians. In a joint interview in late 1989, dovish Labor MK Yossi Beilin and Likud leader Uzi Landau were asked questions about the paralysis of the national unity government and about chances that a violent right-wing challenge would materialize against a narrow Labor government's peace policy. Beilin argued in favor of dissolving the national unity government, despite the risks of regime threats and of a narrow right-wing government. Beilin argued that peace policies that avoided uprooting existing settlements would make civil war or intra-Jewish violence less likely, but expressed confidence that a Labor government would overcome outbursts if they did occur. Landau, on the other hand, encouraged the idea of such threats materializing and magnified their likely consequences. He emphasized that "history teaches us that many societies, when confronted with the need to take major decisions, have collapsed because of divisions and controversies." He cited the controversy over the Lebanon War as an indication of how imperiled the political system in Israel might be by the decision of a narrow Labor government to withdraw from territories. "I believe," he said, "that the danger of a split is so grave, and the prospect of Jews getting hold of each other's throats so frightening, that the effort to avoid a split is paramount." When asked whether he foresaw the danger of civil war or emergence of a left- or right-wing underground should a narrow government be formed, Landau promised that he personally would not participate in such activities. "But," he continued, "there is a danger that if a decision is made to

withdraw from Judea and Samaria, there might be hundreds of thousands of Israelis taking the law into their own hands . . . a wise statesman will be careful to avoid such a situation."[68]

Some months earlier a prominent Hebrew University sociologist warned that settlers and right-wing militants were ready to challenge the authority of the state and had enough support from politicians and elite groups so that "a forced withdrawal from the territories or a deep economic crisis could lead to violent clashes within the organs of the state . . . a case of Yamit writ large and much more serious."[69] After an eight-month study of the options facing Israel in the territories, twenty-four Israeli national security experts concluded that the most salient obstacles to a settlement based on negotiated withdrawal from the territories were "the grave challenges" it would present "to the delicate fabric of Israeli society and to the very unity and integrity of the nation." Although the study group suggested that eventual establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories was in Israel's long-term national interest, they also concluded that a Knesset decision in support of such a policy would trigger sedition within the army, large-scale settler resistance, internecine bloodshed, political assassinations, and widespread anti-Arab provocations.[70]

My point here is not that Israel was on the brink of civil war or that the breakdown of central institutions was imminent. Nor am I arguing that the Israeli political situation in early 1990 was as explosive as the Irish crisis in Britain before World War I or the crises faced by two regimes in France from 1957 to 1961. What I do contend is that between the outbreak of the intifada in December 1987 and the establishment of a narrow right-wing government in June 1990, the Israeli public and Israeli elites substantially diverted their attention from incumbent-level competition and associated policy outcomes to threats and concerns about the regime within which that competition was nominally occurring.

Indeed the particular outcome of the crisis which dissipated Israeli fears of regime collapse or civil war, that is, formation of an unprecedentedly right-wing annexationist government, appears to have been a *direct* result of those fears. In March 1990, sixty members of Parliament announced their support for a Labor-led government, while the other sixty deputies announced support for a Likud-led government. Almost everything turned on Rabbi Eliezer Shach, the ninety-two-year-old leader of the Lithuanian branch of the non-Zionist ultraorthodox community.[71] What signals would he send to his followers in the small Flag of the Torah (Degel Hatorah) party and the Torah-Observing Sephardim (Shas), both of which he had helped found as part of longstanding rivalries within the *haredi* community?

On March 26, in a dramatic televised address delivered in a sports arena, Rabbi Shach affirmed his anti-annexationist beliefs but proceeded to vilify

the kibbutz movement and other secular Israelis, virtually forbidding his followers to support any government organized by the Labor party. The door was thus open to a coalition of the Degel Hatorah and Shas with the Likud and its ultranationalist and fundamentalist partners. After some further dispute over attempts by both Labor and Likud to purchase the loyalty of certain of each other's Knesset representatives, Shamir succeeded in forming a Likud-fundamentalist-ultranationalist-ultraorthodox government which was voted into office by the Knesset on June 11, 1991.

Why did Shach renege on commitments his emissaries had made to Peres? Why did he go against his own consistently voiced opinions favoring withdrawal from the territories?[72] Why did he choose to emphasize the secular profanities of life among dovish kibbutzniks instead of the Messianic heresies associated with Gush Emunim? Four days before the speech was delivered, the answer to these questions was provided by sources identified as close to the nonagenerian rabbi. These sources predicted Shach would support the Likud because of his immediate concern to avoid the kind of internecine struggle which Jewish tradition says was responsible for the Roman destruction of Jerusalem. Under prevailing circumstances, they said, Shach would throw his support to Likud, fearing that "a government which does not include the Likud may lead to internal dissension and even bloodshed within the Israeli people, were it to make territorial concessions."[73]

The substantive intrusion of regime-level concerns into Israeli politics from 1988 to 1990 was triggered by the state-contracting influence of the intifada. But this order of magnitude in the disruptiveness of struggles over disengagement was present only because five years earlier the annexationist camp had succeeded in achieving a substantial institutionalization of its expanded image of the shape of the Israeli state. It had, in other words, succeeded in pushing the problem of the occupied territories past the regime threshold. This sequence of change and consequence[74] corresponds to expectations generated by my model as well as to patterns traced in the British and French cases. By examining responses of Israeli politicians to this crisis in light of the British and French experience with similarly located territorial problems (just to the right of the regime threshold), the likely role of different rescaling mechanisms and the plausibility of various scenarios for Israeli state contraction can be evaluated.

Israeli Strategies for Recrossing the Regime Threshold

Rabbi Shach's decision to back the Likud doomed desperate but promising Labor party efforts to negotiate the regime threshold with a rescaling strategy based initially on a dramatic realignment of Israeli politics. From

late 1989 to June 1990, anti-annexationist politicians and opinion leaders believed there was a good chance they would have an opportunity to form a government without the Likud. Amid initial skirmishing in a war of maneuver I have argued was taking place at that time, they contemplated possible strategies for pushing the problem of the disposition of the occupied territories across the regime threshold in the state-contracting direction. The most serious initiative, and the one that came closest to success, was carried forward by Shimon Peres and the dovish Mashov faction of the Labor party. Believing it was perhaps his last chance to form a government under his leadership, Peres pulled out all the stops in pursuit of the votes in Parliament necessary to form a winning coalition. Once in power the government would implement a disengagement policy emphasizing serial decomposition (to deprive opponents of strategic opportunities for resistance), and pedagogy (to change the preferences of Israelis not ideologically committed to the whole Land of Israel project).

To build their coalition, Peres and his supporters targeted Arab and Communist Knesset deputies, the ultraorthodox parties, and even individual deputies within the Likud. If necessary, Peres was prepared to settle for a minority government, one that could survive votes of no confidence on specific issues by counting on different Knesset deputies from opposition parties to abstain or vote in the negative on different issues. It appears he intended to use his freedom of maneuver as prime minister in a narrow government to plunge Israel into a rapid and decisive diplomatic process whose stated objective would be agreement on transitional arrangements but whose actual goal would be a comprehensive settlement. While standing down regime threats from right-wing extremists, he would count on securing generous U.S. economic and political assistance. Once terms of a peace agreement based on withdrawal from the territories had been arrived at, he would call new elections, using the prospect of peace, strong international backing, and endorsement of his policy by the army high command to give him a victory large enough to turn issues of peace and territorial withdrawal into questions no longer capable of posing serious threats to the stability of the regime.[75]

This strategy required Mapam, Ratz, and Shinui—Labor's three dovish-liberal allies—to trade strong commitments against "religious coercion" and their opposition to extravagant government funding of religious institutions for ultraorthodox support in their struggle to take Israel out of the West Bank and Gaza. Demands from the religious parties Peres was ready to accommodate would have effectively extended the power of ultraorthodox rabbis to control intimate aspects of private life and enforce their interpretation of Jewish religious law on a wide range of other issues, including the sale of pork, the operation of public transportation, restau-

rants, and places of entertainment on the Sabbath, "indecent" advertising, and censorship of the arts. In addition to furthering the appointment of religious politicians to key ministerial and deputy-ministerial positions, these deals would have entailed allocations of huge new sums for distribution in their extensive patronage systems and even bribes, reportedly in the range of millions of dollars, to individual Likud parliamentarians whose votes, it was learned, could be had at the right price.[76] Despite the embarrassment of strengthening groups they typically condemned as "religious reactionaries," Mapam, Ratz, and Shinui agreed to follow Peres's lead and support any narrow government he could muster committed to trading the occupied territories for resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In the end Peres's efforts came to nought. He did get the agreement of the Arab parties and the Communists to support if not join his government, and he thought he had at least two of the three ultraorthodox parties on board. However Rabbi Shach was, as we have seen, unconvinced that Peres could contain domestic disruption within acceptable bounds, and so he opted for the Likud. Once Shach had made his decision, the political winds shifted strongly against Peres, who found himself no longer able to outbid Shamir for the "loyalty" of several renegade Likud and Labor Knesset members.

In fact it was not at all clear that Peres would have been able to carry out his game plan, even had Shach encouraged his followers to support Labor rather than Likud in spring 1990. Some Knesset deputies from the Labor party, and some ultraorthodox deputies indicated they would refuse to support any government that relied crucially on Arab votes in order to decide the fate of the territories.[77] In a local branch meeting of Labor party activists, Mordechai Gur argued for a return to a national unity government because in the context of what he characterized as "a crisis of the state," it was simply too dangerous to allow either a narrow right-wing or left-wing government to pursue its objectives. "As Rabin and I both say," he told his audience, "we have no spare state here, and no spare army."[78] Interviews in April, May, and June 1990 with a dozen Labor party central committee members and Knesset deputies suggested that at least one-third of the Labor party were unwilling to take the risks of regime breakdown that they believed *any* narrow government would face should it go beyond incremental measures and commit itself to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Referring to the prospect of a Peres government committing itself to a land-for-peace settlement, one Labor Knesset member from the hawkish wing of the party said that "anyone within a narrow government who would give an order that might not be followed would risk the very essence of the regime. They know it, and in the end would not risk it." Another Labor MK associated with the political center

of the party agreed, saying that hundreds of officers would resign if ordered to evacuate the territories by a narrow government, and that they would be supported by armed settlers and political groups within Israel itself with easy access to weapons. Other Labor politicians closer to Peres believed that challenges to the authority of the government could and would be resisted successfully, and that the risks were in any case worth taking.[79]

The failure of several splinter rightist parties to pass the 1.5 percent minimum threshold for Knesset representation helped put the Labor party in a position to form a government in July 1992, even though the number of Jewish votes for annexationist parties (excluding the ultraorthodox) was equal to or greater than the number cast for explicitly anti-annexationist parties. In any event, the ability of the Labor party to win the June 1992 election on a platform that stressed its opposition to annexation was a substantial setback to the right wing's state-building ambitions in the territories. But as shown by the victory of the Liberal party in the 1910 elections, and the willingness of the Gaillard government to move toward disengagement from Algeria in early 1958, this incumbent-level victory should be seen as only the first step on a rocky, dangerous, and uncertain road toward state contraction.

Within the anti-annexationist camp the really crucial questions are if, how, and when to confront regime challenges. The debate over this question will be all the more intense because, although the dovish wing of the Labor party was strengthened by the result of internal elections in early 1992, Rabin's traditional sources of support in the party are drawn from circles that generally opposed Peres's narrowly based, high-risk realignment strategy. Also because of its reliance on Knesset deputies elected by Arab and ultraorthodox votes, Rabin's government is vulnerable to accusations of not representing a majority of Zionist Jews—comparable to the accusations leveled by Unionists against the third Home Rule Bill as the product of a "corrupt" bargain between Liberals and Irish nationalists. While ready to launch a process of serial decomposition, including negotiation of an interim autonomy agreement, Palestinian elections, and/or implementation of unilateral autonomy measures in the Gaza Strip, Rabin is not likely to move quickly or explicitly toward a permanent settlement based on a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Although he has spoken openly about withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and has repeatedly expressed his desire to be rid of the Gaza Strip, as of this writing Rabin has avoided committing himself explicitly to territorial withdrawals in the West Bank by emphasizing that the question of drawing maps need not be decided until five years after the interim autonomy agreement goes into effect. As he has pointed out, this means that no territorial concessions will be made before new general elections.

To minimize the danger of the regime crisis Israel will experience in connection with movement toward state contraction, those who have been associated with Rabin in the past would prefer that he wait for a large centrist bloc to coalesce in support of such a policy. This rescaling strategy is based on a different kind of "realignment" and a gradual change in the preferences of non–ideologically motivated Israeli annexationists. It envisions a Labor-led bloc, or a new grouping dedicated to territorial compromise that would represent 70 to 80 percent of the Parliament. Such a large majority, it is argued, could form as a result of the rising costs of repressing the Palestinians, trust built up by the success of autonomy agreements, and the need to harmonize Israeli policies with the demands of the international community in general and the United States in particular. In this way, it is hoped, all but 10 percent of the settlers, and a smaller percentage of their supporters within Israel proper, would either support or feel compelled to accept the decision of the government.

This kind of a "fusionist" or "Caesarist" bloc is what materialized in both Britain and France—under Lloyd George and the Unionists after 1916 and under de Gaulle's leadership in the Fifth Republic. Neither of these cases suggests it as a plausible scenario for Israel, however. In the British case, the bloc crystallized only in the context of World War I, only after the Irish question had been radically decomposed, and only after the losses of the Great War had helped marginalize Irish matters in the minds of most Unionist politicians. Even then it also required for its achievement the singular talents and charismatic authority of David Lloyd George. In Britain, in other words, this sort of realignment was not an important element in rescaling the Irish problem, only in smoothing the way to a disengagement solution of an already rescaled problem.

In France, this fusionist-type realignment took shape within the contours of a regime specially recomposed to facilitate its crystallization and was heavily dependent on the charisma and leadership talents of de Gaulle. As Lloyd George's leadership gifts were made relevant in part by international crisis, so were de Gaulle's personal appeal and the integrity of the political bloc formed as a reflection of it, functions of the vividness of French beliefs that de Gaulle, Gaullist governments, and the Fifth Republic itself were the only alternatives to civil war over Algeria. More fundamental to de Gaulle's success than whatever "unique" qualities he possessed were the thoroughgoing recomposition of the French regime that accompanied his rise to power and the beliefs of most metropolitan supporters of Algérie française that severe threats to the stability of the legal order associated with continued struggle over the future of Algeria were an order of magnitude more important to them than their desire to keep Algeria French.

Accordingly, for Israelis who advocate a rescaling strategy based on a

centrist coalition and a new national consensus, it is misplaced to bemoan the absence of a politician capable of performing the pedagogical or inspirational role associated with de Gaulle in rescaling the Algerian problem.[80] In their emphasis on great leadership or charismatic authority figures, they ignore the institutionally and situationally determined context of its successful exercise. That is, even if someone were present on the Israeli scene possessing the necessary talent, reputation, and flexibility, the decisive question would still be whether conditions enabling such a leader to exploit those assets either existed or could be engineered.

To be sure, a partial recomposition of the Israeli regime is now likely, involving direct election of the prime minister and some change in Israel's extreme version of proportional representation. By affording wider discretion to the prime minister and more security to governments he is able to form, such changes will tend to elicit a stronger leadership style more conducive to the use of charismatic appeals and political pedagogy than has been the case under the current system. However, because the great national debate over the territories is so polarized and so evenly balanced, and because the religious parties see a dire threat to their interests in any far-reaching change in the rules of the parliamentary game, only a very partial recomposition of the regime can be expected—not one capable of providing a basis for a large majority party, at least not until after the territories question is resolved or until a profound crisis over the territories effectively submerges that issue beneath concerns for the integrity of the regime.[81] My point is that the entire purpose of the pseudo-Caesarist realignment strategy designed by cautious anti-annexationists in Israel is to *avoid* sharp, regime-threatening, political struggles—struggles that could produce a powerful charismatic leader by setting the stage for drastic forms of political recomposition and/or by overshadowing preferences for territorial expansion with fears of severe societal disruption.[82]

In both Britain and France, contraction of the state across the regime threshold required a large surplus of political capital. Given the difficulties of accumulating such a surplus, it is not surprising that anti-annexationists have been increasingly explicit and insistent about their desire for stringent U.S. pressure.[83] By reducing economic and military assistance and the intimacy of U.S.-Israeli relations, or at least by explicit threats to do so, U.S. politicians could remove from the shoulders of Israeli politicians much of the burden of persuading Israeli annexationists or of imposing state contraction on unpersuaded Israeli state-builders.

While it is not inconceivable that the United States might play this deus ex machina role, neither the record of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East nor consideration of the British and French cases suggests this as a likely scenario.[84] U.S. support for a territories-for-peace solution to the

Arab-Israeli dispute is clear. Washington is ready to finance, guarantee, and/or broker almost any agreement Israeli and Arab negotiators may be able to come to. At times U.S. diplomacy has displayed an unusually dogged commitment to fostering formal negotiations between Arabs and Israelis over the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. President Bush's policy of withholding loan guarantees from the Shamir government as long as it continued to construct settlements in the territories was a key factor in bringing the Labor party to power in 1992. It is doubtful, however, that the imperatives of U.S. domestic politics and the complex array of alliances and antagonisms in American–Middle East relations will ever lead a U.S. administration to shoulder the burden of enforcing concessions necessary to achieve a settlement.

In neither France nor Britain did external pressure play a significant role in the vital task of rescaling the problems across the regime threshold. In 1958, Anglo-American diplomacy and U.S. threats to withhold badly needed loans did help push the Fourth Republic over the precipice on which it was teetering. Subsequently international opposition to French policies in Algeria also influenced many French to change their attitudes. In Britain, U.S. sympathy and diplomatic support for the Irish struggle were used by Lloyd George during and after World War I to convince Unionists to soften their positions on terms to offer Irish nationalists.[85]

However, no evidence from either of these cases suggests that the territories problem in Israel can be rescaled without decomposing the problem, recomposing the regime, or drawing the necessary political capital from an intense regime crisis. Of course *spatial* decomposition of the territories, meaning some version of the Allon Plan, has traditionally been the dominant view among Israeli doves of the shape a peace agreement would eventually take. In all its various guises, the Allon Plan emphasizes a division of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, awarding Israel particularly salient areas, including the Jordan Valley, expanded East Jerusalem, and virtually all of the post-1967 Jewish settlements. The remainder of the territories, containing the great bulk of the Arab population, would be ruled by a Jordanian/Palestinian state based in Amman under the leadership of the Hashemite dynasty or a combination of Jordanian and Palestinian elements. In the 1988–90 crisis triggered by the intifada, however, spatial decomposition was rarely discussed. As annexationists had often pointed out, the Allon Plan had never been a practical basis for a settlement. Neither King Hussein of Jordan nor any other Arab state had ever indicated readiness to accept permanent Israeli rule of substantial parts of the territories. Intensive settlement of the West Bank and Gaza did not erase the Green Line, but it did erase the lines drawn within those areas by Allon Plan aficionados separating portions to be relinquished, with few or no

Jewish inhabitants, from those containing Jewish settlers and sites of strategic or historical significance, which were to have remained under permanent Israeli jurisdiction. The intifada increased the confidence of Palestinians to demand satisfaction of their national aspirations throughout the small parts of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip), which they now made plain they were willing to accept as their state. Correspondingly, the anti-annexationist camp in Israel has become increasingly willing to forego any substantial Israeli demands for permanent control of various parts of these areas, at least exclusive of expanded East Jerusalem. When Jordan announced in July 1988 that it was formally and effectively severing all its political ties to the West Bank and acknowledging the full authority of the PLO and the Palestinians of the occupied territories to decide the fate of those areas on their own, few Allon Plan loyalists could be found willing to argue in favor of its continued relevance.[86]

If spatial decomposition, that is, the Allon Plan, as a depiction of the final objective of Israeli state contraction has been of decreasing interest to anti-annexationists, serial or temporal decomposition, in which a more total withdrawal of Israeli authority would be achieved at the end of a phased process, has attracted increasing support. In January 1990, Shmuel Toledano[87] published a peace plan involving negotiations with the PLO and eventual establishment of a Palestinian state. His proposal for "peace in stages" received a 60 percent approval rating in surveys of Israeli Jews, the first time a majority of Israelis had ever been found to endorse a "two-state solution."[88]

The basis of Toledano's scheme was to assure the Palestinians at the outset that, five years down the road, a fully recognized, sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip could be established. This would occur, however, only after the successful implementation of a stipulated timetable of interim arrangements and confidence-building measures. In the final stages, Israeli settlers would be given the choice of remaining in place as Israeli citizens, leaving, or becoming citizens of the Palestinian state. Although Toledano's plan explicitly ruled out transfer of expanded East Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty, the plan included provisions for separate supervision of the holy places, two sets of municipal elections, and two mayors (one Arab and one Jew).

Toledano's plan made a sovereign Palestinian state and the relative completeness of ultimate disengagement explicit, thereby challenging argument-persuadable Israelis to reexamine their preferences about acceptable outcomes. The serial decomposition aspect of the plan was its emphasis on a preimplementation basis for corroborating the workability of a Palestinian state solution. The prospect of a series of "tests" of Arab performance was meant to separate Israeli security concerns and visceral

distrust of Arabs from their acceptance of the abstract principle of Palestinian statehood. By replacing spatial division (per the Allon Plan) with temporal division, the potential for flexibility existing within the Israeli Jewish population would be brought to the surface. Finally, by promising that settlements would not be dismantled and that not until close to the end of the process would their inhabitants have to choose whether to leave or stay, the scheme was designed to remove dramatic opportunities for annexationists to rally settler and wider Israeli support for regime-challenging opposition.

An important variation on the Toledano plan was advanced by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. It too emphasized a combination of serial decomposition and preference change as a rescaling strategy, but with one crucial difference.[89] To cope with regime threats, the authors of the Jaffee plan were convinced that a disengagement-oriented government would need to be fundamentally deceptive about its real intentions, both in coming to power and in implementing its policies. To gain support among Sephardic Jewish supporters of the Likud, businessmen formerly identified with the Liberal party, and other non–ideologically committed groups within the annexationist camp, the schedule of transitional stages would be presented as a more rigorous test of Palestinian behavior, and as a guarantee of more Israeli prerogatives, than would actually be the case. In contrast to Toledano, the framers of the JCSS proposal did not depict a Palestinian state as either a guaranteed or likely outcome of even a fully successful process of "confidence-building measures" and transitional agreements, saying only that their plan did not "negate the possibility of the eventual emergence of a Palestinian state."[90]

This is not to say that the framers of this proposal did not believe in the ultimate necessity of this option, only that they judged it unwise to make that conclusion explicit. While describing their plan as a framework to encourage the evolution of change in "fundamental perceptions," and characterizing the process as contingent upon the achievement of change in these perceptions, the clear intent of the framers of the Jaffee proposal was to move the Israeli body politic toward circumstances under which the emergence of a Palestinian state solution could no longer be prevented. Thus the proposal was presented as a means of creating political and diplomatic dialectics with a very definite, but *publicly* unanticipated consequence—the reconciliation of enough Israelis to a Palestinian state so that the government in power in Israel would be able to withstand the challenges to its authority that would most likely erupt in response.[91]

Consideration of the British and French cases suggests that a serial decomposition/change-of-preferences strategy is not by itself likely to bring victory in a state-contracting war of maneuver. In both cases this com-

bination of rescaling mechanisms was present, but only as partial or failed strategies. De Gaulle used serial decomposition to deprive his opponents of strategic opportunities for mobilizing regime threats against the "abandonment" of Algeria. But this occurred during the first years of the Fifth Republic, after the centerpiece of his rescaling strategy—regime recomposition—had been accomplished. In Britain attempts to employ serial decomposition, by implementing home rule in most of Ireland followed by its implementation in Ulster some years later, failed to prevent regime-threatening mobilization. Instead the government accepted a radical spatial decomposition of the Irish problem as a means of avoiding a more severe or prolonged regime crisis. Persuasion was not an important factor during the Ireland-related war of maneuver in Britain prior to World War I.

Thus an approach based on this combination of rescaling mechanisms (i.e., one which did not rely on spatial decomposition) would appear to require those promoting disengagement to find some other source of surplus political capital with which to weather even the diminished regime crisis likely to ensue. With this in mind, the most promising route to an anti-annexationist victory in a war of maneuver might well be that pursued, in part at least, by Shimon Peres and his colleagues in spring 1990. Its salient elements comprised a sequential rescaling strategy: entry into deceptively framed negotiations to serially decompose the process of disengagement; reliance on a narrow coalition to precipitate a serious but manageable crisis or crises; exploitation of the confrontations with annexationist extremists to redefine the issue as regime stability, the rule of law, and respect for the army rather than territorial withdrawal; and finally, isolation and defeat of regime-challenging opponents of state contraction and their supporters.

As it was in the French case, and as it well might have been in the British case if Churchill had had his way in 1914, the source of needed political capital would be the tension generated by regime threats and the prerogatives accorded the government for resisting them. In Israel the idea would be to use actions by settlers or other opponents of state contraction, such as anti-Jewish terrorism, large-scale anti-Arab provocations, assassinations of political leaders, or attacks on soldiers, to justify tough measures. These might include a partial military mobilization, declaration of a state of emergency, arrest of opposition leaders, proscription of political and paramilitary organizations among the settlers and their supporters, strict press censorship, and so forth. In such a context, the government would have an excellent chance to mobilize public sentiment in support of state contraction by identifying the successful implementation of required policies as validation of the state itself and as support for legal authority threatened by civil war and institutional collapse. Talented leaders could also capi-

talize on the crisis by cultivating an image of courageous leadership acting decisively at a historic juncture to save the state from fanatic oppositionists.[92]

In Israel there are several reasons to think that this kind of high-risk, crisis-prone strategy, testing loyalties to the integrity of the regime against ideological commitments to the whole Land of Israel, would stand a better chance of contracting the state across the regime threshold than the broadly similar efforts of Churchill and Asquith in March 1914 (which failed) or even those of de Gaulle from 1959 to 1961 (which succeeded).[93] Although the contribution Israeli settlers are capable of making to a regime challenge on the issue of territorial withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza might be more substantial than that of the Europeans of Algeria, it would be less weighty than that of the Protestants of Ireland. Israelis in the occupied territories, excluding the Jewish population of expanded East Jerusalem, are a proportion of the total Israeli Jewish population that is just a bit smaller than that comprised by the Irish Protestant population in relation to the population of Britain but about 20 percent larger than the European population of Algeria relative to the metropolitan population of France.[94]

Of course equivalent population proportions would not directly translate into equivalent political potential in the context of a war of maneuver. Any regime challenge emanating from the West Bank and Gaza settlers would be spearheaded by Gush Emunim, in cooperation with activists and politicians within the fundamentalist and ultranationalist parties to the right of Likud. Unlike the rather ad hoc organizations that emerged among the pieds noirs during the first years of the Fifth Republic, Gush Emunim contains an extremely talented and experienced elite, thousands of zealous adherents, and a proven track record of sustained, disciplined political mobilization. This elite has wide-ranging political experience, giving it the self-confidence to view itself as capable of leading the state. It has intimate knowledge of and close contacts with the leadership of the National Religious party and all the parties to the right of the Labor party. Its ideological appeals are capable of justifying extreme measures to its followers and to a large proportion of the inhabitants of non-Gush-affiliated settlements. Depending on specific circumstances, these appeals have the potential to rally active support from 20 percent to 30 percent of Israeli Jews.

Although not nearly as formidable a force as the Ulster Volunteers, and although not as numerous as the pied noir militia (the Territorial Units), settlers in the occupied territories have organized well-armed paramilitary and terrorist groups. Together they possess a dense communications network, enough small arms and ammunition to supply ten thousand to fifteen thousand resistants, and a logistical and organizational infrastructure capable of being used effectively against Arabs or anti-annexationist Jews,

or to "up the ante" considerably for any government inclined toward confrontation over the future of the territories. As in the French-Algerian case, many of those active in these groups, along with other settlers, have under different Likud governments and chiefs of staff been integrated into a "civil guard." By carrying out security functions for the army in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, these individuals serve their political objectives while performing their reserve duty and achieve a politically useful blurring of boundaries between legally sanctioned patrols and paramilitary activities not sanctioned by legally constituted authorities.

The compactness, leadership, and political sophistication of Gush Emunim settlers suggest that their contribution to a regime crisis might be more substantial than that of the Europeans of Algeria. No Israeli government is likely to experience the relative ease with which de Gaulle outmaneuvered the pieds noirs, first convincing them that he was their savior, then goading European firebrands into the Barricades Rebellion, and subsequently using terrorist (OAS) excesses to eliminate most if not all metropolitan French sympathy for the Europeans of Algeria. Still, the settlers in the occupied territories do not match the solidity, discipline, and elaborate preparation for armed resistance and self-government manifested by Ulster Protestants, at least in the years 1911–14. Therefore, two of the difficulties facing the Asquith government in 1914 are not as likely to be present in the Israeli case, namely, a settler population so firmly united behind its leadership that government threats of confrontation can neither shake its determination nor spur settler extremists to engage in politically disastrous actions.

Geography is an important factor that will likely reduce the willingness of large numbers of West Bank and Gaza settlers to rally behind a violent challenge to the regime, even if faced with an explicit government policy of relinquishing the territories. Because Ireland and Algeria are separated from Britain and France by substantial bodies of water, the Protestants and Europeans in those territories had good reason to believe that political separation from the metropole would mean a transformation in their entire way of life, including, for most, a significant decline in their standard of living. Jewish settlers in the occupied territories, on the other hand, precisely because of the contiguity between Israel proper and the West Bank and Gaza Strip, know that even if they are forced to evacuate the territories and return to homes within the Green Line, they will move only a short distance, maintaining life-styles and employment opportunities that would be only marginally less attractive, and possibly even more attractive, than those to which they are now accustomed in their settlements. In other words, one ingredient in the political effectiveness of regime challenges by settlers in Ireland and (especially) Algeria, belief by the great majority of

settlers that their standards of living would be drastically reduced if the indigenous majority were accorded self-determination, is not present in the Israeli case. Indeed if the compensation offered Jewish settlers in the event of evacuation were even a substantial fraction of the funds made available to Yamit settlers in 1981 and 1982, most settler families would experience an absolute improvement in their economic situation.

In Chapter 8 the distribution of power within the antidisengagement coalition was identified as a key variable helping to explain differences in outcomes in the wars of maneuver fought in Britain and France over Ireland and Algeria. It was noted that the Unionist party in Britain fully and completely committed itself to the regime-threatening strategy of Carson and the Ulster Volunteers. Its very name connoted its fundamental commitment to maintaining British rule of Ireland, but even that objective was subordinate to its desire to return to power within a stabilized, not recomposed, regime. These characteristics were cited as contributing to a problem-decomposition-based outcome in Ireland.

In France, on the other hand, recomposition of the regime was itself the highest priority of the Gaullists—the senior partner within the antidisengagement coalition that overthrew the Fourth Republic. But as many suspected even in 1958, and as everyone appreciated soon afterward, only a minority of Gaullists were committed to Algérie française in a fundamental way. Certainly de Gaulle was not. This helped explain why regime recomposition was so much more salient as a rescaling mechanism in the French case than the British. The relative fragmentation of the main conservative party in France (the Indépendants) and its nature as a collection of notables with traditional and highly localized bases of support were reflected in the decision of most of its leaders to sacrifice what were, in fact, relatively casual commitments to French rule of Algeria in return for maintaining positions of status within de Gaulle's Fifth Republic. Of particular note is the decision of most of these *modéré* leaders in 1960–61 to rally behind legally constituted authority when confronted with revolts by settlers or army officers or with the prospect of civil war. Even more than the Unionists of Britain, the Indépendants of France were committed above all else to preserve a coherent central authority and respect for legal institutions upon which they relied to protect their wealth and status.

Of course the Likud has resembled British Unionists, French conservatives, and Fourth Republic Gaullists in its use of the problematic future of outlying territory(ies) to gain and maintain political power by fully identifying itself with campaigns to prevent disengagement. In doing so the Likud followed the direction of its organizational core, the Herut (Revisionist) movement. Herut's ancien leader, Menachem Begin, was a true believer in the principle of the whole Land of Israel, especially as

implemented west of the Jordan River. His personal commitment to the state-building enterprise in the territories as well as the commitment of his successor, Yitzhak Shamir, exceeded in intensity and sincerity the commitments of all the top British Unionists for maintaining Ireland within the Union, and the commitments of the vast majority of Gaullist and *modéré* leaders for preserving of Algérie française. Most of those forming the traditional core of Herut—followers of Jabotinsky, graduates of the Betar youth movement, or veterans of the Irgun—share these undeviating beliefs in the imperative of enforcing Jewish sovereignty over those portions of Eretz Yisrael that fell under Israeli jurisdiction following the Six Day War.

In the meantime the Likud has changed and continues to evolve. The businessmen who joined the Likud from the old Liberal party are notorious for their opportunism and are certainly no more likely than most Indépendant notables were to risk their property, status, and influence by supporting a violent challenge to regime authority on behalf of integralist or fundamentalist religious principles of territorial "completeness." Many other positions of influence in the party are now held by development town mayors and other representatives of the Sephardi community who voice the same slogans as Herut veterans but who entertain and represent ambitions for political, social, and economic advancement which play a much more determinative role in their thinking. It has often been noted, for example, how small is the proportion of Sephardi Jews within the ranks of Gush Emunim and its settlements in the territories, how weak is their identification with the settlers, and how unimportant to their political preferences are appeals to maintain the "completedness" of the Land of Israel.[95]

Support for legally constituted authority was the choice made by most Indépendant politicians and their traditional supporters in France during the Fifth Republic. Once the six-county decomposition of the Irish problem had been guaranteed, this was also the choice made by virtually all British Unionists. Since recomposition of the regime has never been an objective of Herut or Likud, and since its electoral strength is drawn from a wide range of practical interests, prejudices, and affiliations unconnected to the fate of the territories, there is no reason to expect that the Likud would in toto embrace a violent or even illegal challenge to the regime. On the other hand, substantial elements within the Likud, especially those long identified with the Herut movement, are likely to follow the course adopted by Soustellian Gaullists and the minority of modérés and MRP militants who followed Duchet and Bidault. These elements will likely endorse and even join a regime-challenging resistance movement. Together with activists within the ultranationalist and fundamentalist parties and Gush Emu-

nim settlers, they would be willing to risk regime disintegration rather than accept substantial movement toward disengagement.

The single most important element distinguishing the constellation of forces likely to determine the course and outcome of a regime crisis in Israel from conditions prevailing in Britain and France is the position of the high command and officer corps of the armed forces. In March 1914, sympathy for the Ulster Volunteers within the British officer corps was evident in the organized refusal by scores of officers in Ireland to carry out orders they believed were designed to lead to the imposition of home rule on Ulster. As noted in Part III, Britain's most prestigious retired generals participated in the organization and command of Ulster resistance forces. Sir Henry Wilson, director of military operations in the office of the chief of staff, systematically connived with Milner, Carson, and the other leaders of the Unionist regime challenge. Support for the "mutineers" at the Curragh by the officers at Aldershot military base near London created the strong impression that the army could disintegrate if ordered to force home rule on Ulster. This evidence suggests that even if Churchill's plan to provoke an Ulster Volunteer attack on British forces had worked, and even if enough units would have remained loyal to deliver a crushing military and political blow, this outcome could not have been entertained by Asquith as more than an informed and optimistic judgment. De Gaulle's careful policy toward the French army, mixing solicitousness, deceit, and reassurance with repeated purges, reflected his judgment that as of late 1958, most of the high command of the French army, a substantial proportion of the officer corps, paratroop and legionnaire regiments stationed in Algeria, as well as important veterans organizations were fully prepared to challenge him and the Fifth Republic over the principle of disengagement from Algeria. The recalcitrance of many officers in January 1960 and the army revolt of 1961 bore out his suspicions. To overcome opposition to his policy from the military, de Gaulle sought not only to isolate Algérie française officers from sources of political support within French society but also to divide the French army horizontally. In May 1961, de Gaulle successfully appealed to conscripts, over the heads of their officers, to obey the law as he and the Fifth Republic defined it and to refuse participation in the revolt.

For any Israeli government contemplating a policy likely to lead to confrontation and an annexationist-inspired regime challenge, the risks of military insubordination by a dangerously large segment of the IDF high command would be small compared to those faced by Asquith as a result of Churchill's gambit or compared to those de Gaulle did accept, and survive, from 1958 to 1961. Of course the IDF would be strained by orders to crack down on right-wing militants and cordon off or evacuate settle-

ments. But unlike the French army, with its paras and legionnaires, or the British army, with its strongly pro-Unionist political ties and its abundance of high-ranking Irish-Protestant officers, the IDF does not contain elite units, or any units, with a particular political coloration. The segment of Israeli society that is significantly overrepresented in the army's high command is the kibbutzim, whose members vote overwhelmingly for the Labor party and its left-wing/dovish allies. Though political authorities set upon a policy of confrontation with the annexationist right might well be concerned with reactions within the ranks, and will certainly expect difficulties with substantial numbers of middle-level officers, they would be unlikely to worry about a politically motivated defection of integrated units led by well-known and popular commanders.[96]

In both Churchill's plan and de Gaulle's actions, however, the decisive element was not the ability to withstand regime-threatening crises, but the mobilization of substantial new bases of positive support arising from them. By accepting the risks of bringing the latent regime challenge out into the open, each hoped to treat the crisis that would result not as a problem but as an opportunity. The accumulation of enough political capital to push the problem of state contraction past the regime threshold was to be accomplished as a result of the fears engendered among most British and French citizens, and their impulse to seek, above all else, reassurance that their lives and property would not be jeopardized by civil war or political disarray. In similar fashion, those in Israel who might try such a strategy will need to push the annexationist camp just as hard as Churchill and de Gaulle pushed their enemies in the wars of maneuver in which they were engaged. As noted earlier, provocations by extremists which would result could enable a determined government to identify the stability of ordinary people's lives, and the most valued institutions of the society, including the army, as at risk. This in turn could justify far-reaching measures to isolate the leadership of the annexationist camp and impose emergency constraints against rights of assembly and speech that might include banning threatening political parties or groups.

Indeed most oriental Jews who have voted regularly for the Likud and its allies have done so out of a traditional dislike for Labor party politicians and antipathies toward Arabs, not out of support for Eretz Yisrael hashlema. Nor do they tend to identify, politically or emotionally, with the settlers across the Green Line, whose budgets were successfully portrayed in 1992 as coming at the expense of their communities. One important sentiment that does exist within the subcultures that comprise the *edot hamizrah* (the "Eastern communities"), and that suggests the transferability of their political allegiance in times of crisis, is a desire for "a strong leader" who makes his listeners feel he is telling them the truth, no matter

what the consequences—an attraction from which right-wing politicians such as Begin, Shamir, Sharon, and Eitan have benefited.[97] Significantly, the image of "a strong leader" is precisely what a premier following the strategy outlined here would naturally project—as did de Gaulle in his dramatic radio and television appearances during the crises of 1960 and 1961 and as Churchill did in his Bradford speech (see Chapters 6 and 8).

The prognosis for successful exploitation of a regime crisis by an anti-annexationist government is also enhanced by the fact that in recent years Israeli Arabs, Russian immigrants, and ultraorthodox Jews have been the fastest growing segments of the Israeli population. Not surprisingly, Israeli Arabs strongly support establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories. In the 1992 elections, Russian immigrants voted heavily in favor of the Labor party and its secular-dovish allies. Indeed there is virtually no support among these immigrants for religious life-styles or parties and little interest in living in West Bank settlements. If large amounts of economic aid for Israel were seen to hang in the balance, if those leading the challenge were doing so in the name of religious or mystically nationalist ideological principles, and if the army's support for the political solution espoused by the government were clear, these new citizens would almost certainly rally to the side of an Israeli government facing a regime challenge.[98] Excluding the highly visible but politically unpredictable Lubavitch sect, most ultraorthodox Jews reject the Messianic claims of Gush Emunim, viewing Israel as a state like any other state (which happens to have a majority of Jews) whose laws must be obeyed so that the protection and benefits of an effective and generous government can continue to be enjoyed by the Torah-faithful. Even those ultraorthodox Jews living in thoroughly *haredi* West Bank settlements make it clear that if and when their rabbis tell them to leave the territories, they will do so without complaint or protest.[99]

Based on comparison of the British and French cases, however, it is also clear that Israeli scenarios cannot be carefully weighed without considering the character of the nationalist movement in the outlying territory(ies) and the dialectical relationship of that movement with the metropole. In the conclusion of Chapter 8 a number of factors were identified which helped explain the comparative readiness of the Irish nationalist movement to accept a fairly radical compromise of their objectives in 1921, including the spatial decomposition of the Irish problem versus the virtually unwavering insistence by the FLN on rapid and complete French withdrawal from all of Algeria (including the Sahara). The main point was that the failure of Irish Protestants to prevent the mobilization of Irish nationalist sentiment within the British political arena, the conservative influence of the Catholic church, and the British policies of land redistribution to Irish

farmers produced an Irish nationalist movement whose "physical force" wing was ultimately subordinated by a bourgeois leadership well practiced in the arts of political compromise, accommodation, and administration—a leadership whose credibility remained intact even as it joined with the British to suppress the militant wing of the movement.[100] In the French case, by contrast, a more drastic denial of political space to middle-class, professional, and religious elites among Algerian Muslims, explained by the systematic success of the pieds noirs and their metropolitan allies in preventing any effective mobilization of Algerian nationalist sentiment within the French political system, contributed to a revolutionary movement dominated by individuals outside the country and by specialists in violence. The effectiveness of these nationalist leaders depended on strict adherence to the achievement of independence for all of Algeria. Indeed they could not hope to survive anything more than minor concessions or relatively insubstantial forms of cooperation with the French authorities.

The dialectical relationship between Israelis and Palestinians has led to a Palestinian national movement whose characteristics place it, on most dimensions, somewhere between the relatively accommodative representatives of Irish nationalism, who signed and enforced the Anglo-Irish treaty, and the uncompromising FLN leadership, whose narrow range of maneuver helps account for its refusal of virtually all concessions, even in the face of staggering losses and military defeat. In general, levels of Israeli repression are less destructive than those prevailing in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 but substantially more rigorous than British policies in Ireland. From 1967 to 1992, Israel forbade free political activity to Palestinians in the occupied territories (including expanded East Jerusalem). Since Palestinians in the territories are not Israeli citizens, or even, Israeli "nationals" (as the Algerians were French "nationals"), they have not been a factor within Israeli electoral or coalition politics. On the other hand, despite constraints and repression, Palestinian professional, educational, labor, and business organizations have been allowed to function (under varying degrees of harassment). Elections within those organizations, an independent though censored Palestinian press in East Jerusalem, participation in demonstrations and symposia within the Green Line, and alliances with Israeli Arabs and sympathetic Jews have provided enough political space for leaders to arise whose skills and credibility are linked to their ability to maneuver in a complex political arena.

Confronted, however, with a series of aggressively annexationist Israeli governments, this leadership has found itself under severe pressure. Large-scale land expropriation, harsh and humiliating treatment by Israeli soldiers and settlers, deportations, and extensive use of collective punishment have left thousands of Palestinians with a personal desire for revenge,

providing Palestinian extremists with plenty of recruits for anti-Israeli or anti-Arab terrorism. Against this background, regional events such as the Iranian Revolution, the Lebanese Civil War, and the Gulf War have fueled an Islamic fundamentalist trend which rejects, in principle, the "separate-state" solution to the Palestinian problem espoused by the PLO and its supporters in the occupied territories, including (since 1987) the Unified National Command of the Uprising. With deep roots in the teeming refugee camps of Gaza and the West Bank, Muslim fundamentalists in 1992 carried out increasingly bloody and provocative attacks, on both Jews and politically mainstream Palestinians, designed to torpedo neogitations with Israel.

As in the past so in the future, popular sentiment among the Palestinians is likely to oscillate within a triangle of fury, hope, and despair. The fury of Palestinians inhibits internal or external leaders from making substantial concessions beyond agreeing to an independent state in the occupied territories as a final settlement of Palestinian political claims, and limits the maneuvering room of those willing to seek such an outcome over a long time period. Specifically, the substantial influence of Muslim fundamentalism constrains the subtlety and length of Israeli strategies of serial decomposition—a rescaling mechanism that requires "good behavior," unity, patience, and discipline from Palestinian partners as a method of camouflaging the end result of a series of interim arrangements. Israeli leaders committed to state contraction are indeed likely to be forced into a difficult choice. To prevent rejectionist extremism among Palestinian fundamentalists and others from disrupting the entire process, they will need to increase the credibility of their Palestinian interlocutors. This will require measures such as negotiations with the PLO, transfer of public land to an interim Palestinian authority, or commitments to share sovereignty in expanded Jerusalem which are themselves likely to prompt a more dangerous and less conveniently timed regime crisis than Israeli leaders would prefer to confront.

But the hope and despair of Palestinians, in contrast to their fury, suggest another kind of outcome, especially when considered in light of the development of the British-Irish relationship in the nineteenth century. The Great Famine of the 1840s cast the Irish into a pit of despair. After a generation, hopes revived as Irish nationalists, with help from British Liberals, fought for and eventually secured a place in British politics. Maneuvering between Unionists and Liberals, the Irish Home Rule party used what had become in political fact as well as in name a "binational" state (the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland) as a first stage on the way to a separate Irish state (established in most of Ireland in 1922).

In the absence of a successful process of Israeli state contraction, a

despairing Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip might well enable Israel to maintain control over these territories on a nonhegemonic basis. Palestinian hopes would then focus on a process similar to that which occurred in nineteenth-century Britain—the transformation of Israel into a binational Jewish-Arab state within which Palestinian political power might eventually organize around a movement for "home rule" or even secession. Indeed it is conceivable that within a generation a similar dynamic will unfold—that Israeli Jewish secularists, doves, and progressives, out of their own political interests, will join with Arab voters inside of Israel and Palestinian leaders from the territories to demand equal citizenship rights for all inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. If successful, such a campaign would set the stage for a new round of struggles over the shape of the state—either over the granting of political autonomy cum independence to heavily Arab areas or over a new definition of the country capable of attracting the loyalty of majorities in both the nations that inhabit it.[101]

Conclusion

The British and French cases show how difficult it has been, since the epoch of nationalism began, for "alien" states to institutionalize their rule on a hegemonic basis over large, nationally ambitious populations concentrated within historic homelands. In the contemporary period, during which the principle of national self-determination is even more strongly established as an international norm, the obstacles to successful Israeli state-building in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would seem even more daunting than those confronted earlier in this century by British Unionists in Ireland and partisans of Algérie française.[102]

I have argued that for Israel to relocate the problem of the territories across the ideological hegemony threshold would require either the conversion of most Israelis to the integralist and fundamentalist doctrines associated with Gush Emunim, the political and cultural integration of West Bank and Gaza Arabs into Israeli society, or the deportation of most Palestinian Arabs from these areas. Even its strongest advocates do not believe that Gush Emunim's redemptionist vision is capable of becoming the common sense of the mass of Israelis without the construction of international circumstances that would leave Israelis virtually no other choice. The ideological and cultural basis of Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state makes democratic integration even less plausible as a designed solution than it was in Britain for the Irish Catholics or in France for the Algerian Muslims. Finally, the wholesale deportation of Palestinians would repre-

sent an even greater insult, to even stronger international norms, by a state even more vulnerable to international pressure, than were the most repressive of British and French policies in Ireland and Algeria.

Accordingly, for all its difficulties, state contraction is the more likely route to the eventual stabilization of Israel's relationship to the West Bank and Gaza. As I have argued, this will require relocating the problem across the regime threshold. I have outlined a number of ways in which the rescaling mechanisms used by British and French leaders could be combined within the Israeli-Palestinian case to achieve such an outcome. Nothing in my analysis or my comparisons enables me to predict which of these combinations is most likely to be attempted, or whether and when any one of them will be successful. The point of the attention I have given to one particular scenario, combining realignment, serial decomposition, and utility-function change achieved within the context of a deliberately orchestrated internal crisis, is not to predict its occurrence but to highlight the conditions which suggest its relative plausibility in the Israeli-Palestinian case.

Combined with the judgment that Israel will not be able to institutionalize its control of the territories on a hegemonic basis, application of my two-threshold model predicts that Israel will not stabilize its relationship to the territories without disengaging from them, that it will not disengage from them without managing threats of regime disruption, and that the decisive stage in the process will not be the negotiation or implementation of an agreement with the Arabs, but an outcome in the struggle among Jews—the rescaling of the problem inside Israel from one that can threaten the regime to one that can threaten only incumbents.

There are two corollaries of this last point. First, diplomatic and political efforts to promote solutions based on disengagement are not important because they could lead directly to the implementation of a withdrawal-based agreement, but because they create opportunities for Israeli anti-annexationists to form winning coalitions and move decisively toward their goal. Second, the character of the process that leads to state contraction, by affecting the generosity of the arrangements for Palestinian self-determination, will determine whether or not future generations of Israelis will be left with a Northern Ireland–style problem of residual Palestinian national claims. Comparison of the British-Irish and French-Algerian relationships suggests that the higher the risks and the more decisive the Israeli moves toward state contraction in the short term, the more stable the Israeli-Palestinian relationship is likely to be in the long run.

In the meantime, both annexationists and anti-annexationists are learning more about the requirements of state-building and state contraction. With the problem of what to do with the territories located as close to

the regime threshold as it has been for most of the last decade, annexationists are learning that there is no "point of no return," no single achievement, that will give them victory in their struggle with the anti-annexationist camp. Building settlements brought them part way toward their goal, but attaining their state-building objectives in the whole Land of Israel means constructing hegemony, not settlements—images and routines, not roads and houses. One difficulty, however, is that the militant mobilization necessary to prevent state contraction at the regime threshold tends to interrupt the habits of thought and sentiment upon which a new hegemonic conception of the expanded state could be built. What anti-annexationists are learning is that Palestinians resisting the occupation must be seen as partners, not enemies, and that state contraction will mean not only winning control of the government, but managing and exploiting the more fundamental challenges that will accompany decisive steps toward state contraction.