

particular. "More or less from the end of 1960," he continues, "the State was deliberately using all the weight of its authority, all the power of coercion, and the pressures of persuasion it had at its disposal to orient opinion toward a view very different from that with which the government had always sought to engage it."⁵⁷

Contrary to Girardet's image, however, the "education" of the French public, which de Gaulle spurred and in which he actively participated, did not occur within an unchanging French state. The recomposition of the regime and the massive political realignment that redesign made possible were necessary components of a rescaling strategy featuring pedagogically induced change in value preferences about Algeria as an important, but subsidiary mechanism in the process of state contraction.

Lloyd George's Caesarism

Realignment without Recomposition. Both the UNR-supported government of Charles de Gaulle and the Lloyd George coalition between Liberals and Unionists were the result of substantial political realignments. Dominant centrist blocs replaced polarized competition over whether or not to contract the territorial scope of the state. Each "Caesarist bloc" relied heavily on the charismatic appeal of its respective architect, whose leadership was widely deemed essential to overcome a protracted national emergency.

However, the impetus for creating these blocs as well as the consequences of their formation were quite different. In France a regime crisis led toward, and was exploited to produce, regime breakdown. The rescue of the state from the chaos which seemed to threaten it produced new political capital. These resources—trust in de Gaulle's judgment, fear of the consequences of his absence, and hope for the consummation of his promises—were used effectively to recompose the regime. The calculated intent of recomposition was to change the rules of political competition so as to enhance the discretion of a centralized authority structure over all areas of public life, including the substantive question of Algeria's future. The realignment of political forces evident in the outcome of parliamentary elections and referenda, and de Gaulle's willingness to risk and ability to withstand repeated regime crises reflect the success of this strategy. Together with the pedagogic campaign described above, they permitted the relocation of the Algerian problem across the regime threshold.

In Britain, on the other hand, the regime crisis was defused before breakdown occurred. Plans for regime recomposition, harbored by Milner and other Unionists associated with him, were never given an opportunity

to become politically relevant.⁵⁸ By accepting some sort of Ulster exclusion (in principle, if not in detail) and by closing ranks in the face of a major external threat to the state (war with Germany), Unionist and Liberal leaders relocated a decomposed Irish question across the regime threshold and formed the basis for a realignment whose origins insured both the continuation of the regime and the eventual partition of Ireland.

Absent the political capital that might have been available had the Ulster crisis been allowed to develop as Churchill had intended, and without any significant change in the rules of political competition, Lloyd George was incapable of freeing himself from the Unionist party's veto over disengagement from all of Ireland—a veto it had acquired as a result of its victory in the prewar showdown. The fact is that the scope of Lloyd George's Caesarist authority was considerably narrower than that of de Gaulle's in the Fifth Republic. It was based very specifically on his value to the Unionists as a wartime leader.

In April 1915 Asquith bowed to public pressure, and the promptings of those within his own party dissatisfied with the conduct of the war, and agreed to form a coalition government with the Unionists. As described in Chapter 6, Lloyd George (with Unionist backing) pushed Asquith from the premiership in December 1916 and remained in office until October 1922. His personal success was based on a significant realignment of British political life. Using his Caesarist-style leadership, he formed a coalition between the right wing of the Liberal party (the "Ginger," or "Lloyd George" Liberals) and the great bulk of the Unionist party. In its composition, if not in its form and durability, this political bloc resembled the dominant, "national-fusionism" party it had long been Lloyd George's ambition to create. But apart from his conduct of the war, Lloyd George never had the freedom to act without consideration of immediate partisan political implications that de Gaulle enjoyed.

For British Conservatives Lloyd George was not a naturally attractive figure. His inelegant manner and plebeian origins were distasteful enough, but his populist, welfare state politics were worse. As chancellor of the exchequer Lloyd George had been the originator of the great budget crisis of 1909. His People's Budget sought to tax the wealthy to pay for social programs. For this he was vilified by the Unionist party as a destroyer of private property. He was also held primarily responsible for loss of the Lords's veto in 1911—the issue having been joined as a direct result of the upper chamber's rejection of the 1909 budget, which the House of Commons had passed overwhelmingly.

In 1916, Unionists threw their support to Lloyd George because they saw in him the only political leader able to mobilize British resources for total war. No one else seemed to have the energy, stature, and popularity necessary to discipline recalcitrant commanders and elicit the sacrifices

from British working people necessary to fight the war through to victory. But it would have been considerably more difficult, and perhaps impossible, for Bonar Law, Carson, Milner, Birkenhead, and other Conservative leaders to have swung behind Lloyd George if the Irish problem had remained the great defining issue it had been, between Liberals and Unionists, from 1886 to 1914. If achieving an Irish settlement was not a part of the tacit agreement on which the success of the wartime coalition was based, it *was* accepted that pursuit of such a settlement would be limited by the requirement that Protestant Ulster be effectively excluded from the jurisdiction of a Dublin Parliament. Even granted this condition, agreement within the coalition could not be reached over the exact terms of an Irish settlement. As shown in Chapter 6, negotiations on the Irish problem in the summer of 1916, the Irish Convention (summer 1917 to spring 1918), and policies during the Anglo-Irish War (1918–21) put significant strains on Lloyd George's personal political standing and the integrity of coalition cabinets. In response to these incumbent-level difficulties, he drew back from pressing for Irish solutions until he judged, in June 1921, that the coalition on which his political ascendancy depended would survive their implementation and that he himself would profit thereby.

Thus the political capital Lloyd George amassed in the course of leading Britain to victory over Germany was never available, or at least never perceived by him to be available, for objectives that fell substantially outside the scope of the war effort or beyond the bounds of Unionist preferences. Not until mid-1921 did Lloyd George pursue disengagement from most of Ireland with real vigor. By then the exasperating difficulty of containing the Irish rebellion had combined with the sobering experience of the world war to change the relative value Unionists placed on British rule of a united Ireland. Only then was hammering out the exact terms of Ulster exclusion a task from which Lloyd George perceived he might profit, and only then was disengagement implemented.

In France, once the substantively undecomposed Algerian problem had been moved across the regime threshold, only a single tumultuous year of negotiating the exact terms of disengagement preceded the evacuation of the Europeans and French recognition of Algerian independence. In contrast, seven years lay between crossing the regime threshold in Britain and implementing a decomposed solution to the Irish problem.

The Irish Problem Decomposed

However slow it was in implementation, decomposition of the Irish problem (rather than regime recomposition) was the political basis of Lloyd George's Caesarist bloc. Excluding portions of Ulster as a means of avoid-

ing a regime-threatening confrontation was first publicly proposed by a Liberal backbencher, T. C. Agar-Robartes, in June 1912. Four months earlier, it will be recalled, the Cabinet had rejected a proposal by Churchill and Lloyd George that to avoid a confrontation with the Unionists, parts of Ulster be temporarily excluded. But most Liberals still made light of the possibility of a regime-threatening crisis. Very few were willing to compromise on their traditional commitment to home rule for all of Ireland. Most opposed any sort of Ulster exclusion as a needless concession to Ulster Protestant bigotry and bombast. Agar-Robartes's amendment to the third Home Rule Bill was accordingly rejected.

Initial Unionist reaction was also hostile. But Unionist responses to the idea of separate treatment for "Loyal Ulster" were also colored by the realization that the general public would refuse to sympathize with Ulster Unionist resistance unless the object of that resistance were Ulster itself, and no more than that. Therefore, while continuing to oppose creation of any Dublin legislature, most Unionists avoided categorical denunciations of an Irish settlement based on the exclusion of Ulster from its terms. Some began treating it as a bad idea, but one that might be preferable to civil war and against which, at least, they would confine themselves to constitutional forms of agitation.

Another approach, adopted by Carson in 1912, was to demand that all of Ulster, including its three heavily Catholic counties, be excluded from the Home Rule Bill—an attempt to scuttle the proposal by making it as impractical as possible. By fall 1913, however, both Carson and Bonar Law were privately making known their willingness to accept six-county exclusion as the basis for a settlement. While willing to compromise on the extent of the area of Ulster to be excluded, they insisted that the exclusion be made permanent. That was the brunt of Bonar Law's proposal to Asquith during their secret meetings in December 1913. Although squabbles continued over the fate of mixed Catholic-Protestant areas in Counties Fermanagh and Tyrone, these were due mainly to the refusal of the Liberals and the Redmondites to accept arrangements guaranteeing the *permanent* exclusion from home rule of whatever area might be demarcated. Exclusion, followed by automatic inclusion in six years, unless Parliament were in the interval to change the law, was as far as the Liberals and their Irish allies were willing to go. Six-year exclusion, followed by continued exclusion of those counties voting to remain outside the Home Rule Parliament's jurisdiction, was as much as the Unionists were willing to concede. This was the specific point at issue in Unionist rejection of Asquith's offer of March 9, 1914, which preceded the Curragh episode and the Larne gun-running. It was also the main reason for the failure of the Buckingham Palace conference in July 1914.

When war erupted in August 1914, the two sides agreed to postpone their struggle over the Irish problem. When the problem resurfaced, after the Dublin Rising in April 1916, it was found to have been effectively transformed. From whether or not to create an Irish legislature for the whole island—the question that had pitted Unionists against Liberals for a generation and a half—the Irish question had been decomposed into two parts. The first of these was the problem of reaching agreement on the modalities for excluding the overwhelming majority of Ulster Protestants from Dublin's jurisdiction. The second was the extent of independence to be granted Irish nationalists in the balance of Catholic-dominated Ireland.⁵⁹

From 1916 to 1921, both of these issues were contentious. Until convinced in 1918 that some sort of Dublin legislature was inevitable, Protestant Unionists in the south of Ireland strongly resisted the exclusion of northeastern Ulster as the basis for an Irish settlement. Meanwhile the displacement of Redmond's Irish Parliamentary party by Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army, and the abstention of Sinn Fein deputies from the House of Commons, deprived Lloyd George of parliamentary support for Irish home rule. The radicalization of Irish nationalism, by making more apparent Irish demands for a thoroughly independent republic, also renewed Unionist opposition to disengagement from any part of Ireland.

Despite these difficulties, neither version of the post-1914 decomposed Irish question ever emerged as a regime-threatening problem. Neither, that is, was divisive enough to raise fears about regime stability or even to prevent alliances and coalitions among politicians with outstanding differences on the terms of Ulster exclusion or the extent of autonomy to be granted to Dublin.

Disengagement without Pedagogy. During the Anglo-Irish War (January 1919–July 1921) Lloyd George took few political risks. In public he adopted a hardline against negotiations with Sinn Fein and in favor of victory over the “murder gangs.” Only by waiting for events, public pressure, and the rising costs of military repression to convince his Unionist colleagues of the need to compromise did he finally succeed in implicating the Conservative party in a policy of disengagement from most of Ireland. By not seeking to persuade British Conservatives to see disengagement as a positive outcome, or at least as inevitable, Lloyd George minimized opportunities for rivals on his right (especially Bonar Law) to use the Irish question to replace him. Moreover, by insisting, even at the risk of a renewal of fighting, on the Irish Free State's formal recognition of the authority of the British Crown, he sought to enhance his coalition's long-term prospects by making the Irish settlement consistent with a reformed,

but still vigorous British Empire. All this represented a parochial but politically prudent strategy. When Lloyd George finally did enter negotiations with the IRA, he could be confident that the public's yearning for an end to the bloodshed, and the involvement of leading Unionists in the Anglo-Irish negotiations, would give him the whip hand over die-hard opponents of any Irish settlement.

Of course Lloyd George's political profit and the composure, not to say enthusiasm, with which the Anglo-Irish treaty was greeted in Britain came at a price. The price was paid by the Irish, mainly the Catholic Irish. The casualties they suffered during the two and a half years of the Anglo-Irish War, in addition to the even heavier losses and deeper emotional scars endured during the Irish Civil War, were due directly though not solely to Lloyd George's decision to take as few political risks as possible in achieving an Irish settlement. Aside from using his talents and his authority to begin negotiations earlier, he might (during the negotiations) have focused the desire of the British public for a settlement on the refusal of Ulster Protestants to compromise on the fate of Fermanagh and Tyrone (counties where Catholics were a narrow majority). He could certainly have insured that the boundary commission would operate to achieve a border between northern and southern Ireland more in keeping with the pattern of nationalist and loyalist habitation. He might even have led British opinion to see the practical irrelevance of arcane language in the treaty which required leaders of the Irish Free State to swear, or appear to swear, allegiance to the Crown—a condition of the treaty which, more than anything else, triggered the civil war.⁶⁰

However, just as Lloyd George did not attempt to "educate" British opinion toward a more generous Anglo-Irish treaty—one that might have been more quickly attainable and less likely to have precipitated an Irish civil war—so too had he not relied on pedagogy but on the sheer dimensions of the slaughter during World War I, and on shifts in the international landscape associated with it, to achieve a broad shift in British attitudes. By the end of the war with Germany, the British public was weary of war and sick of casualty lists.⁶¹ Certain traditional arguments against Irish separatism—that the Irish were incapable of ruling themselves and that an Irish state would endanger vital security interests of Great Britain—no longer carried much weight in a world governed by the spirit if not the letter of the Fourteen Points, and where Anglo-American military supremacy over any combination of enemies seemed absolute. Additionally, Britain's military dependence on the United States during the war had changed to economic dependence in the years immediately afterward. If satisfaction of Irish nationalist ambitions was necessary to gain U.S. favor, and if

securing U.S. loans was necessary to stave off Bolshevism, the demands of Irish nationalists could certainly be reevaluated.

Thus did the experience of the war, and the very different kind of international environment Britain encountered in its aftermath, help reduce the value Britons placed on their country's continued rule of Ireland. By 1921 these changed preferences gave Lloyd George the assurance he had wanted that objections by Unionist diehards would not pose a serious threat to his political fortunes, that is, as long as Ulster Protestants remained within the United Kingdom and the prestige of the British monarchy were preserved.

Summaries and Comparison

The relocation of the Irish problem from point C, across the regime threshold, to point D on Figure A-2, and of the Algerian problem from point H, across the regime threshold, to point I on Figure A-3 were described in Chapters 6 and 7 and analyzed in this chapter. The processes involved in accomplishing those transitions can now be summarized and compared as different combinations of the four rescaling mechanisms.

A partial recomposition of the British regime (removal of the House of Lords veto) encouraged a direct attempt to cross the regime threshold (the third Home Rule Bill). This triggered a regime crisis (1912-14) which led governing elites (beginning in late 1913) to seek to avoid future regime threats by decomposing the Irish problem (private and then public offers from Asquith for temporary Ulster exclusion). When the anti-home rule alliance (among British Conservatives, Ulster Protestants, and a substantial portion of the officer corps) insisted on the principle of permanent exclusion and mobilized for a regime-threatening showdown on that issue, the government again retreated—entering a bargaining process over the exact manner in which the Irish problem would be decomposed that lasted until the Anglo-Irish treaty was signed in December 1921. The ultimate result of that bargaining process was the grant of virtual independence to most of Ireland and full satisfaction of demands by Protestant Unionists in the six northeastern counties. This rigidly decomposed outcome was shaped by three factors. One of them was Sinn Fein and the IRA's domination of the Irish nationalist movement. The ascendancy of these groups was based on the disappearance of the Irish Parliamentary party, which could not survive the retreat of its British allies from the Home Rule Bill and their insistence on the permanent exclusion of most of Ulster. The two other factors were the realignment of Lloyd George Liberals into a Unionist-

dominated Caesarist bloc (Lloyd George's wartime and postwar coalitions), and wartime transformations in British utility functions, that is, preferences and perspectives on economic, military, and political aspects of the Irish question.

From 1954 to 1958, the Fourth Republic was severely weakened by its inability to produce a government capable of either ending the Algerian War or beginning negotiations toward disengagement from Algeria. Despite repeated attempts to enact constitutional reforms, the regime failed to recompose itself in a fashion that might have allowed it to prevent, or survive, the crisis of 1958. Exploiting the "unsolvable problem" of Algeria, an alliance among colons in Algeria, substantial portions of the French officer corps, and antiregime politicians in the metropole successfully challenged the authority of the regime and replaced it with de Gaulle's Fifth Republic. The recomposition of the regime which de Gaulle undertook centralized power by shifting the locus of authority from the Assembly to the executive. It also created electoral conditions which fostered a realignment of political competition, giving rise to de Gaulle's own Caesarist bloc—based on a dominant "Gaullist" party (the UNR). Opponents of de Gaulle's Algerian policy were kept off guard by the serial decomposition of the Algerian problem, accomplished by separating vigorous prosecution of the war from gradually less ambiguous overtures to negotiate toward Algerian independence. These latter measures were accompanied by sustained efforts to "educate" French opinion in regard to France's "true" interests—especially the relative unimportance of Algeria (as de Gaulle saw it) for France's future and its "grandeur." Although de Gaulle's policies triggered a series of regime challenges by elements of the coalition that had brought him to power, within the recomposed regime most supporters of *Algérie française* in the right-wing *Indépendant* party saw no political profit in opposing de Gaulle. Accordingly, neither the *pieds noirs* (in 1960) nor the professional army (in 1961) could draw significant public support for their antiregime activities in France itself. Drawing strength from the public anxieties produced by each successive failure to overthrow the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle moved the Algerian problem across the regime threshold without decomposing it spatially. The result was a relatively short, tumultuous, but complete disengagement of France from all of Algeria.

Comparative analysis of these two cases draws attention to certain key similarities. Both represent wars of maneuver fought to state-contracting conclusions. In both cases, crossing the regime threshold was preceded by crises precipitated by government efforts to move toward disengagement from the peripheral territory. During these crises, settlers, metropolitan conservatives, and army officers made joint extraconstitutional challenges to legally promulgated government policies. In each case territorial dis-

engagement followed the crossing of the regime threshold. In both cases this disengagement ended violent struggles between the metropole and nationalists in the former outlying territory. In both cases as well there was a drastic reduction in the internal political salience of historically prominent issues concerning the status of these territories.

Undoubtedly the most significant difference in outcomes between the two cases was France's complete disengagement from Algeria in contrast to Britain's disengagement from the "southern" twenty-six counties and the retention, within the United Kingdom, of the six northeastern counties.⁶² Other major differences between the two cases include the collapse of one French regime in the course of the war of maneuver, compared to the survival of the British regime; the absorption of substantially heavier dislocation costs by Europeans in Algeria, compared to Protestants in Ireland; and the eruption of an Irish civil war over the terms of British disengagement, compared with the difficult, but relatively straightforward assumption of power in Algeria by the FLN. These differences form a pattern, traceable primarily to the prominence of problem decomposition in the British case and regime recomposition in the French case. These mechanisms were the centerpieces of distinctive strategies of state contraction. Their use and effect reflected both elite choices and differences in the balance of forces among the protagonists—differences linked to prior characteristics of the two political systems.

Wars of maneuver, like all wars, are strategic conflicts whose outcomes are constrained by the resources available to the protagonists and the effectiveness with which they are used. Comparing strategies and decisions that were adopted or rejected by Asquith, Churchill, de Gaulle, and Lloyd George accentuates aspects of strategy, choice, and leadership style when explaining differences in outcome between Britain and France. The most important choices were Asquith's decision to retreat from confrontation with the anti-home rule coalition in 1914, versus de Gaulle's repeated decisions to confront the anti-disengagement coalition, despite the immediate threats to Fifth Republic stability he knew would result. But analysis of wars of maneuver entails consideration of prevailing constellations of power as well as of the techniques with which available resources are manipulated. The particular combinations of rescaling mechanisms through which the Irish and Algerian questions were transformed, from regime-threatening to incumbent-threatening problems, reflect prior differences in the relative weight of key political groups and the timing and extent of pressure exerted by nationalist rebels. These factors, along with important differences in geography and international context, made certain choices more likely than others and help explain why specific policies or gambits employed by actors in one case had consequences substantially

different from the results of similar maneuvers adopted by their counterparts in the other case.

Ulster Protestants versus Pieds Noirs

The Protestants of Ireland were a larger proportion of the total Irish population than were the Europeans as a proportion of the total Algerian population. Irish Protestants were also more territorially concentrated than were the *pieds noirs*. In 1911, approximately 1.1 million Protestants lived in Ireland, 25 percent of the island's population. Seventy-eight percent of Irish Protestants lived in the nine counties of historic Ulster, concentrated particularly in the six northeastern counties that became Northern Ireland under the terms of the Partition Act of 1920 and then the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921. In this area Anglicans, Presbyterians, and Methodists (virtually all loyalists) made up 60 percent of the population, while 37 percent were Roman Catholic (virtually all nationalists). In the city of Belfast, Catholics numbered only 24 percent of the population. In the twenty-six counties of what would be "Southern Ireland" under the terms of the Partition Act (and then the Irish Free State under the terms of the Anglo-Irish treaty), Protestants were wealthy and influential, but represented only just above 9 percent of the population.⁶³

In 1960 the European population of Algeria was approximately 10 percent of the total. In 1954, 80 percent of Europeans lived in urban centers, located mainly along the coast. European preferences for urban life-styles had reversed an early emphasis on rural settlement patterns for nineteenth-century immigrants from Alsace and Lorraine. In the late 1950s the urbanization of the European population was made virtually complete by the constant fear of FLN attacks against European farms and neighborhoods in rural districts. Nevertheless, the *pieds noirs* were not as compactly situated as were the bulk of Irish Protestants. In 1960 there was still a slim European majority in the city of Oran. But a major influx of Muslims from the rural areas into cities and towns produced a non-European majority in the city of Algiers and increased it in every other major urban area except Oran.⁶⁴

The various proposals for partition that were suggested envisioned establishing "French Algerian" enclaves centered around the coastal area between Algiers and Oran. But even assuming the *regroupement* of up to two million Muslims and Europeans, estimates of the population balances in these variously shaped versions of "French Algeria" anticipated a population of no more than 50 percent European (in the smallest of the projected enclaves, and under the most "optimistic" conditions) versus